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INTRODUCTION 
State secrets doctrine catapulted to prominence post-2001, as the 
executive responded to lawsuits alleging a range of constitutional and 
human rights violations by refusing to disclose information during 
discovery and, in some cases, requesting dismissal of suits altogether 
on national security grounds.1  More than 120 law review articles fol-
lowed,2 and media outlets became outspoken in their criticism of the 
privilege.3  In both the Senate and the House, new bills sought to co-
 
1 See, e.g., ACLU v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 493 F.3d 644 (6th Cir. 2007) (applying the 
state secrets doctrine as a privilege against discovery of evidence that the plaintiffs’ 
communications had been intercepted); Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 539 F. 
Supp. 2d 1128 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (holding that the state secrets privilege made issues in 
the case nonjusticiable and deprived the court of subject matter jurisdiction), rev’d, 563 
F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 2009), amended and superseded by 579 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2009), reh’g 
granted, 586 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2009), aff’d, 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc); 
Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 585 F. Supp. 2d 1233 (D. 
Or. 2008) (applying the privilege to prevent access to the government’s record); Hept-
ing v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (considering but refusing to 
apply the state secrets privilege as a disclosure or an absolute bar to action); El-Masri v. 
Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530 (E.D. Va. 2006), aff’d, 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007) (apply-
ing the privilege to bar discovery and dismiss plaintiff’s claims); Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. 
Supp. 2d 250 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (discussing the United States’ motion for summary 
judgment based on state secrets invocation, which later became moot as those claims 
were dismissed on other grounds), vacated, 585 F.2d 559 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc); Ctr. 
for Constitutional Rights v. Bush, No. 06-00313 (S.D.N.Y. filed Jan. 17, 2006) (arguing 
that the state secrets privilege interfered with plaintiff’s representation); see also SEN. 
PATRICK LEAHY, STATE SECRETS PROTECTION ACT, S. REP. NO. 110-442, at 3 (2008) 
(“[W]hat is undebatable . . . is that the [state secrets] privilege is currently being in-
voked as grounds for dismissal of entire categories of cases challenging the constitu-
tionality of Government action, and that a strong public perception has emerged that 
sees the privilege as a tool for Executive abuse.” (citations omitted)).  
2 A bibliography of secondary sources on state secrets will be posted on the web-
site of Georgetown Law’s Center for National Security and the Law after this Article is 
published. 
3 See, e.g., Robyn Blumner, Injustice Hides Behind Badge of Security, ST. PETERSBURG 
TIMES, Feb. 10, 2008, at 5P (discussing the abuse of the state secrets privilege and at-
tempts by Congress to prevent its misuse); Bruce Fein, State Secrets Abuse, WASH. TIMES, 
Mar. 13, 2007, at A16 (same); Editorial, Secrets and Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2008, at 
A18 (same); Editorial, Secure Lawsuits, WASH. POST, Mar. 6, 2008, at A20 (same); Edi-
torial, What’s a Secret?, WASH. POST, Apr. 11, 2008, at A20 (discussing the excessive de-
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dify what had previously been a common law doctrine.4  And in Sep-
tember 2009, the Attorney General introduced new procedures for re-
view and created a State Secrets Review Committee.5 
Despite the sudden explosion in scholarship and other attention 
paid to state secrets, very little is known about how the privilege ac-
tually works.  The research serving as a basis for much of the discus-
sion focuses narrowly on published judicial opinions in which the U.S. 
government has invoked the privilege and the courts have ruled on it.  
Myriad concerns follow. 
First and foremost, such analyses reveal very little about how the ex-
ecutive branch actually uses the privilege—who invokes it, under what 
circumstances it is invoked, how frequently it has been threatened, and 
to what end.  Put simply, there is a logical disconnect between looking 
at how courts rule in their final, published opinions on state secrets and 
drawing conclusions about the executive branch’s practices.6 
 
ference given to state secrets claims); Editorial, Whose Privilege?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 
2008, at A24 (same); Ben Wizner, Shielded by Secrecy, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2008, at A25 
(same); Justin Florence & Matthew Gerke, State Your Secrets, SLATE (Nov. 14, 2007, 
11:32 AM), http://www.slate.com/id/2177962 (same); Henry Lanman, Secret Guarding, 
SLATE (May 22, 2006, 3:57 PM), http://www.slate.com/id/2142155 (same). 
4 In January 2008, Senator Edward Kennedy and twelve cosponsors introduced a 
bill “to enact a safe, fair, and responsible state secrets privilege Act.” S. REP. NO. 110-
442, at 1 (2008).  In the 111th Congress, House and Senate versions of bills entitled 
the “State Secrets Protection Act,” H.R. 984, 111th Cong. (2009), and S. 417, 111th 
Cong. (2009), which would limit the use of state secrets to situations in which a signifi-
cant harm to national security was presented, require judicial review of the informa-
tion to be withheld, and demand that the Attorney General report invocation of the 
privilege to Congress within thirty days of its assertion. 
5 See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Establishes New State Se-
crets Policies and Procedures (Sept. 23, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/ 
opa/pr/2009/September/09-ag-1013.html (providing for “an internal evaluation of 
the pending cases in which the privilege has been invoked”). 
6 For a secondary work drawing conclusions about executive assertion of the state 
secrets privilege based on reported judicial opinions, see, for example, Robert M. Ches-
ney, State Secrets and the Limits of National Security Litigation, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1249, 
1249 (2007).  See also Lucien J. Dhooge, The State Secrets Privilege and Corporate Complicity in 
Extraordinary Rendition, 37 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 469, 490 (2009) (“[I]nvocations have 
increasingly sought dismissal of pending litigation rather than limitations upon discovery 
or other methods by which to shield information from public disclosure.”); Stephanie A. 
Fichera, Compromising Liberty for National Security:  The Need to Rein in the Executive’s Use of the 
State Secrets Privilege in Post–September 11 Litigation, 62 U. MIAMI L. REV. 625, 628-32 (2008) 
(discussing the rise in invoking the state secrets privilege, particularly in recent cases in-
volving the War on Terror); Amanda Frost, Essay, The State Secrets Privilege and Separation of 
Powers, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1931, 1938 (2007) (“For over two decades following Reynolds, 
the executive rarely asserted the state secrets privilege . . . . But starting in 1977, the ex-
ecutive raised the privilege with greater frequency.  Between 1953 and 1976, there were 
only eleven reported cases addressing the privilege; between 1977 and 2001 there were 
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fifty-nine reported cases.”); Meredith Fuchs, Judging Secrets:  The Role Courts Should Play in 
Preventing Unnecessary Secrecy, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 131, 134-35 (2006) (“In the 23-year span 
between the Supreme Court case that authorized use of the state secrets privilege in 1953 
and 1976, the government litigated cases involving the privilege four times.  In the 24 
years between 1977 and 2001, courts were called to rule on the government’s invocation 
of the privilege 51 times.”); Davida H. Isaacs & Robert M. Farley, Privilege-Wise and Patent 
(and Trade Secret) Foolish?  How the Courts’ Misapplication of the Military and State Secrets Privi-
lege Violates the Constitution and Endangers National Security, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 785, 810 
(2009) (explaining the competing needs of ensuring national security and encouraging 
inventors); Carrie Newton Lyons, The State Secrets Privilege:  Expanding Its Scope Through 
Government Misuse, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 99, 132 (2007) (“[C]ourts have altered the 
privilege through their jurisprudence, grafting different standards of review, refashioning 
the balancing test, and relating the privilege to the prima facie case.”).   
 Even authors who recognize that reported cases “represent a fraction of the total 
cases where the privilege is invoked or implicated” go on to suggest that broad conclu-
sions can be drawn from the smaller sample of cases.  ROBERT M. PALLITO & WILLIAM 
G. WEAVER, PRESIDENTIAL SECRECY AND THE LAW 106 (2007).  There are many student 
notes and articles following this pattern.  See J. Steven Gardner, Comment, The State 
Secret Privilege Invoked in Civil Litigation:  A Proposal for Statutory Relief, 29 WAKE FOREST 
L. REV. 567, 583-85 (1994) (“During the past twenty years, an alarming phenomenon 
has developed.  The executive has invoked the state secret privilege much more fre-
quently; though the privilege was invoked only approximately five times between 1951 
and 1970, it has been relied upon more than fifty times between 1971 and 1994.  Fur-
thermore, the privilege has increased in breadth . . . .”); Daniel J. Huyck, Note, Fade to 
Black:  El-Masri v. United States Validates the Use of the State Secrets Privilege to Dismiss “Ex-
traordinary Rendition” Claims, 17 MINN. J. INT’L L. 435, 435-36 (2008) (“The state secrets 
privilege is integral to the Justice Department’s post-9/11 counterterrorism litiga-
tion.”); Anthony Rapa, Note, When Secrecy Threatens Security:  Edmonds v. Department of 
Justice and a Proposal to Reform the State Secrets Privilege, 37 SETON HALL L. REV. 233, 235 
n.14 (2006) (“The state secrets privilege has been invoked just over sixty times since 
1953.”); Erin M. Stilp, Note, The Military and State-Secrets Privilege:  The Quietly Expanding 
Power, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 831, 839-41 (2006) (“The use of the state-secrets privilege 
has expanded in two ways:  (1) the absolute number of cases involving invocation of 
the state-secrets privilege by the government has increased; and (2) within the in-
creased number of state-secrets privilege cases, a larger percentage of those cases in-
volve dismissal of the entire case due to the claimed sensitive nature of the case.” 
(footnote omitted)); Holly Wells, Note, The State Secrets Privilege:  Overuse Causing Unin-
tended Consequences, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 967, 967 (2008) (“Bush’s Administration has 
shown an increased trend towards secrecy and the denial of public access to informa-
tion.”); Christopher D. Yamaoka, Note, The State Secrets Privilege:  What’s Wrong With It, 
How It Got That Way, and How the Courts Can Fix It, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 139, 144 
(2007) (“In the area of state secrets cases, courts have become increasingly likely to 
dismiss litigation before the merits.”); Margaret Ziegler, Note, Pay No Attention to the 
Man Behind the Curtain:  The Government’s Increased Use of the State Secrets Privilege to Con-
ceal Wrongdoing, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 691, 715 (2008) (“In recent years, the use of 
the state secrets privilege has been expanding, both in frequency of use and in the 
types of protection it provides.”).  
 Erroneous correlation between published judicial opinions and executive action 
also appears in legal briefs.  See, e.g., Motion for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae of the 
Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press at 2-3, United States v. Franklin, No. 
05-0225 (E.D. Va. Oct. 12, 2005), 2005 WL 5912060 (“[T]he federal government used 
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Second, the narrow focus on the outcome of published cases 
sheds little light on how the doctrine operates—how it influences the 
course of litigation, the range of cases in which it is used, or how par-
ties respond, such as by dropping suits early in the process in the face 
of the threatened or actual invocation of the privilege. 
Third, current scholarship provides a truncated view of how the 
courts deal with assertion of the privilege.  Omitted are the many cases 
in which the court sidesteps the question altogether or dispenses of 
the state secrets questions at an early stage in the litigation.7  Absent, 
too, are unreported and unpublished opinions (which constitute 
around eighty percent of the appellate courts’ caseload),8 as well as 
sealed memoranda and opinions.  The resultant lack of baseline anal-
 
the state secrets privilege to withhold information only four times between 1953 and 
1976, but more than 23 times since 2001.”). 
 This mistaken interpretation has also worked its way into Congressional docu-
ments.  See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 110-442, at 3 (“In recent years, the executive branch has 
asserted the privilege more frequently and broadly than before, typically to seek dis-
missal of lawsuits at the pleadings stage.”). 
7 See, e.g., In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 101 F.R.D. 97, 98 (E.D.N.Y. 
1984) (holding that assertion of the privilege was proper); see also Jabara v. Kelley, 75 
F.R.D. 475, 479-80 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (disposing of state secrets claim as one of many 
privileges asserted in discovery dispute).  Early in the In re “Agent Orange” case, the gov-
ernment invoked the state secrets privilege; on February 11, 1983, a Special Master is-
sued recommended guidelines to handle the state secrets claim, which Judge George 
C. Pratt subsequently adopted in full.  See In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 97 
F.R.D. 427, 433 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (pretrial order adopting in full the procedures out-
lined in the special master’s report).  This case, however, does not treat the state se-
crets claim in the final, published opinion and so it is not included in compendia of 
state secrets cases.  See, e.g., Chesney, supra note 6, app. at 1315-32 (listing state secrets 
cases, but notably leaving out In re “Agent Orange”). 
8 To some extent “unpublished” and “unreported” are synonymous, as both refer 
to nonprecedential opinions.  The former historically referred to opinions not in-
cluded in the main reporters.  Gradually, both Westlaw and LexisNexis began includ-
ing unpublished opinions in their databases.  Then in 2001, West Publishing intro-
duced a Federal Appendix in which the full text, along with headnotes, topics, and key 
numbers of all unpublished opinions appeared.  See Joseph L. Gerken, A Librarian’s 
Guide to Unpublished Judicial Opinions, 96 LAW LIBR. J. 475, 475 (2004) (“For many years, 
these opinions constituted a ‘hidden’ literature.”).   
 The exact status of nonprecedential opinions is of some doubt, particularly in 
light of the Eighth Circuit’s holding that a judicial rule purporting to free the court 
from the constraints of precedent is unconstitutional, exceeding the courts’ authority 
under Article III in Anastasoff v. United States, 235 F.3d 1054, 1056 (8th Cir. 2000) (en 
banc), vacating as moot on other grounds, 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2000).  See also Michael 
Hannon, A Closer Look at Unpublished Opinions in the United States Courts of Appeals, 3 J. 
APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 199, 200 (2001) (“[T]he opinions of the United States courts of 
appeals are a fundamentally important source of law.”).  But see Hart v. Massanari, 266 
F.3d 1155, 1180 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding as constitutional the Ninth Circuit’s rule ac-
cording precedential status to only selected decisions).   
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ysis makes it difficult to conclude how the judiciary treats the privi-
lege, as well as what variation occurs between the circuits. 
In addition to the narrow adherence to published judicial opi-
nions, state secrets research is marked by a lack of detailed historical 
analysis.  Modern state secrets doctrine is thus said to begin with Unit-
ed States v. Reynolds,9 a 1953 case in which the U.S. Supreme Court 
formally recognized the doctrine following the crash of a B-29 bomb-
er.  The Air Force successfully blocked the widows’ efforts to obtain 
the accident report, on the ground that its release would threaten na-
tional security.10  Without the report, the survivors could not establish 
a prima facie case of negligence.  Chief Justice Vinson wrote that re-
course to state secrets was not to be “lightly invoked,” but where for-
mally asserted by the head of a department with control over the mat-
ter, and where a “reasonable danger” to national security existed, 
information could be withheld.11  It would be up to the court to ascer-
tain whether to inspect the information in question.12 
Very few of some thirty pieces written prior to 1953 discuss the his-
tory of state secrets in depth, and outside of a handful of important 
exceptions, since Reynolds was decided there has been little historical 
exposition of the privilege prior to 1953.13  This gap in scholarship has 
 
9 345 U.S. 1 (1953).  This case created historical precedent in recognizing the 
state secrets doctrine.  Id. at 6-10.  For a thoughtful and detailed exposition of this 
case, see LOUIS FISHER, IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY 258 (2006).  See also 
Chesney, supra note 6, at 1284-86 (describing the ways in which the Reynolds court re-
jected British precedent regarding state secrets); Fuchs, supra note 6, at 168 (“Had the 
Supreme Court [in Reynolds] permitted the lower court to require an in camera review 
of the accident investigation report, it would have enabled the court to ask the military 
to explain its rationale.”); James Zagel, The State Secrets Privilege, 50 MINN. L. REV. 875, 
882 (1966) (“Almost all cases follow the leading case, United States v. Reynolds, and use 
conclusory phrases such as ‘military secrets,’ ‘strategic information,’ or ‘intelligence 
value’ to describe privileged matter.” (footnotes omitted)). 
10 Reynolds v. United States, 192 F.2d 987, 990 (3d Cir. 1951), rev’d, 345 U.S. 1 
(1953). 
11 See Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 7-10 (setting forth the reasonableness standard). 
12 Id. at 8. 
13 For important contributions to our understanding of the privilege prior to 
1953, see FISHER, supra note 9, at 6-22, which describes the development of statutory 
procedures to handle disputes against the government as they relate to state secrets).  
See also MORTON H. HALPERIN & DANIEL HOFFMAN, FREEDOM VS. NATIONAL SECURITY 
156-236 (1977) (discussing various secrecy provisions relating to matters of national 
security); Chesney, supra note 6, at 1271-80 (explaining how the state secrets privilege 
derived from “public interest” privileges in the Anglo-American common law); Zagel, 
supra note 9, at 892 (discussing the executive privilege theory, deriving from English 
law and constitutional principles); Jared Perkins, Note, The State Secrets Privilege and the 
Abdication of Oversight, 21 BYU J. PUB. L. 235, 239 (2007) (explaining that “principles 
justifying the state secrets doctrine” may have first been articulated in Marbury v. Madi-
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resulted in the proliferation of an Athena-like theory of state secrets:  
in 1953 it sprung from Zeus’s forehead, with little or no previous arti-
culation.  Thus, even the authors of some of the most important work 
on the privilege, Professors Robert Pallitto and William Weaver, con-
clude that “[i]n the United States, before Reynolds, there is virtually no 
history with the state secrets privilege.”14  This claim is wrong.  Yet it 
reverberates in the copious articles written on state secrets, where au-
thors frequently repeat the incantation:  Marbury—Burr—Totten—
Reynolds, before focusing on the “modern era.”15  This distorted view 
of state secrets has crept its way into congressional reports and judicial 
opinions.16  The lack of detailed research risks more than just inaccu-
racy—it stunts our broader analysis, such as our ability to weigh Article 
II versus common law assertions, our understanding of the courts’ his-
torical treatment of separation of powers, or the role of state secrets as 
a justiciability doctrine versus an evidentiary rule.17  And it is emble-
matic of how little we really understand this doctrine. 
 
son, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)); Ken Taymor, Note, The Military and State Secrets Pri-
vilege, 91 YALE L.J. 570, 571 (1982) (“[The] heritage in American jurisprudence [of the 
state secrets privilege] can be traced to Aaron Burr’s trial for treason . . . .”). 
14 Brief of Amici Curiae William G. Weaver and Robert M. Pallitto in Support of 
Affirmance at 4, Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 539 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008) (Nos. 06-
17132, 06-17137) (citing William G. Weaver & Robert M. Pallitto, State Secrets and Execu-
tive Power, 120 POL. SCI. Q. 85, 92-97 (2005)).  The same authors, in their book’s dis-
cussion of “The Origins of the State Secrets Privilege” in the United States, briefly dis-
cussed only a few of the early state secrets cases.  See Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 
105 (1875); King v. United States, 112 F. 988 (5th Cir. 1902); District of Columbia v. 
Bakersmith, 18 App. D.C. 574 (D.C. Cir. 1901); United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30 
(C.C.D. Va. 1807);  see also PALLITO & WEAVER, supra note 6, at 93-105 (discussing “The 
Origin of the State Secrets Privilege,” including early state secrets cases). 
15 See, e.g., Fichera, supra note 6, at 628-32 (discussing the historical origins of the 
privilege and the consequences of its increased use in recent litigation); Emily Simp-
son, “Nothing Is So Oppressive As a Secret,” 80 TEMP. L. REV. 561, 563 (2007) (discussing 
the privilege’s historic origin in Burr and Totten). 
16 See, e.g., Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 56 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (suggesting that 
the government had rarely invoked the state secrets privilege prior to World War II); 
EDWARD C. LIU, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40603, THE STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE AND 
OTHER LIMITS ON LITIGATION INVOLVING CLASSIFIED INFORMATION 2 (2009) (focusing 
solely on Reynolds as the origin of the state secrets doctrine). 
17 Compare United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 711 (1974) (“Nowhere in the 
Constitution[] . . . is there any explicit reference to a privilege of confidentiality, yet to 
the extent this interest relates to the effective discharge of a President’s powers, it is 
constitutionally based.”), United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1315 (4th Cir. 
1972) (“Gathering intelligence information and the other activities of the 
[CIA] . . . are all within the President’s constitutional responsibility for the security of 
the Nation as the Chief Executive and as Commander in Chief of our Armed forces.”), 
Rahman v. Chertoff, 244 F.R.D. 443, 454 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (explaining that the defen-
dants argued that the case is nonjusticiable because it falls under the political question 
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Legal scholars highlight the difficulty of assembling more accurate 
data on state secrets.  The government has not previously kept any 
master list detailing the cases in which state secrets have been in-
voked.18  Any effort to assemble one would have to rely on a variety of 
approaches that would likely result in an unreliable data set.19  Verifi-
cation of invocation and attribution to particular administrations 
would require research-intensive docket searches.20  And, even if a list 
were to be assembled, quantitative comparisons year-to-year hold little 
value as such litigation is deeply context-dependent.21 
These commentators are correct that many of the relevant docu-
ments are difficult to obtain.22  When found, moreover, they are often 
 
doctrine), rev’d, 530 F.3d 622 (7th Cir. 2008), vacated in part, No. 05-3761, 2010 WL 
1335434 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2010), El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530, 535 (E.D. Va. 
2006) (“The state secrets privilege is an evidentiary privilege derived from the Presi-
dent’s constitutional authority over the conduct of this country’s diplomatic and mili-
tary affairs and therefore belongs exclusively to the Executive Branch.”), and Brief for 
the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 29-30, Mohawk Indus., 
Inc. v. Carpenter, 130 S. Ct. 599 (2009) (No. 08-0678), 2009 WL 2028902 (“The state-
secrets privilege, whose origins extend to early Anglo-American law, ‘performs a func-
tion of constitutional significance, because it allows the executive branch to protect in-
formation whose secrecy is necessary to its military and foreign-affairs responsibilities.’” 
(citing El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 303 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 
947 (2007))), with Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 10 (“It may be possible to satisfy the court, from 
all the circumstances of the case, that there is a reasonable danger that compulsion of 
the evidence will expose military matters which, in the interest of national security, 
should not be divulged.”), and Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159, 1165 (9th Cir. 1998) 
(“The state secrets privilege is a common law evidentiary privilege that allows the gov-
ernment to deny discovery of military secrets.”). 
18 See Chesney, supra note 6, at 1301 (noting that the government does not keep a 
“master list” of when the privilege has been invoked); Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 14, 
at 111 (“[T]here appear to be no policy guidelines on the use of the privilege in any 
major department or agency of the executive branch.”).  This omission appears to have 
been rectified by the Obama Administration.  See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, supra 
note 5 (creating a State Secrets Review Committee and requiring “an internal evalua-
tion of the pending cases in which the privilege has been invoked”).  
19 See Chesney, supra note 6, at 1302 (“It makes little sense to compare the rate of 
assertions of the privilege in such a year to an earlier year in which few or no such oc-
casions arose. . . . [T]here is little point in asking whether the government asserted the 
privilege at an unusually high rate in any given year.”). 
20 Id. at 1301. 
21 Id. at 1301-02. 
22 See, e.g., Horn v. Huddle, 699 F. Supp. 2d 236 (D.D.C. 2010) (listing a “Motion 
to Depose Former State Department IG Investigator by Richard A. Horn” as declassi-
fied on the docket, No. 94-1756, but still unavailable on PACER); Stahl v. Baxter 
Healthcare Corp., No. 06-0865 (E.D. Mo. dismissed Jan. 29, 2009) (state secrets decla-
ration not available on PACER); Al-Turki v. F.B.I. Document Custodian, No. 06-01076, 
2007 WL 3195129 (D. Colo. Oct. 26, 2007) (unable to access records via PACER); 
Boone v. MVM, Inc., No. 05-02504, 2007 WL 549833 (D. Colo. Feb. 15, 2007) (docu-
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heavily redacted.23  Docket searches are also research-intensive:  874 
state secrets documents currently appear in Westlaw’s CourtEx-
press electronic docket retrieval service, and an additional 100 in Lex-
isNexis’s similar Courtlink service—neither of which contain complete 
docket records from the past thirty years.24  More broadly, a search of 
case holdings since 1790 returns some 700 cases in Westlaw and 
another 670 cases in LexisNexis that refer to state secrets.25  Specific 
court records, such as those obtained from the U.S. Court of Federal 
Claims (in which a significant number of state secrets cases arise), 
augment these searches.26  By supplementing the resulting documents 
with citations in pleadings, motions, briefs, memorandum opinions, 
judicial decisions, Headnote strings, legislative searches, and second-
ary source materials, enough material can be assembled to—at a min-
imum—call into question how well we really understand this privilege, 
and more positively, to suggest some new hypotheses for how the state 
secrets privilege operates. 
The resulting research reveals that the shadow of state secrets casts 
longer and broader than previously acknowledged:  more than 400 
 
ments not available via PACER); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated August 9, 2000, 218 
F. Supp. 2d 544, 547, 549 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (explaining that dates of filing and the state 
secrets privilege invocation are unavailable via PACER because it was a sealed proceed-
ing); Int’l Action Ctr. v. United States, No. 01-0072, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16874, at  
*7-8 (D.D.C. Aug. 30, 2002) (confirming the state secrets privilege invocation, likely 
between July and August 2002 when the government replied to plaintiff’s motion to 
compel discovery, but there is no access to documents actually asserting the state se-
crets privilege via PACER). 
23 See, e.g., Rahman v. Chertoff, No. 05-3761, 2008 WL 4534407 (N.D. Ill Apr. 16, 
2008) (showing that the amended memorandum opinion and order were redacted); 
Mirage Systems, Inc.’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to St. 
Clair’s Motion to Compel Production of Classified Documents at 5, 7-8, Eastman Ko-
dak Co. v. Speasl, No. 05-039164 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 5, 2007), 2007 WL 5210219 
(same); Complaint at 4-9, Doe v. CIA, No. 05-7939 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2005) (exempli-
fying a heavily redacted document). 
24 Searches conducted by author in course of research. 
25 Searches conducted by author in course of research. 
26 The Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 105(a), 96 
Stat. 25, 26-28 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 171 (2006)), established the U.S. 
Claims Court.  This judicial body inherited most of the trial authority covered by the 
Court of Claims, first created by Congress in 1855 to prevent a run on public money 
through litigation.  The Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-
572, § 902, 106 Stat. 4506, 4516 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 171), changed the 
name to the U.S. Court of Federal Claims.  The court focuses on suits brought against 
the United States rooted in constitutional or statutory challenges, contractual disputes, 
or damages related to actions other than torts.  Appeals from this court go to the Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.   
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state secrets cases emerged in the aftermath of Reynolds.27  In hundreds 
of additional cases, moreover, state secrets doctrine played a signifi-
cant role. 
Careful examination of the period from 2001 to 2009 proves par-
ticularly illuminating.  Hitherto, the intense academic and public de-
bate about the Bush Administration’s use of state secrets has centered 
on some twenty opinions issued as of 2006, with further attention on a 
handful of highly visible ongoing suits in which the outcome turned 
on state secrets.28  The central question has been whether the Admin-
istration quantitatively or qualitatively used the privilege differently 
from its predecessors. 
Setting aside for a moment our limited knowledge about what ac-
tually did come before, critiques and defenses have been made too 
hastily, as much of the commentary came prior to the close of the 
 
27 These numbers are significantly different from those that currently mark both 
scholarship and public discourse.  See, e.g., ACLU OF MASS., RESTORING THE RULE OF 
LAW SCORECARD:  PRESIDENT OBAMA’S FIRST YEAR IN OFFICE 3 (2010), available at 
http://aclum.org/scorecard/archive/obama_first_year.pdf (“The Bush Administra-
tion invoked ‘state secrets privilege’ 20 times in its first 6 years.  The Obama Adminis-
tration has used it twice in its first 60 days.”); Chesney, supra note 6, at 1298 (citing da-
ta that estimates there were eighty-nine published opinions in state secrets cases from 
1954 to 2006); Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 14, at 101, 109 (tallying fifty-five uses of 
the privilege from between 1953 and 2001 and seven since 2001). 
28 See, e.g., Chesney, supra note 6, at 1301 (“The available data do suggest that the 
privilege has continued to play an important role during the Bush administration, but it 
does not support the conclusion that the Bush administration chooses to resort to the 
privilege with greater frequency than prior administrations or in unprecedented substan-
tive contexts.”).  Chesney goes on to list twenty published opinions from 2001 to 2006.  
Id. app. at 1329 -32; see also FISHER, supra note 9, at 245 (“The political climate after 9/11 
has emboldened the government to assert state secrets in an increasing number of cas-
es.”); Frost, supra note 6, at 1935 (discussing “how the Bush Administration’s assertion of 
the privilege differs from past practice”); Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 14, at 108 (“Presi-
dent George W. Bush’s administration seems even more committed to secrecy and main-
tenance of executive power than previous administrations . . . .”).   
 For prominent ongoing cases centered on rendition, see Mohamed v. Jeppesen 
Dataplan, Inc., 563 F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d, 563 F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 2009), 
amended and superseded by 579 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2009), reh’g granted, 586 F.3d 1108 (9th 
Cir. 2009), aff’d, 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc); El-Masri v. United States, 
479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007); and Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250 (E.D.N.Y. 
2006), vacated and superseded by 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc).  For those cases 
associated with the National Security Agency’s (NSA) warrantless wiretapping pro-
gram, see Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 539 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008); ACLU v. Nat’l Sec. 
Agency, 493 F.3d 644 (6th Cir. 2007); Al-Haramain Islamic Found. v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Treasury, 585 F. Supp. 2d 1233 (D. Or. 2008); and Ctr. for Constitutional Rights v. 
Bush, No. 06-0313 (S.D.N.Y. filed Jan. 17, 2006).  
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Administration.29  These analyses ignored the time it takes for such 
cases to work their way through the courts, attributing cases that arose 
under previous administrations to the current government and ignor-
ing ongoing cases that had yet to be decided.30  They omitted many 
unpublished, unreported, and sealed cases, as well as suits voluntarily 
dismissed.  Missing too were cases in which either the government or 
private actors threatened state secrets, but the executive refrained 
from invoking it, or where the executive did invoke it, but the issue 
did not work its way into the final judicial opinion. 
In contrast, docket searches demonstrate that, from January 2001 
to January 2009, the privilege played a significant role in the executive 
branch’s national security litigation strategy.  In one case, the Admin-
istration asserted the state secrets privilege some 245 times.31  More to 
the point, the government has invoked the state secrets privilege in 
more than 100 cases, which is more than five times the number of cas-
es previously considered.  And it is not just the executive branch that 
benefitted from the privilege:  in scores of additional cases, private in-
dustry claimed that the state secrets doctrine applied, with the expec-
tation that the federal government would later intervene to prevent 
certain documents from being subject to discovery or to stop the suit 
from moving forward.  Beyond these, there are hundreds of cases on 
which the shadow of the privilege fell. 
This Article thus focuses on cases working their way through the 
courts between 2001 and 2009.  It begins with disputes related to gov-
ernment contractors, where the threatened and actual invocation of 
the privilege appears in a broad range of grievances.  Breach of con-
tract, patent disputes, trade secrets, fraud, and employment termina-
tion cases prove remarkable in their frequency, length, and range of 
technologies involved.  Wrongful death, personal injury, and negli-
 
29 For similar critiques of the Obama Administration, see Steven D. Schwinn, The 
State Secrets Privilege in the Post-9/11 Era, 30 PACE L. REV. 778 (2010).  “[T]he Govern-
ment’s new position [of expanding the state secrets privilege], first under President 
Bush and now under President Obama, marks an important and disturbing change in 
how it considers and treats the privilege.”  Id. at 779. 
30 Professor Chesney recognizes this problem and the consequent difficulty in 
narrowing the scope for attribution.  He explains that even if a list of state secrets cases 
could be assembled, “difficult questions of political attribution arise.  Particularly with 
respect to cases identified by virtue of . . . circuit court opinions published in the first 
or second year of a presidential administration, it may well be the case that the original 
invocation of the privilege occurred under the prior administration.”  Chesney, supra 
note 6, at 1301.  
31 Int’l Action Ctr. v. United States, No. 01-0072, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16874, at 
*7 (D.D.C. Aug. 30, 2002).  
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gence cases extend beyond product liability to include infrastructure 
and services, as well as an emerging area perhaps best understood as 
the conduct of war. 
These corporate cases are distinguished by the tendency of com-
panies to claim that state secrets are at stake early in the dispute and 
the subsequent role of the United States, if it chooses to become in-
volved and to invoke the privilege, as an intervenor.  Close inspection 
suggests a conservative executive branch that is more likely to step 
forward when breach of contract, trade secrets, or patent disputes 
present themselves, and unlikely—once it invokes the privilege—to 
back down.  Where the executive initially decides not to intervene and 
invoke the privilege, the rapid expansion of the use of contractors ap-
pears to be giving birth to a new form of “graymail”:  should the gov-
ernment initially refuse to support the corporation’s state secrets 
claim, companies deeply embedded in the state may threaten to air 
legally or politically damaging information.32  Even when no overt 
threat is made, the government may worry that certain information 
will emerge during the course of the trial that would politically com-
promise the agency or individuals involved.  In other cases, the gov-
ernment may be dependent upon a corporation for a key aspect of na-
tional defense, thus creating an incentive for the state to protect the 
company from financial penalties associated with bad behavior.33 
The Article next turns to the telecommunications cases that arose 
from the warrantless wiretapping program of the National Security 
Agency (NSA).  More than fifty such suits emerged between 2006 and 
2009, with the government acting variously as plaintiff, intervenor, 
and defendant.  Although many of these cases ultimately turned on 
amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA),34 
state secrets assertions grounded on a closely held executive branch 
jurisprudence played a key role throughout.  These cases shed light 
 
32 I use the term “graymail” differently here from the manner in which it was used 
prior to the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA), 18 U.S.C. app. §§ 1–16 
(2006).  See infra text accompanying notes 682-85.  
33 To distinguish between claims by corporations in which state secrets will be im-
plicated (generally in the form of an affirmative defense) and the government’s actual 
invocation of the privilege, I use the verb “claim” for the former and “invoke” for the 
latter.   Later in the Article, for cases where the government asserts the state secrets 
privilege but does not formally invoke it, I similarly use the word “claim.”  These terms, 
of course, are to be distinguished from courts actually upholding the privilege itself. 
34 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. 
No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 50 
U.S.C.). 
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on the parallel effect of state secrets, with similar treatment for suits in 
which the privilege is never formally invoked.  They also bring to the 
fore the constitutional questions that accompany the privilege. 
Following this discussion, the Article looks at disputes in which the 
government defended the suit and invoked state secrets.  These cases 
stem from allegations of Fourth and Fifth Amendment violations, tor-
ture, environmental degradation, breach of espionage contracts, and 
defamation.35  Here, it appears that state secrets serve not just to pro-
tect national security interests, but also to mask officials’ unlawful be-
havior.  As in the corporate cases and the telecommunications suits, 
the executive does not change its course once it invokes the privilege.  
Significant advantages, quite apart from the suppression of particular 
documents or the dismissal of a suit altogether, accompany the asser-
tion of the privilege and affect motions, attorney-client communica-
tions, and control over discovery.  The privilege may also give the gov-
ernment access to opposing counsel’s files, if and when the attorney 
tries to withdraw from the case. 
Despite Judge Learned Hand’s admonition in United States v. An-
dolschek that the government must choose either to prosecute or to 
drop criminal charges,36 the state secrets privilege has also played a 
role in the criminal context and provides the basis for Part IV.  Re-
markably, in two cases—quite apart from Chief Justice Vinson’s re-
quirement in Reynolds that the state secrets privilege be formally in-
voked—the executive did not even need to formally invoke the 
privilege.37  Instead, the court simply read into the case that the privi-
lege had been invoked and, therefore, applied. 
Collectively, these cases underscore the importance of looking 
more carefully at how the state secrets doctrine works in practice.38  
 
35 Immigration disputes are not included in this discussion.  As there are prece-
dents for state secrets arising in this context, further research specifically focused on 
the use of the privilege in immigration proceedings may be warranted.  See, e.g., Yang v. 
Reno, 157 F.R.D. 625, 632 (M.D. Pa. 1994) (explaining that the government moved for 
a protective order limiting discovery based in part on state secrets); United States v. 
Koreh, 144 F.R.D. 218, 222-24 (D.N.J. 1992) (holding that disclosure of documents re-
lating to the Soviet bloc’s alleged disinformation campaign against an Eastern Euro-
pean emigrant would threaten U.S. national security). 
36 United States v. Andolschek, 142 F.2d 503, 506 (2d Cir. 1944). 
37 See United States v. Stewart, 590 F.3d 93, 98 (2d Cir. 2009); United States v. Aref, 
533 F.3d 72, 76 (2d Cir. 2008).  
38 This Article focuses on instances in which the U.S. state secrets doctrine has 
been invoked.  In the course of my research, I found dozens of further cases in which 
corporations asserted foreign countries’ state secrets.  See, e.g., City of Emeryville & 
Emeryville Redevelopment Agency’s Opposition to Sherwin Williams’ Motion to En-
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They challenge the dominant paradigm, which tends to cabin state se-
crets as an evidentiary rule within executive privilege.39  They suggest 
 
force November 25, 2008 Court Order and for Judgment of Civil Contempt at 20, City 
of Emeryville v. Elementis Pigments, Inc., No. 39-03719 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2009), 
2009 WL 1248140 (distinguishing, on a motion opposing sanctions for bad faith, a case 
in which a corporate arm of the Chinese government was sanctioned for failing to 
comply with discovery and for asserting the state secrets privilege in an untimely fa-
shion) (citing Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants, 959 F.2d 1468, 1471-79 
(9th Cir. 1992); Verified Shareholder Derivative Complaint at 18, Knopf v. Semel, No. 
08-04538 (N.D. Cal. July 30, 2008), 2008 WL 4066973 (arising out of Yahoo’s agree-
ment with China to enable China to monitor Internet activity, leading to the arrest of 
two democracy advocates by China for allegedly divulging state secrets); Amec Inc.’s 
Reply Brief in Support of Its Motion to Dismiss Applied’s First Amended Complaint at 
11-12, Applied Materials, Inc. v. Advanced Micro-Fabrication Equip., Inc. China, 630 F. 
Supp. 2d 1084 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (No. 07-05248), 2008 WL 1912916 (mentioning the 
Chinese state secrets laws governing exports in arguing for a Chinese forum for the 
litigation); Defendant Yahoo!, Inc.’s Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion to Initiate Initial 
and Jurisdictional Discovery at 5 n.2, Xiaoning v. Yahoo!, Inc., No. 07-02151 (N.D. Cal. 
Oct. 11, 2007), 2007 WL 4357951 (noting that pursuing discovery recommended by 
plaintiffs would expose defendants to legal sanction for disclosing what the China con-
siders to be state secrets); Memorandum of Law of J.V. Trading (Glendale) Inc. and 
Jeffrey Liu in Support of Motion (1) to Dispense with Jurisdictional Hearing, as Jianli-
bao Group Has Waived the Defense of Lack of Personal Jurisdiction Except for Alleged 
Improper Service of Process, and (2) in the Alternative, to Compel Discovery on Juris-
dictional Issues at 15-16, JLB Holdings (HK) Co. v. Qishu, No. 03-600705 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
Aug. 31, 2004), 2004 WL 3320503 (referring to the “Chinese State Secret Law” objec-
tion plaintiffs asserted twenty-eight times in their “General Objections” and separate 
objections); Response of Trans Chemical Limited to CMC’s Objections and Emergency 
Motion for Protective Order and Expedited Hearing, In re Arbitration Between Trans 
Chemical Ltd. & China Nat’l Mach. Imp. & Exp. Corp., 978 F. Supp. 266 (S.D. Tex. 
1997) (No. 95-4114), 1997 WL 33832255 (discussing Chinese state secrets laws as used by 
the respondent to argue that the discovery sought by the petitioner was illegal).  In addi-
tion to China (to which the previous examples refer), my docket searches have unco-
vered that state secrets have been asserted with regard to the Gambia, Georgia, Iran, In-
donesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Peru, the Philippines, Russia, Switzerland, and Venezuela. 
39 See, e.g., Mauro Cappelletti & C.J. Golden, Jr., Crown Privilege and Executive Privi-
lege:  A British Response to an American Controversy, 25 STAN. L. REV. 836, 841 (1973) (de-
tailing the role of English courts in balancing the executive interest in withholding 
sensitive information against the interests of the litigants in the case); Paul A. Freund, 
Foreword:  On Presidential Privilege, 88 HARV. L. REV. 13, 20 (1974) (“A . . . possible mean-
ing of executive privilege is . . . an exemption from a duty to produce testimony or 
documents and a legal capacity to control the production of certain kinds of evidence 
by others.”); Paul Hardin, III, Executive Privilege in the Federal Courts, 71 YALE L.J. 879, 
879 (1962) (“In the eyes of the executive departments . . . of the United States Gov-
ernment . . . [t]he executive branch has uncontrolled discretion to withhold from the 
courts anything whose disclosure would be inimical to the public interest or even, it 
seems, to the best interest of the executive.” (footnote omitted)); Neil Kinkopf, Execu-
tive Privilege:  The Clinton Administration in the Courts, 8 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 631, 634 
(2000) (“When the President asserts the privilege in a judicial proceeding, the courts 
understand the battle line to be drawn between the President’s constitutional powers 
and those of the Judiciary.  This assumption, however, is a misunderstanding.”); Heidi 
Kitrosser, Secrecy and Separated Powers:  Executive Privilege Revisited, 92 IOWA L. REV. 489, 
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in contrast that the doctrine has evolved to become a powerful litiga-
tion tool, wielded by both private and public actors.  It has been used 
to undermine contractual obligations and to pervert tort law, creating 
a form of private indemnity for government contractors in a broad 
range of areas.  Patent law, contracts, trade secrets, employment law, 
environmental law, and other substantive legal areas have similarly 
been affected, even as the executive branch has gained significant and 
unanticipated advantages over opponents in the course of litigation.  
Ascertaining how the doctrine actually works is not, in itself, a norma-
tive enterprise.  It thus falls to future articles to consider structural 
and procedural devices to ensure that the manner in which the state 
secrets privilege operates mirrors the purpose for which it was created. 
I.  GOVERNMENT CONTRACTORS AND STATE SECRETS 
The increasingly intricate relationship between national defense, 
private industry, and technology provides the framework for scores of 
 
493 (2007) (concluding that the executive privilege is not constitutionally based and 
the courts should order compliance with statutorily proper demands for information 
from the executive); William W. Lentz, Executive Privilege to Withhold Information from 
Congress:  Constitutional or Political Doctrine?, 42 UMKC L. REV. 374, 375 (1974) (“Li-
mited judicial participation in the development of the doctrine of executive privilege 
has resulted in a doctrine molded by political expediency and by the distribution of 
power between the President and Congress as much as by constitutional theory.”); Na-
thaniel L. Nathanson, Commentary, From Watergate to Marbury v. Madison:  Some Reflec-
tions on Presidential Privilege in Current Historical Perspectives, 16 ARIZ. L. REV. 59, 73-77 
(1974) (explaining the immediate effect of the presidential privilege on the Watergate 
scandal, as well as the long-term effect of the privilege on the presidency and the sepa-
ration of powers); Mark J. Rozell, Executive Privilege Revived?:  Secrecy and Conflict During 
the Bush Presidency, 52 DUKE L.J. 403, 419-20 (2002) (arguing that the use of executive 
power during President George W. Bush’s presidency deviated from its traditional use, 
ultimately weakening it); Mark J. Rozell, Restoring Balance to the Debate over Executive Pri-
vilege:  A Response to Berger, 8 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 541, 550-55 (2000) (arguing that 
executive privilege is a legitimate power under the Constitution); Jonathan Turley, Pa-
radise Lost:  The Clinton Administration and the Erosion of Executive Privilege, 60 MD. L. REV. 
205, 211 (2001) (emphasizing that executive privilege must be reformed to repair the 
“damage to the presidency itself” in the wake of the Clinton scandal); John F. Dodge, 
Jr., Recent Decision, 53 MICH. L. REV. 1178, 1188 (1955) (“[S]ome courts have given 
such great weight to the executive request for secrecy as to almost nullify the effective-
ness of the judicial determination.”); Timothy V. Ramis, Comment, Executive Privileges:  
What Are the Limits?, 54 OR. L. REV. 81, 90-96 (1975) (delineating the scope of executive 
privilege and the various legal issues that arise when the privilege is claimed); Taymor, 
supra note 13, at 583-89 (suggesting alternative means for the executive to protect state 
secrets while minimizing the imposition on individual rights).  But see JAMES E. BAKER, 
IN THE COMMON DEFENSE 48-49 (2007) (arguing that state secrets is more than an evi-
dentiary rule within executive privilege and is an absolute privilege that can be used in 
what might otherwise be a justiciable case). 
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lawsuits that have arisen during the War on Terror.  Somewhat surpri-
singly, very little attention has been paid to this litigation.  Yet such 
suits are hardly new.  In the early twentieth century, the judiciary con-
fronted issues arising from government contractors’ construction of 
weapons and military vessels.  Thus, in addition to the more tradition-
al area of libel,40 cases like In re Grove, Pollen v. United States, and Pollen 
v. Ford Instrument Co. alleged patent infringements and resulted in the 
invocation of the state secrets privilege.41 
As technology advanced and the threat of the Cold War loomed, 
the government sought new and more varied relationships with pri-
vate companies, driving national security deeper into the public do-
main.  In 1950, National Security Council Report 68 became the blue-
print for U.S. strategy, calling for “a rapid and sustained build-up of 
the political, economic, and military strength of the free world.”42  The 
United States would need to draw on its industrial strength for suc-
cess.  In his famous farewell address in January 1961, President Dwight 
D. Eisenhower explained: 
A vital element in keeping the peace is our military establishment . . . . 
This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms 
industry is new in the American experience.  The total influence—
economic, political, even spiritual—is felt in every city, every statehouse, 
every office of the federal government.  We recognize the imperative 
need for this development.  Yet we must not fail to comprehend its grave 
implications.  Our toil, resources, and livelihood are all involved; so is 
the very structure of our society . . . . Only an alert and knowledgeable ci-
tizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and mili-
 
40 See, e.g., Pac.-Atl. S.S. Co. v. United States, 175 F.2d 632 (4th Cir. 1949) (libel in 
admiralty); Republic of China v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 142 F. Supp. 551 (D. Md. 
1956) (same); Cresmer v. United States, 9 F.R.D. 203 (E.D.N.Y. 1949) (libel against the 
Navy under the Federal Tort Claims Act); Wunderly v. United States, 8 F.R.D. 356 (E.D. 
Pa. 1948) (libel against the Armed Forces under the Federal Tort Claims Act); Anglo-
Saxon Petroleum Co. v. United States, 78 F. Supp. 62 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 1948) (libel in ad-
miralty); State ex rel. Kent v. United States, 1947 A.M.C. 1336 (D. Md. 1947) (libel against 
the Navy under the Public Vessels Act and Federal Tort Claims Act); The Wright, 2 F. 
Supp. 43 (E.D.N.Y. 1932) (libel against the Navy in admiralty). 
41 See In re Grove, 180 F. 62 (3d Cir. 1910) (patent infringement for torpedo 
boats); Pollen v. United States, 85 Ct. Cl. 673 (1937) (patent infringement for gun 
sightings components); Pollen v. Ford Instrument Co., 26 F. Supp. 583 (E.D.N.Y. 1939) 
(same); see also United States v. Haugen, 58 F. Supp. 436, 438 (E.D. Wash. 1944) (“The 
right of the Army to refuse to disclose confidential information, the secrecy of which it 
deems necessary to national defense, is indisputable.”).  
42 NAT’L SEC. COUNCIL, NSC-68:  A REPORT TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL BY 
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ON UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES AND PROGRAMS FOR NATIONAL 
SECURITY 64 (1950), available at http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_ 
collections/coldwar/documents/pdf/10-1.pdf. 
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tary machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so that 
security and liberty may prosper together.
43
 
Many trends mark the evolution of the relationship between gov-
ernment and private corporations.  Two are of particular importance 
to state secrets considerations.  First is the increasing formalization of 
secrecy protections to control information.44  Thus, in 1954, the 
Commerce Department established the Office of Strategic Informa-
tion to work with companies to limit the dissemination of informa-
tion.45  Simultaneously, the Department of Defense (DoD) issued a 
regulation advising defense contractors to avoid publishing informa-
tion of “possible use” to enemy states.46  By 1960, these arrangements 
had become formalized in a new system of classification specifically 
targeted at industry.47  Executive Order 10,865 provided for the classi-
fication of bidding on, negotiating, awarding, performing, or termi-
nating contracts with federal agencies, as well as for allowing private 
actors to have access to classified information.48  Subsequent orders 
extended and defined the relationship between the executive and pri-
vate companies.49  The end of the Cold War neither weakened public-
private relations nor diminished efforts to protect national security in-
 
43 President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Farewell Address to the Nation ( Jan. 17, 1961). 
44 The following discussion omits efforts to restrict media access to and coverage 
of government activities.  
45 JAMES RUSSELL WIGGINS, FREEDOM OR SECRECY 102-03 (1964). 
46 Id. at 110. 
47 The broader twentieth-century development of the classification system falls 
beyond the scope of this Article.  Its development can be traced through past executive 
orders.  See Exec. Order No. 10,290, 3 C.F.R. 789 (1949–1953) (extending military clas-
sification to civilian departments and agencies for the first time and establishing four 
classification categories); Exec. Order No. 10,501, 3 C.F.R. 979 (1949–1953), reprinted 
as amended in 50 U.S.C. § 401 (1970) (revoking Exec. Order No. 10,290 and establish-
ing the Confidential, Secret, and Top Secret classifications in order to safeguard offi-
cial information); Exec. Order No. 11,652, 3 C.F.R. 678 (1971–1975), reprinted as 
amended in 50 U.S.C. § 401 (Supp. III 1973) (creating new procedures for classification 
and declassification of national security information and revoking Exec. Order No. 
10,501); see also Developments in the Law—The National Security Interest and Civil Liberties, 
85 HARV. L. REV. 1130, 1189-90 (1972) (discussing the classification of government 
documents for national security purposes). 
48 Exec. Order No. 10,865, 3 C.F.R. 398 (1959–1963), reprinted as amended in 50 
U.S.C. § 435 (2006). 
49 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 10,909, 26 Fed. Reg. 508 ( Jan. 17, 1961) (defining and 
amending Exec. Order 10,865); Exec. Order No. 11,382, 32 Fed. Reg. 16247 (Nov. 28, 
1967) (changing all mentions of the Federal Aviation Agency to referencing the Depart-
ment of Transportation with regard to classified information); Exec. Order No. 12,038, 
43 Fed. Reg. 4957 (Feb. 3, 1978) (transferring the functions of the Atomic Energy Com-
mission to the Department of Energy and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission). 
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formation held by third parties.  To the contrary, in 1993, the execu-
tive formally established a robust National Industry Security Program 
to safeguard classified information released to contractors, licensees, 
and grantees of the federal government.50 
While these devices centered on public-private contractual rela-
tions, new legislation extended the executive’s ability to control non-
contractual entities to private actors that held information central to 
national security.  Following World War II, the Invention Secrecy Act 
became the first peacetime measure to restrict private actors’ inven-
tions in the name of national security.51  Between 1963 and 1979, the 
annual number of secrecy orders placed on inventions derived from 
government contracts hovered between 4100 and 5100.52  During the 
following decade, the total number of secrecy orders increased signifi-
cantly.53  Since that time, the number of annual secrecy orders has ho-
vered around 5000 per year.54 
Beyond secrecy orders, the Atomic Energy Act tethered nuclear 
technologies to the national interest, classifying such discoveries from 
birth.55  Both benign and nefarious explanations for the increase in 
secrets and secrecy orders abound.  The numbers could be equally 
tied to the growth of the bureaucratic state and the government’s 
growing dependence on technology rather than attributing the in-
crease to information control.  But, in the context of this Article, such 
 
50 See Exec. Order No. 12,829, 58 Fed. Reg. 3479 ( Jan. 6, 1993), as amended by Ex-
ec. Order No. 12,885, 58 Fed. Reg. 65863 (Dec. 14, 1993). 
51 Invention Secrecy Act of 1951, Pub. L. No. 82-256, 66 Stat. 3 (codified as 
amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 181–188).  
52 See H.R. REP. NO. 96-1540, at 62 (1980) (“According to Patent Office records, 
the number of secrecy orders climbed to 6,149 by December 31, 1958, dropped to 
4,503 at the end of 1963, and rose to 5,092 at the end of 1967.  On January 1, 1971, 
there were 5,006 secrecy orders in force.  The number declined to 4,887 at the begin-
ning of 1973, to 4,145 at the beginning of 1976, and to 4,109 at the outset of 1978.”).   
53 See Gary L. Hausken, The Value of a Secret:  Compensation for Imposition of Secrecy 
Orders Under the Invention Secrecy Act, 119 MIL. L. REV. 201, 202 n.10 (1988) (showing 
3513 orders in effect in 1979); Letter from Robert Fawcett, Program Analyst, U.S. Pa-
tent & Trademark Office, to Steven Aftergood, Fed’n of Am. Scientists (Oct. 22, 2004), 
available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/invention/stats.pdf (showing a total of 
5556 orders in 1989). 
54 See LAURA K. DONOHUE, THE COST OF COUNTERTERRORISM 299 (2008) (track-
ing the number of secrecy orders since 1950); Letter from Robert Fawcett to Steven 
Aftergood, supra note 53; Steven Aftergood, Invention Secrecy Activity, as Reported by the 
Patent and Trademark Office, FED’N OF AM. SCIENTISTS, http://www.fas.org/sgp/ 
othergov/invention/stats.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2010). 
55 Atomic Energy Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-585, § 10, 60 Stat. 755, 766-68 (codi-
fied as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2161–2166 (2000)) (restricting the dispersal of data 
relating to atomic energy use or technology). 
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arguments are less important than the fact of the expansion, as these 
and other executive orders and statutory devices became intimately 
linked to state secrets assertions:  when such devices are implicated in 
suits, the state secrets privilege often attends.56  The privilege has thus 
become part of a broader framework through which the government 
tries to limit its vulnerability. 
A second trend deserving of notice is the increasingly complex rela-
tionship between private industry and the national security establish-
ment.  In the context of state secrets, this relationship plays out in a few 
important ways.  For one, our understanding of national interest and 
homeland security has expanded, involving a broader spectrum of 
companies implicating national security concerns.  Thus corporations 
owning any part of the critical information infrastructure, such as bio-
tech firms with insight into biologically engineered diseases, high-
technology companies with access to double-key encryption codes, firms 
that log flight plans, and mobile telephone service providers become 
central to national defense.  Proliferating points of contact have created 
the potential for an increasing number of disputes.57 
The increasing complexity also plays out in a deeper role for pri-
vate industry within the military domain:  it is not just the companies 
which manufacture weapons or build battleships that contribute to 
U.S. national security, but also corporations that fight, train forces, 
collect intelligence, and carry out special operations under contract.  
Such private military companies (PMCs) maintain a corporate struc-
 
56 See, e.g., Clift v. United States, 597 F.2d 826 (2d Cir. 1979) (affirming that doc-
uments in a lawsuit under the Invention Secrecy Act were not discoverable on state se-
crets grounds); Halpern v. United States, 258 F.2d 36, 38 (2d Cir. 1958) (alleging a 
lawsuit under the Invention Secrecy Act involved state secrets); Foster v. United States, 
12 Cl. Ct. 492, 493 (1987) (same); AT&T Co. v. United States, 4 Cl. Ct. 157, 158 (1983) 
(upholding state secrets privilege in lawsuit under the Invention Secrecy Act). 
57 See, e.g., United States v. Haugen, 58 F. Supp. 436, 431-38 (E.D. Wash. 1944) 
(arising in the course of the Manhattan Project), aff’d, 153 F.2d 850 (9th Cir. 1946); 
Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Haw./Peace Educ. Project, 454 U.S. 139, 146-47 
(1981) (concerning the storage of nuclear weapons).  For discussion of the growing 
relationship between government and industry in the twentieth century, see SEYMOUR 
MELMAN, PENTAGON CAPITALISM 71-96 (1970), which explains the Pentagon’s in-
volvement with private means of production.  See also CHALMERS JOHNSON, THE SOR-
ROWS OF EMPIRE 131-49 (2004) (tracking the United States military’s use of private 
contractors); C. WRIGHT MILLS, THE POWER ELITE 169 (1956) (“[T]he distinction be-
tween the political and the economic man has been diminishing . . . . [M]ore and 
more of the corporate executives have entered government directly; and the result has 
been a virtually new political economy . . . .”); THE WAR ECONOMY OF THE UNITED 
STATES 1-8 (Seymour Melman ed., 1971) (discussing the effect of the military-industrial 
firm on industrial capitalism). 
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ture, distinguishing them from traditional mercenary models.58  Sand-
line International, once one of the largest PMCs, explained that its 
“business was established in the early 1990s to fill a vacuum in the post 
cold war era.”59  The company specialized in strategic advice, threat 
analysis, basic and advanced military and special forces training, intel-
ligence operations, humanitarian operations, strategic communica-
tions, counternarcotics, counterterrorism, operations to counter or-
ganized crime, protection of key installations, and other operational 
support (e.g., command, control, communication and intelligence 
teams, special forces units, pilots, and engineers).60 
Sandline is just one of many contractors that have become in-
volved in U.S. military operations.  According to the Congressional 
Research Service, as of September 2009, the U.S. Department of De-
fense had more contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan (218,000) than 
uniformed personnel (195,000).61  These numbers did not include the 
significant number of contractors hired on behalf of other U.S. enti-
ties, such as the Department of State or USAID.  Perhaps the starkest 
measure of the degree to which contractors have become integrated 
into the war effort is morbidity:  by July 2007, according to Reuters, 
more than 1000 government contractors had died in Iraq and Afgha-
nistan since the wars began, and more than 13,000 had been severely 
wounded or injured.62  These numbers represented approximately 
one civilian contractor killed for every four members of the U.S. 
 
58 P. W. SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS 45 (Robert J. Art et al. eds., 2003).  Singer 
explains that the newest wave of companies are, first and foremost, commercial enter-
prises.  See id. (“[PMCs] are hierarchically organized into registered businesses that 
trade and compete openly (for the most part) and are vertically integrated into the 
wider global marketplace.  They target market niches by offering packaged services 
covering a wide variety of military skill sets.”). 
59 Corporate Overview, SANDLINE INT’L, http://www.sandline.com/company/ 
index.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2010). 
60 Incorporated in the Bahamas, with offices in London and Washington, D.C., the 
company guaranteed “strict rules of confidentiality.”  Id.  In 2004, the company closed 
operations.  In 2002, Sandline’s director, former British Army Lieutenant Colonel Tim 
Spicer, founded Aegis Defense Services, a private military company that contracts with 
the U.S. Department of Defense.  See Tim Spicer, AEGIS, http://www.aegisworld.com/ 
index.php/tim-spicer (last visited Sept. 15, 2010). 
61 MOSHE SCHWARTZ, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40764, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
CONTRACTORS IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN:  BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS 5 (2009); see 
also GARY MOTSEK, ASSISTANT DEPUTY UNDER SEC’Y OF DEF., CONTRACTOR SUPPORT OF 
U.S. OPERATIONS IN THE USCENTCOM AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY, IRAQ, AND AFGHANIS-
TAN 1 (2010) (reporting a total of 207,553 contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan in the 
second quarter of fiscal year 2010).   
62 Bernd Debusmann, In Outsourced U.S. Wars, Contractor Deaths Top 1,000, REUTERS, 
July 3, 2007, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN0318650320070703. 
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Armed Forces, with upwards of 3919 U.S. soldiers having died in Iraq 
and Afghanistan as of July 2007.63 
The government has expended considerable resources to hire these 
firms.  The Congressional Budget Office estimates that from 2003 to 
2007, the Department of Defense committed some $76 billion to con-
tractors in the Iraq theater.64  In fiscal year 2007 and the first half of fis-
cal year 2008, the DoD spent an additional $22 billion on its contracts 
and obligations in Iraq.65  Nevertheless, very little is known about the 
private companies working for the United States overseas.  It was not 
until the second half of 2007 that the DoD began to collect information 
on contractors—and even this data has been brought into question.66 
What is remarkable about these contractors is that, quite apart 
from Reynolds’s requirement that only the government invoke the state 
secrets privilege, PMCs such as Halliburton, DynCorp, and L-3 Com-
munications, as well as more traditional contractors, such as Boeing 
Company, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon, and Honeywell Interna-
tional, consistently assert state secrets as an affirmative defense.67  Yet 
there is virtually no scholarship on how and when these companies 
have claimed the privilege, how successful they have been in claiming 
that it applies, the role of the privilege as a tactical device, or the con-
ditions under which the executive branch formally supports such 
claims by intervening and invoking the privilege. 
The pattern over the past eight years is that these corporations re-
spond to complaints by claiming state secrets as an affirmative de-
fense.  They then approach the executive to intervene and prevent the 
suit from moving forward.68  The federal government subsequently (a) 
does nothing, (b) files a motion of interest and requests time to con-
sider the national security implications, (c) files a motion to intervene 
and requests time to consider the national security implications, (d) 
 
63 Id.  At a minimum, these numbers highlight significant corporate interests in 
the wars. 
64 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, 3053, CONTRACTORS’ SUPPORT OF U.S. OPERATIONS IN 
IRAQ 3 (2008).  The Iraq theater includes Iraq, Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates.  Id.   
65 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-19, CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING:  
DOD, STATE, AND USAID CONTRACTS AND CONTRACTOR PERSONNEL IN IRAQ AND  
AFGHANISTAN 21 (2008). 
66 SCHWARTZ, supra note 61, at 4. 
67 See infra Section I.B. 
68 On occasion, intelligence agencies may also alert the executive to suits as they 
arise, as Department of Justice personnel indicated to the author during a discussion at 
American University School of Law on November 18, 2009. 
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files a motion to suppress certain evidence, or (e) files a motion to 
dismiss or a motion for summary judgment on state secrets grounds.  
A number of observations that have previously escaped notice can be 
drawn—precisely because of the narrow focus on published opinions 
adjudicating the state secrets question. 
First, the executive appears to adopt a conservative approach:  it 
only intervenes in commercial disputes once other formalities have 
been met and the suit is, indeed, moving forward.  Even at this point, it 
does not always become involved.  For instance, although there are ex-
ceptions, the executive appears more likely to intervene in contract, 
patent, and trade secrets cases than in class action torts (although 
many of these suits are still in their infancy and the government’s ap-
proach may change).  Similarly, the executive appears more willing to 
intervene in tort suits involving military equipment and technology 
than in cases regarding contractors’ services—even where the contrac-
tors are engaged in a more traditional armed-forces capacity.  Addi-
tionally, there appears to be a one-way ratchet:  such suits often span 
multiple administrations, but once the executive has invoked the state 
secrets privilege, subsequent administrations hold the line. 
Second, many government contractors—including most of the top 
ten in terms of volume of business—benefit from use of the state se-
crets doctrine in suits that allege a range of illegal activity including 
torture, disappearances, chemical warfare, assault, battery, racial dis-
crimination, toxic dumping, fraud, breach of contract, patent in-
fringement, trade secrets, and libel. 
Two further observations are of note.  First, and perhaps most im-
portantly, the operation of the privilege gives rise to the potential for 
a new form of “graymail.”  Many of these companies have access to in-
formation that would make the state politically and legally vulnerable 
to exposure.  Once a company is confronted with a suit, it can ap-
proach the government and threaten that, in the course of litigation, 
information that the state does not want in the public domain may 
emerge.  If the government refuses to intervene, the company may 
not just make the information it currently holds public, but it can be-
gin subpoenaing internal government documents and reports alleged-
ly necessary to its defense, thus spurring the government to act.  In 
other cases, there may be no wrongdoing involved; that is, companies 
may not deliberately be seeking to provoke the government to re-
spond by threatening to air politically or legally damaging informa-
tion.  Nevertheless, the natural evolution of the lawsuit may result in a 
similar outcome:  the government, aware that the agency or individu-
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als involved may be compromised if the lawsuit is to continue and if 
the company is to be provided with the opportunity to defend itself, 
may step in to prevent a case from proceeding.  Second, quite apart 
from these risks, the corporation may be so embedded in the country’s 
national defense that the state cannot afford for it to be subject to sig-
nificant financial penalties—or bankruptcy.  In each of these situations, 
the state secrets privilege gives rise to a form of private indemnity. 
Even where the government never becomes involved in the suit, 
the threat of the state secrets privilege gives companies a tactical ad-
vantage.  It shapes litigation in important and prejudicial ways, often 
dropping out of the picture by the time the court issues its opinion re-
solving the case.  Once it becomes an affirmative defense, for instance, 
the privilege provides a hook for companies to remove the case to fed-
eral court.  Its use draws out litigation, giving companies, which tend to 
have significantly more resources than plaintiffs, more time to mount a 
defense.  The privilege may scare off litigants who may be unwilling or 
unable to sustain a multiyear, even multidecade, court battle, particu-
larly if the case is ultimately unlikely to come to trial.  Whether or not 
the government will eventually intervene is unknown; corporations 
claiming that state secrets are at stake are privy to classified materials, 
and precedent for the state intervening in every type of suit exists. 
A.  Breach of Contract, Patent Disputes, and Trade Secrets 
The most common contractor actions implicating state secrets in-
volve breach of contract, patent disputes, and trade secrets.  Indeed, 
one of the first state secrets cases to arise in the Bush Administration 
came from a suit involving Virtual Defense and Development Interna-
tional, Inc., a corporation claiming to be entitled to a sales commission 
on MiG-29 fighter jets.69  The contractor, who brought suit on January 
22, 1998, sought production of an unredacted classified cable from the 
U.S. Ambassador to Moldova to the State Department, which reported 
on a meeting in which a potential arms deal was discussed.70  The Secre-
tary of State invoked the state secrets privilege.71  After reviewing the ca-
ble in camera, Judge Ricardo M. Urbina ordered the State Department 
 
69 Virtual Def. & Dev. Int’l, Inc. v. Republic of Moldova, 133 F. Supp. 2d 9, 11, 23 
(D.D.C. 2001).  
70 Id. at 23. 
71 Id. 
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to declassify two of the redacted sentences.72  On August 15, 2001, the 
court granted summary judgment in favor of Moldova.73 
Such cases certainly predate the Bush Administration.74  Indeed, 
contract suits, like Virtual Defense & Development International v. Republic 
of Moldova, often span multiple administrations.  For instance, McDon-
nell Douglas and General Dynamics entered into a full-scale engineer-
ing and development contract with the Navy in 1988 to develop a 
stealth aircraft known as the A-12 Avenger.75  In 1991, the contractors 
sought $3.992 billion in a claim for equitable adjustment and conver-
sion of the contract termination for default to one of convenience.76  
Successive rounds of litigation carried the case through 2009.77  The 
state secrets claim played a complex role throughout, and the appeals 
court ultimately sustained it in the third round of litigation.78  The leng-
thy timeframe that applies to breach of contract cases also marks patent 
infringement and trade secrets disputes.79 
Many of these disputes extend beyond traditional military aircraft 
or weapons specifications.  The technologies range from digital imag-
ing, fiber optics, and radar to data mining and source code.80  At the 
 
72 Id. at 24 (order granting reconsideration).   
73 Virtual Def. & Dev. Int’l, Inc. v. Republic of Moldova, No. 98-0161 (D.D.C. Aug. 
15, 2001) (order granting summary judgment for defendant and dismissing the case 
with prejudice).   
74 See, e.g., N.S.N. Int’l Indus. v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 140 F.R.D. 275, 
281 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (upholding a government motion for a protective order barring 
release of classified documents discussing state secrets). 
75 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States, 182 F.3d 1319, 1321-22 (Fed. Cir. 
1999). 
76 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States, 567 F.3d 1340, 1355-56 (Fed. Cir. 
2009). 
77 See id. (concluding that the government was justified in terminating the contract 
because of a default by the plaintiff). 
78 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States, 323 F.3d 1006, 1024 (Fed. Cir. 
2003). 
79 See, e.g., Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 86 Fed. Cl. 738 (2009) (B-2 bomber pa-
tent infringement case filed March 25, 1996; in November of the same year the gov-
ernment filed a motion for a protective order based on state secrets—a motion 
granted by the court ten years later); D.T.M. Research, L.L.C. v. AT&T Corp., 245 F.3d 
327 (4th Cir. 2001) (misappropriation of trade secrets case involving state secrets, 
which endured for nearly eight years); see also Motion with Memorandum in Support 
by USA for Protective Order, and Exhibits A-D, D.T.M. Research, L.L.C., 245 F.3d 327 
(No. 96-01852) (entered on September 14, 1998, and modified on April 27, 2000). 
80 See, e.g., D.T.M. Research, L.L.C., 245 F.3d at 329 (arguing that the defendant mi-
sappropriated trade secrets regarding data mining); Crater Corp. v. Lucent Techs., 
Inc., 625 F. Supp. 2d 790, 794 (E.D. Mo. 2007) (alleging misappropriation of trade se-
crets, patent infringement, and breach of contract in a dispute regarding fiber-optic 
technology); Montgomery v. eTreppid Techs., No. 06-0056, at 2-10 (D. Nev. May 29, 
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heart of the Montgomery v. eTreppid Technologies litigation, for instance, 
lies surveillance software claimed to assist intelligence agencies in 
scanning traffic for Al Qaeda communications.  On June 21, 2007, Di-
rector of National Intelligence Jonathan Negroponte invoked state se-
crets.81  The United States sought a protective order pursuant to Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) to prevent disclosure of 
information regarding the 
existence . . . of any actual or proposed relationship, agreement, connec-
tion, contract, transaction, communication, or meeting of any kind be-
tween an intelligence agency . . . and any actual or proposed interest in, 
application, or use by any intelligence agency, or any current or former 
official, . . . of any technology, software, or source code owned or 
claimed by any individuals or entities associated with these lawsuits.
82
   
After reviewing the evidence in camera and ex parte, the court 
granted the order on August 29, 2007.83 
 While private corporations tend to claim the applicability of the 
state secrets doctrine in the first instance, the executive branch often 
steps in to formally support such claims.84  It only tends to do so, how-
ever, once it appears that the suit is, indeed, moving forward.  For in-
stance, a dispute between Crater Corporation and Lucent Technolo-
gies stemmed from a patent filed in 1991 by Philip French and co-
 
2008) (order regarding source-code discovery), 2008 WL 2277118, at *2-6 (discussing 
allegations involving source code, breach of contract, and patent infringement and 
ordering the plaintiffs to produce all documents in response to discovery requests); 
Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law at 7-9, Sensis Corp. v. Lysack, No. 07-00543 (N.D.N.Y. 
May 22, 2007), 2007 WL 4675710 (alleging misappropriation of trade secrets regarding 
radar technology); Mirage Sys., Inc.’s Amended Memorandum of Points and Authori-
ties in Opposition to St. Clair’s Motion to Compel Production of Classified Documents 
at 2, Eastman Kodak Co. v. Speasl, No. 05-039164 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 12, 2007), 2007 
WL 5303264 (claiming the defendant infringed digital imaging technology patents). 
81 Montgomery, No. 06-00056, at 2 (D. Nev. Aug. 29, 2007) (protective order). 
82 Id. at 1. 
83 Id. at 2. 
84 See, e.g., D.T.M. Research, L.L.C., 245 F.3d at 330 (moving to quash defendant’s 
subpoenas served to numerous federal agencies through the United States’ invocation 
of the state secrets privilege); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States, 182 F.3d 
1319, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (remanding the state secret issue to the trial court); Mont-
gomery v. eTreppid Techs., L.L.C., No. 06-0056, 2009 WL 910739, at *8 (D. Nev. Mar. 
31, 2009) (involving the state secrets privilege invocation by the United States in a trade 
secret mis-appropriation case); Virtual Def. & Dev. Int’l, Inc. v. Republic of Moldova, 133 
F. Supp. 2d 9, 23 (D.D.C. 2001) (discussing state secrets invoked by the State Department 
to oppose plaintiff’s motion to compel disclosure of a classified cable); McDonnell Doug-
las Corp. v. United States, 37 Fed. Cl. 270, 272 (1996) (dismissing multiple claims by a 
military contractor after the government invoked the state secrets doctrine).   
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inventors Charles Monty and Steven Van Keuren.85  Lucent Technolo-
gies, a subsidiary of AT&T, was interested in using the inventors’ de-
sign for an underwater fiber-optic coupler in conjunction with a classi-
fied contract it had secured with the U.S. government.86  The inven-
tors provided Lucent with drawings and consented to a research and 
development license, with the future design to be negotiated.87  They 
alleged that Lucent subsequently denied the inventors access to the 
CAD drawings and offered some $100,000 to license the technology.88  
In May 1998, the inventors brought suit for misappropriation of trade 
secrets, patent infringement, and breach of contract.89  Three months 
later Lucent moved for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a).90  The 
district court dismissed the suit based on the patent infringement 
claim.91  With the trade secrets and breach of contract claims still in 
play, however, litigation continued, prompting the U.S. military to in-
tervene on March 12, 1999, and to invoke the state secrets privilege to 
protect some 26,000 documents.92  The government argued that the 
 
85 Crater Corp., 625 F. Supp. 2d at 795-96; see also Chesney, supra note 6, at 1303 
n.294 (citing Crater Corp. v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 423 F.3d 1260, 1262-63 (Fed. Cir. 
2005)) (discussing the Crater case, in which a protective order was granted against fact 
discovery regarding production of radar technology due to the state secrets privilege).   
86 Crater Corp., 624 F. Supp. 2d at 796-97.  For detailed discussion of this case, see 
Isaacs & Farley, supra note 6, at 789-99. 
87 Second Amended Complaint at 2-3, Crater Corp., 625 F. Supp. 2d 790 (No. 98-
00913), 2006 WL 2699395. 
88 Isaacs & Farley, supra note 6, at 790 (citing Kevin Poulsen, Secrecy Power Sinks Pa-
tent Case, WIRED (Sept. 20, 2005), http://www.wired.com/science/discoveries/news/ 
2005/09/68894). 
89 Crater Corp. v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 423 F.3d 1260, 1261-62 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
90 Crater Corp. v. Lucent Techs., Inc., No. 98-00913, 1999 WL 33973795, at *1 
(E.D. Mo. Aug. 25, 1999), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 255 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2001).  
Section 1498(a) provides an affirmative defense for government contractors that shifts 
liability to the government for patent infringement, where a patented invention is used 
by or manufactured for the government by a private party.  28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (2006).  
91 Crater Corp., 1999 WL 33973795, at *3.  A separate administrative claim filed 
against the United States was still pending as of 2007.  Crater Corp., 625 F. Supp. 2d at 799. 
92 See Crater Corp., 423 F.3d at 1264 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (stating the government’s po-
sition that none of the approximately 26,000 documents could be disclosed); United 
States’ Motion to Intervene and Supporting Memorandum at 1, Crater Corp., 625 F. 
Supp. 2d 790 (No. 98-00913), 1999 WL 34870263 (asserting grounds for intervention 
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24); United States’ Motion to Quash and 
for a Protective Order and Supporting Memorandum at 4-8, Crater Corp., 625 F. Supp. 
2d 790 (No. 98-00913) [hereinafter Motion to Quash in Crater Corp.], 1999 WL 
34870264 (providing grounds for the state secrets privilege and protection pursuant to 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26(c) and 45(c)). 
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state secrets privilege was an absolute bar to the suit moving forward.93  
Secretary of the Navy Richard Danzig and Acting Secretary of the Navy 
Hansford T. Johnson submitted classified and unclassified declara-
tions in support.94 
The Crater Corp. v. Lucent Technologies case illustrates the chicken-
and-egg problem with patent disputes in the national security realm.  
It also underscores a certain judicial sloppiness that has crept its way 
into state secrets cases, with courts allowing the executive branch to 
draw a wide net—preventing a broad range of documents from enter-
ing the public domain—on the grounds that some portion of the ma-
terial withheld qualifies as a state secret. 
Crater Corporation argued that it did not need any classified in-
formation to make its case:  the coupler was not a state secret.95  The 
company objected to Lucent’s claim, arguing that only the govern-
ment could invoke—and argue—state secrets.96  Lucent disagreed.  
Not only could the company argue state secrets, but dismissal was war-
ranted:  the exclusion of such privileged material would leave the 
plaintiff unable to mount its case and the defendant unable to con-
firm or deny the allegations.97  Upon inspection of the documents in 
 
93 See Motion to Quash in Crater Corp., supra note 92, at 1 (“Plaintiff in this case 
seeks to discover information from defendants and various third-parties whose disclo-
sure is prohibited by the state secrets privilege.  That privilege, as properly invoked by 
the United States here, acts as an absolute bar . . . .”). 
94 Crater Corp., 423 F.3d at 1263, 1265. 
95 See Plaintiff’s Brief in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judg-
ment at 34, Crater Corp., 625 F. Supp. 2d 790 (No. 98-00913), 2007 WL 5248865 (“This 
court should deny defendants[’] motion for summary judgment because defendants[’] 
state secret defense is false, because the Crater coupler was never a secret and the gov-
ernment intentionally allowed public presentation . . . .”). 
96 Plaintiff Crater Corporation’s Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Mo-
tion to Dismiss at 4, Crater Corp., 625 F. Supp. 2d 790 (No. 98-00913), 2003 WL 
25749187. 
Defendants’ claim that this case should be dismissed as a result of the State 
Secrets privilege should be rejected because the Government—the holder of 
the privilege—has not moved to dismiss on that ground.  AT&T and Lucent 
do not have authority to assert the Government’s state secret privilege offen-
sively against Crater as grounds for dismissal.  Only the Government can in-
voke the state secrets privilege in this manner.  Moreover, Defendants lack 
standing and should not be permitted to argue here that operation of the 
state secrets privilege has prejudiced their defense to Crater’s claims. 
Id. 
97 See Defendants’ Reply in Support of Its Motion to Dismiss, Crater Corp., 625 F. 
Supp. 2d 790 (No. 98-00913), 2004 WL 5583982 (“[D]ismissal is appropriate when, as 
here, the state secrets privilege would prevent a defendant from either confirming or 
denying plaintiff’s factual allegations.”); Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and Memo-
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camera, the district court ordered that a substantial portion of the 
documents be disclosed.98  The government refused.  The district 
court then held a show-cause hearing, following which it determined 
that even if some documents could be released, others could not be—
and that these documents were central to the plaintiffs establishing a 
prima facie case.99  Although the Federal Circuit upheld the invoca-
tion of the state secrets privilege (without examining the documents), 
Judge Newman registered concern that the military had failed to dis-
tinguish between public information and documents that genuinely 
posed a threat to national security.100  The court remanded the case 
for consideration of trade secrets, whether Crater and Lucent had a 
contract in place, and what its terms might have been.101  The United 
States argued that the court did not even need to reach the state se-
crets question.102  Lucent responded that it was “entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law due to the United States’ invocation of the state se-
crets privilege.”103  The company wrote, “[n]either party can escape 
the iron curtain of the state secrets privilege.  Crater cannot make out 
a prima facie case, and Lucent cannot adequately defend itself with-
out evidence protected by the privilege.”104  The court subsequently 
found insufficient evidence to support Crater’s claim that the coupler 
had been used.105  In June 2009, the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit affirmed.106 
 
randum in Support at 1-2, Crater Corp., 625 F. Supp. 2d 790 (No. 98-00913), 2003 WL 
25749186 (“Crater’s remaining claims require it to prove . . . that Lucent somehow in-
corporated Crater’s technology into the Government’s classified device.  Given the 
Government’s assertion of the state secrets privilege, however, neither Crater nor Lu-
cent will be able to prove or disprove this allegation.”). 
98 Crater Corp. v. Lucent Techs., Inc., No. 98-00913, 2004 WL 3609347, at *2 (E.D. 
Mo. Feb. 19, 2004), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. AT&T Co., 423 
F.3d 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
99 Id. at *2-3. 
100 Lucent Techs., Inc. v. AT&T Co., 423 F.3d at 1270 (Newman, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). 
101 Id. at 1268 (majority opinion). 
102 See United States’ Response to Plaintiff’s Informal Request for Information, 
and Response to Plaintiff’s Brief Concerning Case Scheduling and Report at 1, Crater 
Corp., 625 F. Supp. 2d 790 (No. 98-00913), 2006 WL 5808938 (“[P]laintiff is ‘putting 
the cart before the horse’ by seeking information regarding damages when it has failed 
to prove that any wrongdoing occurred or even could have occurred.”). 
103 Defendants’ Memorandum in Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment 
at 2, Crater Corp., 625 F. Supp. 2d 790 (No. 98-00913), 2007 WL 5248864. 
104 Id. at 2-3.  
105 Crater Corp., 625 F. Supp. 2d at 807. 
106 Crater Corp. v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 319 F. App’x 900 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (per cu-
riam). 
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The use of state secrets in the corporate realm may hamper efforts 
by employees to draw attention to contractor fraud.  For example, this 
may have occurred in United States ex. rel. Schwartz v. TRW, Inc.107  Dr.  
Nira Schwartz alleged violation of the False Claims Act,108 on behalf of 
the United States against defendants TRW and Boeing; wrongful termi-
nation in violation of 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h), against TRW; and wrongful 
termination in violation of California public policy against TRW.109  She 
stated that, starting in 1990, the United States began contracting with 
Boeing to develop an exoatmospheric kill vehicle to intercept incoming 
ballistic missiles as part of its national missile defense program.110  Boe-
ing, in turn, contracted with TRW to develop algorithms to enable the 
system to distinguish between decoys and the infrared signatures of in-
coming missiles.111 
Schwartz alleged that TRW and Boeing misled and lied to the 
government by providing falsified data, rigging tests, concealing er-
rors, and repeatedly failing to comply with the technical requirements 
and specifications to which they had agreed.112  Schwartz claimed that 
her suspension and termination, ostensibly on grounds of miscon-
duct, related to complaints she had lodged about the false representa-
tions.113  On January 15, 2003, the U.S. government, which had failed 
to comply with Reynolds formalities in its first invocation of the state 
secrets privilege, invoked the privilege a second time through a mo-
tion to intervene and a motion to dismiss the suit.  Five weeks later, 
the court granted the request.114 
B.  Negligence, Wrongful Death, and Bodily Injury 
Recourse to the state secrets privilege in suits brought against pri-
vate actors for negligence, wrongful death, or bodily injury predates 
the Bush Administration.  In 1974, for instance, the Southern District 
 
107 211 F.R.D. 388 (C.D. Cal. 2002); see also United States ex rel. Schwartz v. Raythe-
on Co., 150 F. App’x 627, 628 (9th Cir. 2005) (affirming dismissal of the whistleblower 
lawsuit alleging Raytheon failed to perform on defense contract on state secrets 
grounds).   
108 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2006). 




113 Id. at 390-91. 
114 Civil Minutes, United States ex rel. Schwartz v. TRW, Inc., No. 96-3065 (C.D. 
Cal. Feb. 24, 2003). 
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of New York sustained the government’s invocation of state secrets in 
regard to CIA documents in a personal injury case brought by Pan 
American World Airways against Aetna.115  In 1989, a California district 
court dismissed an action brought against the United States and 
twelve defense contractors by the families of passengers and crew 
aboard an airliner shot down by missile fire from the U.S.S. Vin-
cennes, based in part on the invocation of the state secrets privilege.116  
The following year, the Second Circuit granted the defendants’ mo-
tion to dismiss in a suit brought by the estate of a sailor killed by Iraqi 
fire against the designers, manufacturers, testers, and marketers of an 
anti-missile system and weapons system on the U.S.S. Stark, on the 
grounds of state secrets, as well as the political question doctrine.117  In 
1993, a California district court held that the government’s invocation 
of the state secrets privilege, in response to a suit brought by the fami-
ly of a Marine killed in the Persian Gulf, precluded adjudication of the 
claim.118  Looking at lawsuits from 2001 through 2009, it quickly be-
comes clear that similar suits include, but go considerably beyond, 
mere product liability. 
1.  Product Liability 
The traditional product liability national security suit centers on 
weapons and equipment.  Many of these have emerged, with a signifi-
cant percentage of cases focused on helicopter malfunction.119  In 
 
115 Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 368 F. Supp. 1098, 1139-
41 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff’d, 505 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1974). 
116 Nejad v. United States, 724 F. Supp. 753, 755-56 (C.D. Cal. 1989). 
117 Zuckerbraun v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 755 F. Supp. 1134, 1135, 1142 (D. Conn. 
1990), aff’d, 935 F.2d 544, 548 n.1 (2d Cir. 1991).  The Fifth Circuit followed suit in a 
case based on the same incident in Bareford v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 973 F.2d 1138, 1140, 
1144 (5th Cir. 1992).  
118 Bentzlin v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 833 F. Supp. 1486, 1495-97 (C.D. Cal. 1993). 
119 For instance, Duncan Ruth and Clayton Shearcroft died on November 3, 2005, 
when the Boeing-Vertol model BV 107-II helicopter they were piloting broke in midair 
and crashed to the ground.  Complaint at 4, Ruth v. Boeing Co., No. 07-04851 (E.D. 
Pa. Nov. 19, 2007), 2007 WL 4882640.  Boeing removed the case from the Court of 
Common Pleas, Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania, to the U.S. District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania on grounds of diversity jurisdiction.  Notice of Remov-
al at 2-4, Ruth, No. 07-04851 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 19, 2007), 2007 WL 4761731.  Ruth code-
fendant Honeywell International raised state secrets as an affirmative defense.  See An-
swer of Honeywell International Inc. to Plaintiffs’ Complaint at 30, Ruth, No. 07-04851 
(E.D. Pa. Nov. 27, 2007), 2007 WL 4874833 (asserting state secrets as the thirty-second 
affirmative defense).   
 In another case, family members of fourteen American servicemen killed in a 
Black Hawk helicopter crash near Kirkuk, Iraq, on August 22, 2007, sued the compa-
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February 2007, for instance, a U.S. Army Chinook helicopter crashed 
in Afghanistan, killing eight soldiers and wounding fourteen others.120  
The following October, seven persons injured in the accident and 
some of their spouses, as well as the surviving heirs of seven decedents, 
brought suit in San Francisco County Superior Court against The Boe-
ing Company, Honeywell International, Inc., and Goodrich Pump and 
 
nies responsible for helicopter maintenance.  Plaintiffs’ Original Complaint at 6, 
McLead v. L-3 Commc’ns Vertex Aerospace, LLC, No. 08-00264 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 7, 
2008), 2008 WL 3924669.  The plaintiffs alleged that negligence had resulted in a for-
eign object being left in the engine during a Phased Maintenance Inspection, causing 
the driveshaft to fail.  Id. at 6.  L-3 Communications responded to the complaint by as-
serting the state secrets privilege.  See Defendant L-3 Communications Vertex Aero-
space, LLC’s Answer to Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint at 4, McLead, No. 08-
00264 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 18, 2009), 2009 WL 464073 (“Plaintiffs’ claims are barred in 
whole or in part by the political question doctrine and the state secrets doctrine.”).   
 Yet another aircraft accident, this time involving a charter flight that crashed into 
a mountain in Afghanistan on November 27, 2004, resulted in an industrial state se-
crets assertion.  Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dis-
miss Amended Complaint at 2, 18, McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., 410 F. Supp. 
2d 1189 (M.D. Fla. 2006) (No. 05-01002), 2006 WL 422219.  The complaint alleged 
that all five defendants, operating under contract with the United States “to provide air 
transportation and operational support services to the Department of Defense (‘DoD’) 
in Afghanistan,” negligently caused the deaths of the plaintiffs’ spouses.  Complaint at 
5, 7-9, McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 2d 1315 (M.D. Fla. 2006) 
(No. 05-1002), 2005 WL 4902790.  Blackwater, one of the defendants in the suit, 
moved to dismiss the case for lack of personal jurisdiction.  Defendant Blackwater 
Lodge and Training Center, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction, 
McMahon, 460 F. Supp. 2d 1315 (No. 05-1002), 2005 WL 3806018.  State secrets asser-
tions—despite the government’s statement that it would not step in to formally assert 
the privilege—played a role throughout the litigation.  See, e.g., Plaintiffs’ Motion to 
Unseal Renewed Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum in Support at 1, 5, McMahon v. 
Presidential Airways, No. 05-1002 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 17, 2009), 2009 WL 773422 (moving 
for the court to unseal a renewed motion to dismiss and its supporting exhibits as no 
governmental secrets were at issue). 
120 Answer of Defendant Goodrich Pump & Engine Control Systems, Inc. to 
Amended Complaint at 1, Getz v. Boeing Co., 690 F. Supp. 2d 982 (N.D. Cal. 2010) 
(No. 07-06396), 2008 WL 4762725; Amended Answer of Defendant The Boeing Com-
pany at 2, Getz, 690 F. Supp. 2d 982 (No. 07-6396), 2008 WL 744106; Notice of Removal 
of Civil Action from Superior Court of California, County of San Francisco at 2, Getz, 
690 F. Supp. 2d 982 (No. 07-6396) [hereinafter Notice of Removal in Getz], 2007 WL 
5017768; US Troops Killed in Chopper Crash, BBC NEWS, Feb. 18, 2007, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6372813.stm. It was not the first Chinook to 
crash in Afghanistan and result in American casualties.  See US Troops Killed in Chopper 
Crash, supra (discussing the April 2005 Chinook crash in which sixteen people died, 
thirteen of whom were U.S. personnel, as well as a July 2005 helicopter crash in which 
all sixteen soldiers on board were killed).  A number of unreported cases that deserve 
further examination have dealt with prior Chinook crashes.  See, e.g., Humphreys v. Boe-
ing Co., No. 85-4524, 1986 WL 8129, at *4 (E.D. Pa. July 17, 1986) (dismissing a lawsuit 
for injuries suffered in a helicopter crash based on the government contractor defense). 
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Engine Control Systems, Inc.121  The defendants removed to federal 
court on December 18, 2007, based in part on Boeing’s claim to the 
state secrets privilege as an affirmative defense.122  Eighteen months 
later, the company still had not amassed sufficient information to file 
additional dispositive motions on the state secrets privilege—resulting 
in efforts to further push back discovery within the case management 
schedule.123 
As in the Lucent case, discussed above, Judge Claudia Wilken 
noted the chicken-and-egg problem that accompanies such suits: 
 Defendants’ state secret privilege and political question defenses 
present additional problems, since the viability of those defenses depends 
not only on evidence produced by the government, but also the evidence 
that the government refuses to produce to defendants.  It is well settled 
that summary judgment is appropriate when the government’s assertion 
of the state secrets privilege deprives a defendant of information that 
would support a valid defense to plaintiffs claim.  Therefore, before the 
defendants can even prepare a motion based on the state secrets privi-
lege, we have to wait and see what information the government produces 
and what information the government refuses to produce.
124
 
The refusal of the government to provide even seemingly innocuous 
information could have a profound effect: 
As the Ninth Circuit noted in Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 
1998), “if seemingly innocuous information is part of a classified mosaic, 
the state secrets privilege may be invoked to bar its disclosure and the 
court cannot order the government to disentangle this information from 
other classified information.”  Id. at 1166.  Under this standard, defen-
dants anticipate that the government will withhold considerable infor-
mation critical to their defenses herein.  However, defendants cannot 
make such a showing until such time as the government produces doc-
 
121 Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Modify Case Management Or-
der at 4 nn.1, 2, Getz, 690 F. Supp. 2d 982 (No. 07-06396) [hereinafter Plaintiffs’ Oppo-
sition in Getz], 2009 WL 2407163; Notice of Motion and Motion for Summary Judg-
ment and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant the 
Boeing Company’s Motion for Summary Judgment Based on the Government Con-
tractor Defense at 2, Getz, 690 F. Supp. 2d 982 (No. 07-06396) [hereinafter Motion for 
Summary Judgment in Getz], 2009 WL 3785314. 
122 Plaintiffs’ Opposition in Getz, supra note 121, at 4; Notice of Removal in Getz, 
supra note 120, at 5, 7.  Additional affirmative defenses included the government con-
tractor defense and the political question doctrine.  Notice of Removal in Getz, supra 
note 120, at 5, 6. 
123 See Defendants’ Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion to 
Modify Case Management Order at 5, Getz v. Boeing Co., No. 07-06396 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 
3, 2009), 2009 WL 2407164 (explaining how the viability of the state secrets privilege 
depends on what documents the government refuses to produce). 
124 Id. (citations omitted). 
DONOHUE FINAL REVISED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/18/2010  11:10 AM 
2010] The Shadow of State Secrets 109 
uments in response to defendants’ requests and asserts the state secrets 
privilege as to other information.
125
 
Like the other aircraft cases cited above, Getz v. Boeing Co. relates 
to an accident in the theater of war.  However, as in Reynolds, even 
where the incident involving aircraft is far removed from the actual 
battlefield, state secrets may still play a role.126  This holds even in bi-
zarre cases tangentially involving military aircraft, where government 
contractors claim in the first instance that state secrets are at stake.127 
 
125 Id. at 5-6.  In any event, the first card Boeing played was the government con-
tractor defense.  Motion for Summary Judgment in Getz, supra note 121.  As of the time 
of this writing, the case has yet to be resolved. 
126 On November 2, 2007, Stephen Stilwell, on routine training maneuvers for the 
Missouri Air National Guard in restricted Military Operations Area airspace over south-
central Missouri, executed a break turn in an F-15C Eagle.  Complaint at 3-4, Stilwell v. 
Boeing Co., No. 08-00395 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 21, 2008), 2008 WL 2364199.  The plane al-
legedly began violently shaking and broke apart.  Id. at 4.  Stilwell, who ejected from 
the aircraft and was hit by parts of it, suffered debilitating injuries.  Id. at 4-5.  On 
March 21, 2008, he sued Boeing.  Id. at 1.  Boeing responded by arguing, inter alia, 
state secrets as an affirmative defense.  See Defendant’s Answer and Additional De-
fenses to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint at 7, Stilwell, No. 08-00395 (E.D. Mo. 
Dec. 31, 2008), 2008 WL 5467424 (“The First Amended Complaint, and each pur-
ported cause of action therein, may be barred, in whole or in part, if the government 
invokes the state secrets privilege to preclude production of information necessary to 
Boeing’s defense or to Plaintiff’s prima facie case.”).  On April 16, 2009, the case was 
dismissed with prejudice.  Stipulation for Dismissal with Prejudice, Stilwell, No. 08-
00395 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 16, 2009), 2009 WL 1147055. 
127 See, e.g., Plaintiffs’ Complaint for Wrongful Death, Personal Injuries, and Business 
Loss at 3, 5, Sheffels v. United States, No. 03-0355 (E.D. Wash. Oct. 10, 2003) [hereinafter 
Complaint in Sheffels], 2003 WL 23981154 (involving a suit on behalf of a deceased civi-
lian pilot, Louis Roger Sheffels, who crashed on May 2001 in his Piper PA-18 aircraft).  
Wilbur, Washington, where the crash occurred, is a rural town with a population of 960, 
located sixty-five miles west of Spokane, Washington.  Jonathan Martin, Crop Circles Lure 
Visitors to Wilbur, Wash., SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 13, 2009, at A1, available at 2009 WLNR 
15825974.  Sheffels’s heirs and his surviving passenger, Michael J. Palmquist, brought an 
action against Boeing, alleging that the C-17 Globemaster III, manufactured by Boeing, 
had an ultrahazardous wake turbulence profile, posing an “unreasonable risk to general 
aviation aircraft,” and that a C-17 had been the proximate cause of Sheffels’s crash.  
Complaint in Sheffels, supra, at 5, 9-10.  Boeing responded to the complaint by, inter alia, 
asserting state secrets as an affirmative defense.  Defendant The Boeing Company’s 
Amended Answer and Affirmative Defenses to Amended Complaint and Counterclaim at 
10, Kuch v. United States, No. 03-0355 (E.D. Wash. Apr. 30, 2004), 2004 WL 3108354.  
The C -17, operated by the U.S. Air Force, is a military transport aircraft used for rapid 
airlift of troops and cargo to main and forward-operating bases.  C-17 Globemaster III, BOE-
ING, http://www.boeing.com/defense-space/military/c17/index.htm (last visited Sept. 
15, 2010).  The court granted the defendants’ motions for judgment pursuant to Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 52(c).  See Order Denying Plaintiffs’ Motion to Reconsider 
Dismissal and Reconvene Trial, Kuch v. United States, No. 03-0355 (E.D. Wash. Oct. 
23, 2007), 2007 WL 3129674, at *1 (denying plaintiff’s motion to have the court recon-
vene and consider additional testimony).  In September 2007, plaintiffs filed a motion 
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Aircraft are not the only focus of such suits.  Liability cases arise 
from a wide range of products.  Some involve weapons, where the gov-
ernment may be particularly vulnerable to exposure.  For instance, U.S. 
Navy combat pilot Lieutenant Nathan White’s death from “friendly fire” 
while on patrol over Iraq led to a suit against the manufacturer of the 
errant Patriot missile.128  On June 26, 2007, Raytheon moved to dismiss 
the suit, arguing that it raised a nonjusticiable political question:  “the 
discretionary decision of the Army to deploy the Patriot system in ‘Op-
eration Iraqi Freedom.’”129  The court denied the motion, and in De-
cember 2007 the parties began discovery.130  Although the defendants 
claimed that state secrets were involved, the government had not yet in-
tervened in the suit to invoke the privilege.  Raytheon subsequently 
served a number of document requests on the U.S. Army, including re-
ports on the internal investigation of the incident, communications be-
tween the government and Raytheon about the incident, information 
on the U.S. Army’s missile defense operations, and the Patriot missile 
system’s rules of engagement.131  On September 5, 2008, Peter Geren, 
Secretary of the Army, filed an affidavit invoking the state secrets privi-
lege.132  The court upheld the state secrets invocation on December 17, 
2008, concluding “that the information which the Secretary has claimed 
as privileged is relevant and necessary to prove and defend the 
Amended Complaint[,] and . . . its public disclosure would endanger 
vital security interests of the United States . . . . Therefore, I have no al-
ternative but to order the case dismissed.”133 
Personal injury suits extend beyond dysfunctional weapons.  In one 
case, plaintiffs Kevin R. McLane and Sharon Brown alleged that, while 
in Iraq on August 17, 2004, they were shocked by an antenna supplied 
 
to reopen the case.  Id.  At his first deposition on March 24, 2004, Palmquist testified 
that his last memory before the crash was flying over a field he was surveying and that he 
had not seen any other aircraft that day.  Id.  However, after undergoing hypnosis to 
enhance his memory, at his second deposition on October 13, 2004, Palmquist recalled 
seeing a large aircraft directly in front of their windshield.  Id.  After District Court 
Judge Suko dismissed the case on summary judgment, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the 
exclusion of the posthypnotic recollections but reversed the grant of summary judg-
ment.  Id.  The district court subsequently declined to reopen the case under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a).  Id. at *2-3. 






133 Id. at *5. 
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by Honeywell Technology Solutions Inc. (HTSI).134  In seeking removal 
to a federal court, HTSI noted, “If the equipment at issue was supplied 
by HTSI, it was delivered to the National Security A[gency] by HTSI 
under a classified contract with that agency.”135  HTSI argued for re-
moval under the Federal Officer Removal Statute,136 and on the basis of 
the incident being located in a federal enclave.137  Defendants further 
claimed state secrets as a colorable defense.138 
In a similar case, Sergeant Chris Everett, a member of the Texas 
Army National Guard, died from electrocution while he was cleaning 
a Humvee in Iraq.139  The generator providing electricity for the power 
washer was not properly grounded, a responsibility that his mother 
said fell squarely on the shoulders of defendants Arkel and Kellogg, 
Brown & Root Services, Inc. (KBR), who had contracted with the gov-
ernment to install, operate, and maintain the generator.140  State se-
crets once again provided an affirmative defense.141 
Personal injury due to radiation provides the nexus for a number 
of suits currently pending in the courts.  From November 2002 
through January 2003, dozens of people seeking recovery for expo-
sure to ionizing radiation while working with Honeywell radar devices 
filed class action complaints in Texas, Massachusetts, and New Jer-
sey.142  In the Norwood v. Raytheon Co. actions, Honeywell claimed state 
 
134 Notice of Removal at 1-2, McLane v. Honeywell Int’l Inc., No. 07-02816 (D. Md. 
Oct. 16, 2007), 2007 WL 4603347. 
135 Id. at 2. 
136 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) (2006). 
137 Notice of Removal, supra note 134, at 2, 4. 
138 See Defendant Honeywell International Inc. and Honeywell Technology Solu-
tions Inc.’s Answer to Plaintiff’s Complaint at 8, McLane, No. 07-2816 (D. Md. Oct. 23, 
2007), 2007 WL 4603348 (“Plaintiffs’ claims and/or causes of action are barred, in 
whole or in part, because the government’s invocation of the state secrets privilege ir-
revocably prejudices the Honeywell Defendants’ ability to defend themselves.”). 
139 Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand at i, McGee v. Arkel, 
No. 08-4707 (E.D. La. Oct. 29, 2008), 2008 WL 5366105. 
140 Id. 
141 See id. at iv (“KBR claims that the state secret doctrine applies as a defense to 
this action, citing United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953).  However, there is no 
doubt that proper electric grounding, generators, and power washers do not involve 
issues of national security.”).  The Army’s public report of the incident, as well as Con-
gress’s public investigation, helped strengthen the plaintiffs’ contentions.  Id. (citing 
Deficient Electrical Systems at U.S. Facilities in Iraq:  Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight 
and Gov’t Reform, 110th Cong. 2 (2008) (statement of Rep. Henry A. Waxman, Chair-
man, Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform)). 
142 Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Sever and Dismiss the German 
Plaintiffs’ Claims Pursuant to the Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens at 3, Tichenor v. 
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secrets as an affirmative defense.143  A Texas district court subsequently 
deemed Honeywell to have asserted its Norwood state secrets defense in 
that lawsuit as well.144 
2.  Infrastructure and Services 
The integration of PMCs into military operations means that con-
tractors are now providing a broad array of services that have become 
the subject of tort allegations.  Indeed, one of the companies claiming 
that state secrets are at stake most frequently is KBR, which received 
nearly $5 billion in government contracts in fiscal year 2007 alone.145  
The base operations and facilities management branch of KBR’s gov-
ernment and defense market delivers on-demand logistical support 
services to national security clients across the full military mission 
cycle.  This includes taking out the trash.146 
 
Honeywell Int’l, Inc., No. 09-00014 (W.D. Tex. July 30, 2007) [hereinafter Plaintiff’s 
Opposition in Tichenor], 2007 WL 6211225. 
143 Norwood v. Raytheon Co., 455 F. Supp. 2d 597, 604 (W.D. Tex. 2006). 
144 Plaintiff’s Opposition in Tichenor, supra note 142, at 15 (“Presumably, Defen-
dants will raise those same defenses against all plaintiffs in these actions.”).  At defen-
dants’ request, the case had been removed to the U.S. District Court for the Western 
District of Texas.  Id. at 3-4.  Fort Bliss, located in El Paso, is home to the U.S. Army Air 
Defense Artillery Center and School and serves as the worldwide headquarters for 
training soldiers on the Nike and HAWK missile systems.  Id. at 2-3.  The Texas court 
downplayed the state secrets claim to the degree that it implicated the political ques-
tion doctrine:   
Plaintiffs’ claims involve radar systems acquired during the Cold War, but 
American military strategy is not implicated by Plaintiffs’ claims on the face of 
the pleadings. . . . [A]ny analysis by the court of the American military’s use of 
the radar systems would not involve inquiries into rules of engagement, reac-
tions of United States servicemen during combat, or any information that De-
fendants contend is protected by the state secrets privilege.   
Norwood, 455 F. Supp. 2d at 604. 
145 Federal Contractor Misconduct Database, PROJECT ON GOV’T OVERSIGHT, 
http://www.contractormisconduct.org (last visited Sept. 15, 2010).  Court documents 
similarly report that the company received billions of dollars in no-bid contracts in fis-
cal year 2003 for work in Iraq.  See, e.g., Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint & Jury 
Demand at 2-3, McManaway v. KBR, Inc., 695 F. Supp. 2d 883 (S.D. Ind. 2010) (No. 08-
0186), 2009 WL 3253907; Defendants’ First Amended Answer and Affirmative De-
fenses at 1-2, 9, McManaway, 695 F. Supp. 2d 883 (No. 08-0186), 2009 WL 108453; 
Plaintiffs’ Original Complaint & Jury Demand at 2, McManaway, 695 F. Supp. 2d 883 
(No. 08-0186), 2008 WL 5110377. 
146 Base Operations / Facilities Management, KBR, http://www.kbr.com/Markets/ 
Government-and-Defense/Base-Operations-Facilities-Management (last visited Sept. 15, 
2010); see also Infrastructure & Minerals, KBR, http://www.kbr.com/About/Business-
Units/Infrastructure-and-Minerals (last visited Sept. 15, 2010). 
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Early in the war effort, millions of dollars went to KBR to dispose of 
waste on bases and camps in Iraq and Afghanistan.147  The company al-
legedly said that it would minimize safety risks, environmental impact, 
and smoke exposure.148  It then allegedly took tractors and indiscrimi-
nately pushed waste (e.g., trucks, tires, lithium batteries, Styrofoam, pa-
per, petroleum-oil lubricating products, metals, hydraulic fluids, muni-
tions boxes, medical waste, biohazard materials such as corpses and an-
animal carcasses, medical supplies used during smallpox inoculations, 
latrine waste, paints, solvents, asbestos insulation, pesticides, dangerous 
chemicals, and plastic water bottles) into massive trenches and burned 
it.149  The resulting flames reportedly extended hundreds of feet into 
the sky, burning blue, green, and other colors, with thick black and 
white smoke frequently filling nearby bases and living quarters.150 
In May 2009, soldiers and others deployed to Iraq and Afghanis-
tan brought a class action lawsuit, claiming injury from the toxic 
smoke, ash, and fumes.151  Symptoms ranged from burning eyes, sharp 
pain in the lungs, and lesions in the nostrils, to upper respiratory con-
gestion and infections, headaches, and loss of consciousness.152  KBR 
claimed state secrets as an affirmative defense “to the extent that clas-
sified information is involved.”153  The company further stated that it 
 
147 Complaint at 4, Brister v. KBR, Inc., No. 09-00097 (D. Alaska May 18, 2009), 
2009 WL 1499260. 
148 Id.  In their answer, Defendants admitted only that KBR, pursuant to its Logis-
tics Civil Augmentation Program III contract with the U.S. Army,  
provides a number of essential services to support the United States Army in 
its military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, including assistance with some 
aspects of waste disposal at some U.S. military bases and camps in Afghanistan.  
All waste disposal work performed by KBRSI under the LOGCAP III contract 
is done pursuant to contractual and regulatory requirements and under the 
supervision and control of the United States Army.   
Defendants’ Answer, Affirmative Defenses and Demand for Jury Trial at 4, Brister, No. 
09-00097 (D. Alaska June 5, 2009) [hereinafter Defendants’ Answer in Brister], 2009 
WL 1642730. 
149 Complaint, supra note 147, at 4. 
150 Id. at 5-6. 
151 Id. at 1-2; Defendants’ Answer and Affirmative Defenses at 4, Cain v. KBR, Inc., 
No. 09-00435 (W.D. Tex. June 5, 2009), 2009 WL 1632528; Notice of Removal at 2-4, 
Cain, No. 09-00435 (W.D. Tex. May 29, 2009), 2009 WL 1632118; Plaintiffs’ Original 
Petition at 2, Cain, No. 09-00435 (W.D. Tex. May 29, 2009), 2009 WL 1632117; Notice 
of Removal at 3-4, Massman v. KBR, Inc., No. 09-0117 (D. Wyo. May 29, 2009), 2009 
WL 3150062; Notice of Removal at 2-4, Ochs v. KBR, Inc., No. 09-00094 (E.D.N.C. May 
29, 2009), 2009 WL 2441836; Notice of Removal at 2-4, Ochs v. KBR, Inc., No. 09-
00237 (E.D.N.C. May 29, 2009), 2009 WL 2441839. 
152 Complaint, supra note 147, at 7-8.  
153 Defendants’ Answer in Brister, supra note 148, at 14. 
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was immune from all claims “stemming from the performance of offi-
cial, discretionary duties pursuant to contracts with the United States 
to provide essential support services to the United States military in 
Iraq and Afghanistan.”154 
In addition to providing direct support to military bases, KBR also 
helps to build infrastructure.  The company has claimed state secrets in 
this domain as well.  One suit has been brought against it for disregard-
ing and downplaying the danger of site contamination by sodium dich-
romate, a toxic chemical used “as an anti-corrosive and containing 
nearly pure hexavalent chromium” at a water plant in Iraq.155  The U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services lists this hexavalent chro-
mium (Chromium(VI) or Cr(VI)) as a known carcinogen.156  Accord-
ing to the Centers for Disease Control, an increased risk of lung cancer 
has been demonstrated in workers exposed to Cr(VI) compounds.  
Other adverse health effects associated with Cr(VI) exposure include:  
“dermal irritation, skin ulceration, allergic contact dermatitis, occupa-
tional asthma, nasal irritation and ulceration, perforated nasal septa, 
rhinitis, nosebleed, respiratory irritation, nasal cancer, sinus cancer, 
eye irritation and damage, perforated eardrums, kidney damage, liver 
damage, pulmonary congestion and edema, epigastric pain, and ero-
sion and discoloration of the teeth.”157  In June 2008, congressional 
hearings drew attention to KBR’s apparent efforts to mask the contin-
ued contamination of its work site in Iraq.158  In February 2010, the 
court dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction.159 
 
154 Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d) (1988) and Westfall v. Erwin, 484 U.S. 292 
(1988)). 
155 Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint at 3, McManaway v. KBR, 
Inc., 695 F. Supp. 2d 883 (S.D. Ind. 2010) (No. 08-0186).  
156 See DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES AND DIS-
EASE REGISTRY, PUBLIC HEALTH STATEMENT:  CHROMIMUM (2008), available at 
http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/ToxProfiles/tp7-c1-b.pdf (stating inhalation of chromium(VI) 
has been shown to cause lung cancer, exposure to chromium(VI) in drinking water has 
been correlated with an increase in stomach tumors, and laboratory experiments have 
shown chromium(VI) to cause tumors in the stomach, intestinal tract, and lungs). 
157 Hexavalent Chromimum, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, 
http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/hexchrom (last visited Sept. 15, 2010) (“The 
NIOSH 1988 testimony to OSHA on the air contaminants standard recommended that 
all Cr(VI) compounds, regardless of their degree of solubility in water, be considered 
occupational carcinogens.”). 
158 See, e.g., The Exposure at Qarmat Ali:  Contractor Misconduct and the Safety of U.S. 
Troops in Iraq, Hearing Before the S. Democratic Policy Comm., 110th Cong. (2008) (featur-
ing witnesses describing how KBR exposed contractors, workers, and soldiers to so-
dium dichromate, a poentially deadly chemical). 
159 McManaway, 695 F. Supp. at 896. 
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Like other government contractors, KBR has claimed state secrets 
even in cases seemingly insulated from actual hostilities.  For example, 
on March 10, 2004, Texas resident Lonnie Amason and a KBR driver 
(whose identity is not provided in court records) were both driving 
nonmilitary vehicles when they had a car accident in Baghdad’s Green 
Zone at the intersection of the road to the Al Rashid Hotel and the 
road to the North Gate.160  Arguing for removal to a federal court, KBR 
claimed the following as colorable federal defenses:  government con-
tractor defense, the combatant activities exception to the Federal Tort 
Claims Act,161 the political question doctrine, separation of powers, and 
the state secrets doctrine.162  KBR’s claim to state secrets as an affirma-
tive defense echoes in numerous other cases against the company.163 
3.  Conduct of War 
The subject matter of state secrets cases varies:  in addition to per-
sonal injury suits that show a broad range of contractor involvement 
in national security (e.g., designing, maintaining, and operating air-
craft, supplying missile systems, providing communications equip-
ment, generating electricity, manufacturing radar equipment, dispos-
ing of waste at overseas bases, and building water plants), there are 
also tort claims based on contractors’ involvement in what can best be 
understood as the actual conduct of war.  Two observations follow:  
first, the growing military role of PMCs creates tension between ordi-
nary soldiers and contractors.  Thus, U.S. soldiers are now lodging 
suits complaining of failures in base security, the operation of supply 
convoys, and the like.  Second, the involvement of contractors in the 
conduct of war has placed contractors in positions traditionally filled 
by the military, such as conducting counternarcotics missions, trans-
 
160 Motion to Remand at 2, Amason v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., No. 05-03029 
(S.D. Tex. Oct. 3, 2005), 2005 WL 3133922. 
161 28 U.S.C. § 2680( j) (2006). 
162 Motion to Remand, supra note 160, at 6. 
163 See, e.g., Defendants’ Answer in Brister, supra note 148, at 14; Defendants’ An-
swer and Affirmative Defenses, supra note 151, at 13; Notice of Removal, Cain v. KBR, 
Inc., supra note 151, at 15; Notice of Removal, Massman v. KBR, Inc., supra note 151, at 
19; Notice of Removal, Ochs v. KBR, Inc., No. 09-00094, supra note 151, at 15; Notice 
of Removal, Ochs v. KBR, Inc., No. 09-00237, supra note 151, at 15; Memorandum in 
Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand, supra note 139, at xxiii-xxiv; Plaintiffs’ Mo-
tion to Remand at 23-25, McGee v. Arkel Int’l, LLC, No. 08-2709 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 3, 
2008), 2008 WL 4499471; Defendant Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss 
Pursuant to Rule 12(b) and Memorandum in Support Thereof, Lessin v. Kellogg 
Brown & Root at 8 n.2, No. 05-01853 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 21, 2005) [hereinafter Motion to 
Dismiss in Lessin], 2005 WL 3663857. 
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ferring prisoners, and interrogating suspects—arguably with neither 
the oversight and discipline developed by the state, nor the legal pro-
tections traditionally extended to soldiers on the battlefield.  Civilian 
claims against PMCs are thus emerging.  In all of these cases, corpora-
tions claim state secrets as a colorable federal defense, often obtaining 
advantages even in the absence of federal corroboration. 
One of the services provided by Halliburton, for instance, is base 
security.  On December 21, 2004, a suicide bomber detonated explo-
sives in the mess tent on Forward Operating Base Marez in Mosul, 
Iraq.164  Survivors of Allan Keith Smith, one of the soldiers who died in 
the explosion, brought suit against Halliburton.165  Defendants, based in 
part on their colorable federal defenses,166 successfully petitioned for 
removal from the Eleventh Judicial District Court of Harris County, 
Texas, to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas.167 
Supply convoys present a similar situation.168  On March 26, 2004, 
for instance, a military escort assigned to provide security accompa-
nied a supply convoy allegedly controlled and operated by KBR and 
was traveling along one of the principal supply routes into and out of 
Iraq.169  En route to Kuwait, one of the trucks had an equipment mal-
 
164 Notice of Removal at 1-2, Smith v. Halliburton Co., No. 06-00462 (S.D. Tex. 
Feb. 10, 2006), 2006 WL 520176. 
165 Id. 
166 Such defenses included the state secrets doctrine, the government contractor 
defense, the combatant activities exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2680( j) (2006), the political question doctrine, and the Defense Production Act of 
1950, ch. 932, 64 Stat. 798 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C app. §§ 2061–2172)).  No-
tice of Removal, supra note 164, at 1-2. 
167 Notice of Removal, supra note 164, at 1-2. 
168 See, e.g., Complaint for Wrongful Death Damages, Estate Damages and Punitive 
Damages, Whitaker v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 2d 1277 (M.D. Ga. 
2006) (No. 05-00078), 2005 WL 2303546.  In April 2004, a soldier serving in the 
Second Armored Calvary Regiment of the U.S. Army in Iraq was escorting trucks 
owned and operated by KBR on their return from Al Kut, Iraq, to the Convoy Support 
Center in Scania, Iraq.  Id. at 3.  As the convoy approached a bridge over the Tigris 
River, one of KBR’s drivers lost control of the truck and went over the edge of the 
bridge, setting off a violent explosion as the truck fell.  Id. at 5.  Marquis A. Whitaker 
was operating a U.S. Army escort vehicle behind the truck and immediately stopped, 
but another KBR truck hit him from behind, causing his vehicle to teeter precariously 
on the edge of the bridge.  Id. at 5-6.  During his attempt to extricate himself from the 
vehicle, Whitaker fell off the bridge into the aqueduct and drowned.  Id. at 6.  In July 
2005, his surviving heirs brought a wrongful death suit.  Id. at 10.  KBR asserted state 
secrets, as well as the political question doctrine; the court later dismissed the case as 
nonjusticiable under the political question doctrine.  Whitaker, 444 F. Supp. 2d at 1282.   
169 Motion to Dismiss in Lessin, supra note 163, at 6. 
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function on its loading ramp and was forced to stop.170  The military 
secured the perimeter and Sergeant Sean Lessin, a member of the 
U.S. Army’s Bravo Battery, tried to help.  The ramp assist arm struck 
and injured him, requiring him to be evacuated by Army helicopter.171  
In May 2005, Lessin and his wife sued KBR for negligence.172  In its de-
fense, KBR stated that the case was nonjusticiable under the political 
question doctrine and was preempted by federal law interpreting the 
“combatant activities” exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act.173  
The company expressly reserved the right to claim that state secrets 
were at stake: 
[A]ny further prosecution or defense of this case may trigger the protec-
tions of the state secrets privilege because classified information may 
have been implicated regarding the supply needs of the United States 
military, its procedures for intelligence gathering and threat assessment, 
and its rules and protocols regarding force protection provided to civi-
lian contractors.174 
In other words, the company was not actually claiming that classi-
fied information was implicated—merely that it might arise in the fu-
ture, thus presenting a bar to discovery or preventing the case from 
moving forward altogether.  On the one hand, the inclusion of the 
reference may be seen as a good-faith effort to provide the court with 
notice of the issues that may arise.  On the other hand, the manner in 
which such an executive privilege enters into private litigation, and 
the potential chilling effect of such statements on the progress of such 
suits, are equally relevant. 
State secrets cases over the past eight years also include tort suits 
brought by nonmilitary personnel for contractor behavior related to the 
conduct of war.  DynCorp International’s work in offering major pro-
grams in law enforcement training and support, security services, base 
operations, aviation, contingency operations and logistics support to 
further “U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives” provides a 
prime example.175  Its predecessor, Land-Air, Inc., began by providing 
teams of technicians to maintain aircraft.  On its website, the company 
 
170 Id. 
171 Id.  The Army subsequently barred military convoy escort personnel from oper-
ating or repairing civilian vehicles absent direct command.  Id. 
172 Plaintiffs’ Original Complaint at 2-3, Lessin v. Kellogg Brown & Root, No. 05-
1853 (S.D. Tex. May 23, 2005), 2005 WL 1512296. 
173 28 U.S.C. § 2680( j) (2006). 
174 Motion to Dismiss in Lessin, supra note 163, at 8 n.2. 
175 Overview, DYNCORP INT’L, http://www.dyn-intl.com/overview.aspx (last visited 
Sept. 15, 2010). 
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boasts that it has now “broadened its reach” and has “recruited, trained, 
and deployed more than 6,000” soldiers to eleven countries, including 
Afghanistan and Iraq, for the U.S. Department of State.176  Further-
more, the company provides “logistics and contingency support to the 
U.S. military around the world,” including major contract task orders in 
Afghanistan and Kuwait to augment U.S. Army logistics capabilities, as 
well as support for African Union peacekeepers in Somalia.177  It also 
maintains more than 300 intelligence professionals within the United 
States and operates “on all continents except Antarctica.”178 
DynCorp has at times found itself the focus of public attention.  In 
2009 the company terminated one of its senior vice presidents, who al-
so served as the company’s chief compliance officer, following disclo-
sures that the firm had bribed officials through its subcontractors to 
“expedite the issuance of a limited number of visas and licenses from 
foreign government agencies”—potentially violating the Foreign Cor-
rupt Practices Act.179  The company has been implicated in sex crimes, 
including trafficking girls as young as twelve years old and running 
prostitution rackets, as well as engaging in the illegal arms trade.180  Ac-
 
176 Id. 
177 See Contingency Operations, DYNCORP INT’L, 1 (Feb. 2010), http://www.dyn-
intl.com/media/5585/dy376_dy322_033010_somalia_casestudy_2pg.pdf (detailing how 
DynCorp equipped, deployed, sustained, and trained all African Union peacekeepers 
as part of its service to U.S. Department of State); Press Release, DynCorp Int’l, Dyn-
Corp International Awarded New LOGCAP IV Task Order for Southern Afghanistan 
Support ( July 8, 2009) (announcing that the U.S. Army awarded DynCorp a new task 
order to provide existing Afghanistan bases with operations and maintenance sup-
port); Press Release, DynCorp Int’l, DynCorp International Has $77 Million LOGCAP 
IV Task Order in Kuwait (Feb. 18, 2009) (stating that the U.S. Army Sustainment 
Command awarded a task order to make DynCorp responsible for movement control 
operations and management of logistics and facilities needed for U.S. military person-
nel arriving in and departing Kuwait). 
178 Overview, supra note 175.  For more information on the history of DynCorp Inter-
national, see KEN SILVERSTEIN, PRIVATE WARRIORS 182-87 (2000), which describes Dyn-
Corp as “a hydra-headed firm” involved in state matters in Africa and South America. 
179 DynCorp Int’l LLC, Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 19 (Nov. 12, 2009); see 
also August Cole, DynCorp Fires Executive Counsel, WALL ST. J., Nov. 28–29, 2009, at B5 
(reporting the termination of DynCorp’s senior vice president, executive counsel, and 
chief compliance officer shortly after the firm disclosed that subcontractors may have 
broken U.S. law). 
180 See OFFICE OF DEPUTY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR INVESTIGATIONS, DEP’T OF DEF. OF-
FICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., ASSESSMENT OF DOD EFFORTS TO COMBAT TRAFFICKING 
IN PERSONS:  PHASE II—BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA AND KOSOVO 10-11 (2003) [hereinafter 
OFFICE OF DEPUTY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR INVESTIGATIONS], available at 
http://www.dodig.mil/fo/foia/HT-Phase_II.pdf (investigating claims of human traf-
ficking of underage women and a pornographic videotape that appeared to document 
a rape by DynCorp employees); see also Mary Alice Robbins, RICO Used in Wrongful-
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cording to congressional reports, the contractor overcharged the gov-
ernment in providing much-needed fuel in Iraq.181  The company also 
reportedly cut corners with regard to vital national security staffing, as-
signing “waitresses, security guards, cooks, and cashiers” to maintain 
combat aircraft.182  In a seventy-page amended complaint, a previous 
employee alleged ten company schemes, several of which involved 
many subschemes, to defraud the U.S. government.183 
DynCorp, on behalf of the U.S. government, also runs counter-
narcotics operations in South America.184  On September 11, 2001, a 
 
Termination Suit, TEX. LAW., Apr. 2, 2001, at 1, available at 2001 WLNR 12941467 (re-
porting a suit by a DynCorp whistleblower alleging DynCorp employees purchased 
women and girls from Serbian Mafia members who brought them into Bosnia from 
other Eastern European countries); Robert Capps, Sex-Slave Whistle-Blowers Vindicated, 
SALON.COM, (Aug. 6, 2002), http://dir.salon.com/story/news/feature/2002/08/06/ 
dyncorp/index.html (recounting that a tribunal in the U.K. vindicated a whistleblower 
of the DynCorp Bosnia sex trade by ruling in her favor). 
181 See OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION, JANU-
RARY QUARTERLY AND SEMIANNUAL REPORT 21 (2005), available at http://www.sigir.mil/ 
files/quarterlyreports/January2005/Report_-_January_2005.pdf (estimating that Dyn-
Corp may have overcharged the government by as much as $600,000, with a potential 
additional claim of $85,000). 
182 P. W. SINGER, supra note 58, at 156.  
183 The ten schemes were:   
seeking double reimbursement for travel expenses; seeking reimbursement 
for inflated or unearned per diem, danger pay, and post differential allow-
ances; charging the Government for services without verifying documentation, 
such as time cards; seeking reimbursement for employee living expenses such 
as cable television and lawn services that were not payable under the INLEA 
Contract; failing to return relocation expenses advanced by the Government 
when employees did not relocate or resigned shortly after relocating; failing to 
return payroll expenses advanced by the Government but never paid by Dyn-
corp; seeking reimbursement for severance payments and associated attor-
neys’ fees, which were not payable under the INLEA Contract; seeking reim-
bursement for employee expenses without supporting documentation; 
seeking reimbursement for compensation to unapproved employees; charging 
the Government for purported expenses that were actually embezzled by a 
Dyncorp employee, and failing to reimburse the Government upon discover-
ing the embezzlement; and seeking reimbursement for a variety of other gen-
eral expenses either not earned or not permitted under the INLEA Contracts, 
including double-charging for vacation pay, seeking reimbursement for rental 
car damages that were paid by an insurance company, and seeking reim-
bursement for employees’ personal travel and cell phone expenses. 
United States ex rel. Longest v. DynCorp, No. 03-0816, 2006 WL 47791, at *2 (M.D. Fla. 
Jan. 9, 2006). 
184 See Defendants’ Answer at 1, Quinteros v. DynCorp, 677 F. Supp. 2d 330 
(D.D.C. 2007) (No. 07-01042), 2007 WL 4459753 (admitting that the company had 
“acted pursuant to its contracts with the United States government to assist with the 
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class action lawsuit on behalf of 10,000 citizens of Ecuador was filed in 
the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia against DynCorp 
and several previous affiliates.185  The complaint alleged personal in-
jury, property damage, and wrongful death resulting from DynCorp’s 
fumigation of crops in Colombia and adjacent land in Ecuador. 
Four more lawsuits relating to the same underlying allegations fol-
lowed on December 4, 2006, December 29, 2006, March 14, 2007, and 
April 24, 2007.186  Three of these suits, filed on behalf of three Ecua-
dorian provinces, alleged violations of Ecuadorian law, international 
law, and Florida state statutory and common law, including negli-
gence, trespass, and nuisance; the fourth case, filed on behalf of 1663 
citizens of the Ecuadorian provinces of Esmeraldas and Sucumbíos, 
alleged personal injury, negligence, trespass, battery, assault, inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress, violations of the Alien Tort 
Claims Act,187 and violations of international law.188  DynCorp claimed 
as its fifth defense that it may not be able to defend itself in the suit 
“based on the U.S. government’s claims of confidentiality or ‘military 
and state secrets’ regarding documents that are necessary to prove the 
defendants’ lack of responsibility or culpability for the claims made 
against them in this suit.”189  The court consolidated the four suits on 
May 22, 2007, and transferred the case to the U.S. District Court for 
the District of Columbia.190 
In DynCorp’s Quarterly Report filed with the Securities and Ex-
change Commission on November 7, 2007, the company explained 
why it would not be held accountable for its actions:  “The spraying 
 
aerial eradication of coca and poppy plants in the Republic of Colombia”); see also 
DynCorp Int’l LLC, Quarterly Report, supra note 179, at 10. 
185 Id. 
186 Id. at 9. 
187 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). 
188 Consolidated Complaint at 14, Quinteros, 677 F. Supp. 2d 330 (No. 07-1042), 
2007 WL 4459752; see also DynCorp Int’l LLC, Quarterly Report, supra note 179, at 16. 
189 Defendants’ Answer, supra note 184, at 16. 
190 Consolidated Complaint, supra note 188, at 1-2.  The same set of facts gave rise 
to Province of Sucumbios v. DynCorp Int’l LLC, No. 06-61926 (S.D. Fla. filed Dec. 27, 
2006) and Province of Esmeraldas v. DynCorp Int’l LLC, No. 07-60311 (S.D. Fla. filed 
Mar. 5, 2007).  These two cases were consolidated into No. 06-61760 on May 18, 2008.  
Later, Quinteros v. DynCorp Aerospace Operations LLC, No. 06-61760 (S.D. Fla. filed 
Nov. 21, 2006) and Province of Carchi, Republic of Ecuador v. DynCorp Aerospace 
Operations LLC, No. 07-60550 (S.D. Fla. filed Apr. 17, 2007) were consolidated into 
No. 06-61760 on September 15, 2010.  Province of Carchi, No. 07-60550, at 2-3 (S.D. Fla. 
May 18, 2007) (order consolidating the actions and administratively closing case num-
ber 07-60550); Defendants’ Answer, supra note 184, at 1; see also DynCorp Int’l LLC, 
Quarterly Report, supra note 179, at 10. 
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operations were and continue to be conducted under a DoS [State 
Department] contract in cooperation with the Colombian govern-
ment.  The terms of the DoS contract provide that the DoS will in-
demnify the company against third-party liabilities arising out of the 
contract, subject to certain limitations.”191 
Among the most prominent of the state secrets suits are those cen-
tered on coercive interrogation and rendition.  While much of the fo-
cus has been on suits lodged against the executive branch and succes-
sive administrations’ stance on the privilege, precious little attention 
has been paid to such suits as a species of private indemnity.  In Mo-
hamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, five plaintiffs alleged that the company 
logged flight plans for the so-called “extraordinary rendition” of sus-
pects to third countries, where they were tortured and held without 
charge.192  Plaintiffs filed suit on May 30, 2007.193  Unusually, the United 
States moved to intervene in the case in October 2007—before Jeppe-
sen even answered the complaint.194  CIA Director General Michael 
Hayden then submitted declarations of state secrets.195  The district 
court, following an in camera, ex parte review of the classified version, 
concluded that the very subject matter of the suit represented a state 
secret, thus warranting dismissal.196  In January 2009, the Obama Ad-
ministration issued an executive order to ensure that the interrogation 
 
191 DynCorp Int’l LLC, Quarterly Report, supra note 179, at 10. 
192 Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 563 F.3d 992, 997-98 (9th Cir. 2009), 
amended and superseded by 579 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2009), reh’g granted, 586 F.3d 1108 (9th 
Cir. 2009), rev’d, 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc).  
193 Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1129-30 (N.D. Cal. 
2008), rev’d, 563 F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 2009), amended and superseded by 579 F.3d 949 (9th 
Cir. 2009), reh’g granted, 586 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2009), aff’d, 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 
2010) (en banc). 
194 Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., No. 07-02798, at 2 (N.D. Cal. Feb 13, 2008) 
(order granting the United States’ motion to intervene and granting the United States’ 
motion to dismiss with prejudice); Civil Minutes, Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 2d 
1128 (No. 07-02798); Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss, or, in the Alternative, for 
Summary Judgment by the United States of America at 7, Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 539 F. 
Supp. 2d 1128 (No. 07-02798), 2008 WL 273865; Memorandum of Plaintiffs in Opposi-
tion to the United States’ Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judg-
ment at 19, Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (No. 07-02798), 2007 WL 
4438281; Notice of Motion and Motion to Intervene at 2, Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 539 F. 
Supp. 2d 1128 (No. 07-02798), 2007 WL 3194319; Notice of Motion and Motion to Di-
miss, or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment by the United States of America at 2, 
Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (No. 07-02798), 2007 WL 3223297. 
195 See Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 563 F.3d at 999 (stating that Hayden filed two decla-
rations in support of the motion to dismiss, one of which was classified and the other 
public).  
196 Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 2d at 1132, 1136. 
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of individuals held by the United States be conducted in a manner 
consistent with the Geneva Conventions.197  The document went on to 
create a special task force to study rendition, with the purposes of 
ensur[ing] that such practices comply with the domestic laws, interna-
tional obligations, and policies of the United States and do not result in 
the transfer of individuals to other nations to face torture or otherwise 
for the purpose, or with the effect, of undermining or circumventing the 
commitments or obligations of the United States to ensure the humane 
treatment of individuals in its custody or control.
198
 
While it is important to distinguish between interrogation, rendi-
tion, and extraordinary rendition, these and other steps taken by the 
new Administration signaled a shift in U.S. policy away from transfer-
ring prisoners to other countries for coercive interrogation.199  Leon 
Panetta, moreover, subsequently stated during his confirmation hear-
ings for CIA Director that he would no longer engage in extraordinary 
rendition, as it had been outlawed by executive order.200  Nevertheless, 
the Obama Administration maintained its stance that the Jeppesen suit 
centered on a state secret and should not be allowed to proceed. 
 The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court.201  Judge Hawkins, 
writing for the panel, held that the suit was not barred under either 
Totten or Reynolds, that classification alone did not compel a finding of 
state secrets, and that the case should be allowed to proceed with state 
 
197 See Exec. Order No. 13,491, 74 Fed. Reg. 4893, 4894 ( Jan. 27, 2009) (prohibit-
ing “violence to life and person” and “[o]utrages upon personal dignity . . . whenever 
such individuals are in the custody or under the effective control of an officer, em-
ployee, or other agent of the United States Government or detained within a facility 
owned, operated, or controlled by a department or agency of the United States”). 
198 Id. at 4895; see also Exec. Order No. 13,493, 74 Fed. Reg. 4901, 4901 ( Jan. 27, 
2009) (creating a special task force to review lawful options with respect to the deten-
tion and transfer of individuals apprehended in armed conflict and counterterrorism 
operations consistent with national security and foreign policy interests). 
199 A U.S. Department of Justice Press Release in August 2009 stated that the Unit-
ed States would continue to send suspects to third-party countries after obtaining as-
surances that the prisoners would be treated humanely and after securing the ability to 
periodically monitor their individual situations.  See Daphne Eviatar, Commission Inquiry 
into Rendition May Rankle Obama Administration, WASH. INDEPENDENT, Aug. 27,  
2009, http://washingtonindependent.com/56888/commission-inquiry-into-rendition-
may-rankle-obama-administration (comparing the Obama Administration’s approach to 
that of the Bush Administration and suggesting that the Department of Justice Press Re-
lease indicates the Obama Administration may be resistant to an inquiry into rendition). 
200 Editorial, Not Even a Little Torture, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2009, at A24. 
201 Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 563 F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 2009), amended 
and superseded by 579 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2009), reh’g granted, 586 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 
2009), rev’d, 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
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secrets treated as an evidentiary rule, not a justiciability doctrine.202  
On December 15, 2009, the Ninth Circuit assembled en banc to re-
consider the case.203  In a 6-5 decision, the court ruled that the five 
plaintiffs could not use even public documents to make a case that the 
company played a pivotal role in the rendition program.204  Judge 
Raymond Fisher, writing for the majority, suggested that the executive 
branch could make reparations to the five men—or the legislature 
could open an investigation, pass a private bill, or introduce remedial 
legislation.  But the judiciary’s hands were tied.205 
Jeppesen is not the only case to challenge the role of private con-
tractors in the exercise of interrogation.  On June 30, 2008, an Iraqi 
filed a complaint against CACI International, L-3 Services (formerly 
Titan Corporation), and Timothy Dugan, formerly employed as a 
screener and interrogator for CACI International, in the U.S. District 
Court for Ohio, Southern District, Eastern Division.206  The plaintiff 
alleged repeated torture at the hands of defendants (including elec-
tric shock, beatings, food deprivation, sleep deprivation, sensory de-
privation, extreme temperature exposure, forced nakedness, stress 
positions, and death threats) while imprisoned in Abu Ghraib.207  The 
suit centered on violations of domestic and international law, with 
counts including cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment; torture; 
war crimes; assault and battery; sexual assault and battery; intentional 
infliction of emotional distress; negligent hiring and supervision; and 
civil conspiracy, as well as aiding and abetting to many of the same.208  
The court granted the defendant’s motion to change venue in August 
2008, at which point the case was transferred to the Eastern District of 
Virginia.209  The court subsequently dismissed the plaintiff’s claims 
against L-3 and Dugan without prejudice, accepting an amended 
 
202 Id. at 1004-07. 
203 Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d at 1070. 
204 See id. at 1094 (Hawkins, J., dissenting) (“[Plaintiffs] are not even allowed to 
attempt to prove their case by the use of nonsecret evidence in their own hands or in 
the hands of third parties.”). 
205 Id. at 1091-92 (majority opinion); see also Laura K. Donohue, State Secrets:  Con-
tractors’ Easy Out, WASH. POST, Oct. 8, 2010, at A19. 
206 Civil Complaint and Jury Demand at 1-3, Al Shimari v. Dugan, No. 08-0637 
(S.D. Ohio June 30, 2008). 
207 Id. at 4-5. 
208 Id. at 16-29. 
209 Al Shimari, No. 08-0637 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 7, 2008) (order granting transfer of 
venue). 
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complaint on September 15, 2008.210  The case, which continued 
against CACI, is currently on appeal following partial denial of CACI’s 
motion to dismiss. 
As of the time of writing, although CACI has claimed protection 
under the state secrets privilege, the Department of Defense has 
represented that it does not intend to intervene.211  Nevertheless, the 
case illustrates how uneasily the PMC phenomenon sits within the 
current law.  Had the contractors been troops enlisted in service of 
the U.S. government, and had the state come forward to claim the 
state secrets privilege, the court’s hands would be tied.  However, it is 
not at all clear how the court should treat a similar assertion from a 
private corporation—nor is it clear how, exactly, international law 
could be applied to a private actor: 
 THE COURT:  You want me to go way down the road on this, and I’m 
trying to understand how do I instruct the jury on such a thing. . . .  
 . . . . 
 . . . [T]he soldier would be absolutely immune if the government 
came forward and asserted immunity. 
 [ATTORNEY FOR THE PLAINTIFFS]:  That’s correct, Your Honor.  And in 
the same way, what they’re asking for here basically is to put themselves 
in the shoes of the soldiers.  And they’re not allowed to be in the shoes 
of the soldiers for a couple reasons.  They’re corporate employees who 
had a contractual duty to obey the law.  And the United States, the mili-
tary, has not intervened. . . . 
 . . . . 
 The military has also represented that it does not intend to invoke 
the state secrets.  So what you’re really dealing with here is you’re deal-
ing with a group of people, some of whom are military and some of 
whom are corporate employees, all of whom are bad actors in the sense 
that they conspired to torture. 
 Now, they have different—they have different levels of immunity. . . . 
But the duty, the duty is the same.  They all have the same duty not to 
torture. 
 THE COURT:  Well, I don’t think that anyone disputes nor I don’t [sic] 
think that CACI is saying it has any right to torture. . . . 
 
210 Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l, Inc., No. 08-0827 (E.D. Va. Sept. 12, 2008) (order 
dismissing claims against Dugan without prejudice); Al Shimari, No. 08-0827 (E.D. Va. 
Aug. 20, 2008) (order dismissing claims against L-3 without prejudice); Amended 
Complaint, Al Shimari, No. 08-0827 (E.D. Va. Sept. 15, 2008). 
211 Transcript of Motions Hearing at 20, Al Shimari, No. 08-0827 (E.D. Va. Oct. 24, 
2008). 
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 The more precise legal question I have today is whether the victim of 
torture in a battlefield circumstances [sic] who has been detained in the 
military prison can come into federal court and assert some type of tort 
claim against the soldiers or the private—more precisely the private con-
tractor who carried out the interrogation and allegedly carried out the 
torture.  That is the legal question. . . . 
 . . . . 
 . . . [T]he claim here is one of some type of negligence of some sort, 
and I don’t know what that is.  I mean, I know that it violates Geneva 
Convention and the law.  You shouldn’t torture people.  But what is the 
duty here? . . . 
 . . . . 
 . . . [M]y question has to do with the government contractors who are 
interrogators or others who are breaking the law by torturing people in a 
battle zone in a military prison whether such a case has been brought to 
trial in federal court. 
 . . . . 
 Why shouldn’t a government contractor who has been engaged to 
carry on a government function which is interrogation of detainees in a 
military detention be held immunized from suit as if they were soldiers?  
Aren’t they soldiers in all but uniform?
212
 
Indeed, why shouldn’t government contractors, fulfilling the same 
functions as soldiers, benefit from the same legal protections?  The 
question is whether contractors would thus be subject to the same mil-
itary rules which, in the absence of civil penalties, apply to soldiers.213 
The case also brings out the difficult position in which a court 
confronted with such cases finds itself. 
 [ATTORNEY FOR THE PLAINTIFFS]:  [P]erhaps on your precise question 
as to whether a government contractor has been brought to a jury, the 
answer to that I believe is no. 
 
212 Transcript of Motions Hearing, supra note 211, at 19-23, 31. 
213 In 2006, Congress amended one of the jurisdictional provisions of the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 802(a) (2006), to extend jurisdiction over “persons 
accompanying the armed forces in the field” to include both contingency operations and 
declared wars.  John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, 
Pub. L. No. 109 -364, § 552, 120 Stat. 2083, 2217 (2006) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)).  
The change could allow courts-martial jurisdiction to reach contractors.  There is some 
question as to whether this provision would survive judicial review.  See Reid v. Covert, 354 
U.S. 1, 3, 39-41 (1957) (holding that the military could not try the civilian wife of a sol-
dier under military jurisdiction for the murder of her husband, which occurred on a mil-
itary base).  Appellate review of this authority has yet to occur. 
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 THE COURT:  So I would be the first district judge in America to allow 
such a claim to go forward? 
 [ATTORNEY FOR THE PLAINTIFFS]:  Yes, Your Honor. 
 THE COURT:  The first out of 1,236 district judges to let it go forward? 
 [ATTORNEY FOR THE PLAINTIFFS]:  Your Honor, Judge Robertson in the 
District of Columbia just a few miles across the river was letting it go for-
ward.  It’s up on appeal, but he let it go forward. . . . 
 THE COURT:  I know Judge Robertson.  I would follow his opinion if I 
thought that it was judicially sound.  And it may be in a D.C. Circuit. 
 I’m in the Fourth Circuit and as you know, we’ve had Hamdi and sev-
eral other cases involving Moussaoui where this circuit is really conserva-
tive and they are, you know, very expansive in their view of what the gov-
ernment can do particularly in a wartime and a battlefield. 
 District judges around here have been beaten down three or four 
times involving those issues.  It’s only been the Supreme Court that 
stood up and said well, wait a minute in Hamdi, the right of habeas cor-
pus does apply on the battlefield to people detained here. 
 So, I’m in a Fourth Circuit circumstance where I’ve got to be very 
thoughtful about how I do this.  And so, if I’m going to do this, this one 
sentence from Judge Robertson’s opinion is not going to help me.
214
 
The application of international law to contractors involved in 
hostilities in Afghanistan and Iraq raises novel questions.  Courts ap-
pear uneasy about being the first to forge into such new territory. 
Additional suits against CACI, alleging torture, are working their 
way through the courts.215  These and other cases demonstrate the dif-
 
214 Id. at 24-26. 
215 In June 2004, a class action lawsuit alleging violations of the Racketeer Influ-
enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 (2006), the 
Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, the Geneva Conventions, the U.S. Constitu-
tion, and common law torts was brought against Titan Corporation, CACI Internation-
al, and contractors at Abu Ghraib.  Class Action Alleging Violations of RICO, Conspir-
acy to Violate RICO, Violations of the Alien Tort Claims Act, Violations of the Geneva 
Convention, Violations of the United States Constitution, Violations of the Religious 
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, and Common Law Torts at 1, Al Rawi v. 
Titan Corp., 353 F. Supp. 2d 1087 (S.D. Cal. 2004) (No. 04-1143), 2004 WL 2545652.  
The complaint stated,  
Defendants contracted with the United States to provide interrogation and 
other related intelligence services.  Instead of providing such services in a law-
ful manner, they conspired with each other and with certain United States 
government officials to direct and conduct a scheme to torture, rape, and, in 
some instances, summarily execute Plaintiffs.  
Id.  Plaintiff sought a permanent injunction against the conduct, compensatory and 
punitive damages, treble damages, attorneys’ fees under RICO, declaratory relief, and 
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ficulty of addressing the role of PMCs under more traditional military 
doctrines.216  For the most part, these suits are still in their early stages; 
it is too soon to know on which defenses the defendants will rely or 
whether the Department of Defense will step in to support their state 
secrets claims.  These suits reflect the many different functions private 
industry has assumed in national security, both in the multitude of in-
dustries implicated and the degree to which private actors now popu-
late traditional military operations. 
 
a permanent injunction against any future contracting with the U.S. government.  Id.  
In a parallel case, also brought in the Southern District of California, plaintiffs again 
lodged a suit against Titan, CACI International, and others.  See Saleh v. Titan Corp., 
361 F. Supp. 2d 1152, 1155 (S.D. Cal. 2005) (suing for alleged abuses in Iraqi prisons).  
For a discussion of the relationship between these cases, see Motion to Intervene for 
Purposes of Opposing Plaintiffs’ Motion to Enjoin Pending ‘Duplicative Action’ in Dis-
trict of Columbia and Brief in Support Thereof at 1-3, Saleh, 361 F. Supp. 2d 1152 (No. 
04-1143), 2004 WL 2714618.  The defendants in Saleh asked the court to enjoin anoth-
er suit brought in the District of Columbia, Complaint, Ibrahim v. Titan Corp., 556 F. 
Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2007) (No. 04-01248), 2004 WL 1773191, on the grounds that the 
Ibrahim suit was duplicative and sought redress for the same harms.  See Iraqi Prisoners 
Fight Dismissal of Suit Against Contractors, ANDREWS LITIG. REP., Dec. 16, 2004, at 3, 3-4 
(summarizing the claims in Al Rawi and the parallel litigation pursued in Ibrahim).  
CACI objected that   
[b]ecause most, if not all, of the evidence relating to each detainee’s arrest 
and detention is likely highly sensitive and in the possession of the United 
States government, it also is likely that the United States will assert a state se-
crets privilege to prevent discovery of these materials. . . . This is precisely the 
type of wartime claim that defies resolution through the judicial process.   
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of the Motion of Defendants CACI 
International Inc., CACI INC.-FEDERAL, and CACI N.V. to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Second 
Amended Complaint at 15-16, Saleh, 361 F. Supp. 2d 1152 (No. 04-01143), 2004 WL 
5577919. 
216 See, e.g., Fisher v. Halliburton, 454 F. Supp. 2d 637, 642-44 (S.D. Tex. 2006) 
(deciding whether certain actions were taken by the Army or the private military con-
tractor), rev’d sub nom. Lane v. Halliburton, 529 F.3d 548, 568 (5th Cir. 2008).  Some 
suits have been dismissed on the grounds that they raise nonjusticiable political ques-
tions.  See, e.g., Smith v. Halliburton Co., No. 06-0462, 2006 WL 2521326, at *5-6 (S.D. 
Tex. Aug. 30, 2006) (“Even if defendants had some responsibility for implementing 
force protection measures promulgated by the military, the court would still be called 
upon to examine the military’s decision-making in many respects . . . .”); Whitaker v. 
Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 2d 1277, 1282 (M.D. Ga. 2006) (finding that 
“no judicially discoverable and manageable standards” existed to resolve the questions 
presented).  But not all such suits have come out this way, as PMC cases often sit unea-
sily in the Baker analysis.  See, e.g., Lane, 529 F.3d at 568 (“It appears . . . that these tort-
based claims of civilian employees against their civilian employers can be separated from 
the political questions that loom so large in the background.”); cf. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 
186, 228 (1962) (“[T]he nonjusticiability of claims resting on the Guaranty Clause which 
arises from their embodiment of questions that were thought ‘political’ can have no bear-
ing upon the justiciability of the equal protection claim presented in this case.”). 
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Two final points are left to make about these contractor cases.    
First, in many of them, defendants answered complaints by claiming 
state secrets as an affirmative defense well before—and often in the 
absence of—the government intervening and formally invoking the 
privilege.  But as seen in the foregoing examples, and by the amount 
of time such suits take to work their way through the courts, the spec-
ter of state secrets may play a significant role.  The mere assertion of 
state secrets by a government contractor may help to get a suit re-
moved to federal court, at which point lengthy delays may ensue as 
the contractor, either unable or unwilling to pressure the government 
to provide enough information even to sustain the state secrets claim, 
draws out the suit. 
Second, the effect of companies claiming that state secrets are at 
stake in one suit may have important carryover effects on the imme-
diate suit and in parallel, related actions—even without the state for-
mally intervening and invoking the privilege.  On September 11, 2004, 
for example, a Hellenic Army CH-47D Chinook helicopter crashed in-
to the Aegean Sea.217  Three years later, the survivors of four Greek 
passengers who died in the accident brought suit in Cook County, Il-
linois, alleging product liability.218  The following day, the plaintiffs 
filed a virtually identical complaint in the U.S. District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania.219  Boeing removed the case to the 
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois on the grounds 
of federal officer removal and federal jurisdiction arising from the 
Death on the High Seas Act;220 it then filed a motion to transfer the 
case to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, where the two cases could 
be consolidated.221  In doing so, Boeing again claimed both a govern-
ment contractor and a state secrets privilege defense. 
Boeing invokes the State Secrets Privilege.  The CH-47D helicopter is the 
United States Army’s primary multi-mission, heavy-lift transport helicop-
ter, providing tactical and combat support for armed forces at wartime.  
The CH-47D helicopter is also a key combat support tool for the Hellen-
ic Army’s armed forces.  Furthermore, the crash of the subject helicopter 
occurred while members of the Hellenic Army were transporting a 
number of high officials of the Greek Orthodox Church, including Pe-
tros VII, the Patriarch of the Church.  Some information relevant to is-
 
217 Defendant The Boeing Company’s Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand 
at 1, Papapetrou v. Boeing Co., No. 07-5862 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 4, 2007), 2007 WL 4874802. 
218 Id. 
219 Id. 
220 46 U.S.C. §§ 30301–30308 (2006). 
221 Id. at 1-2. 
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sues herein may, therefore, be state secrets about which the United 
States and/or Greek Governments may assert privilege, thereby impair-
ing Boeing’s ability to defend itself herein.
222
 
Honeywell International, also named as a defendant in the suit, 
similarly raised state secrets as an affirmative defense.223  And Boeing 
again raised state secrets as a defense in a parallel suit.224 
C.  State Secrets as a Litigation Strategy 
The contractor cases suggest that we are just now starting to see 
lawsuits coming out of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, that we should 
expect to see more of them in the years ahead, and that private corpo-
rations are counting on the government to intervene on their behalf. 
For many of these suits, it is too early to know what will happen.225  
Thus far, at least, the executive seems to have adopted a conservative 
 
222 Defendant The Boeing Company’s Notice of Removal at 5, Papapetrou, No. 07-
5892 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 17, 2007), 2007 WL 4874834 (citations omitted).   
223 Answer of Honeywell International Inc. to Plaintiffs’ Complaint at 13, Papape-
trou, No. 07-5892 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 19, 2007), 2007 WL 3232423. 
224 See The Boeing Company’s Answer to Plaintiff’s Complaint at Law at 10, Nolan 
Law Grp. v. Boeing Co., No. 09-8056 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Dec. 30, 2009) (stating as the sixth 
affirmative defense:  “The Complaint, and each purported cause of action therein, may 
be barred, in whole or in part, if either the United States Government or the Greek 
Government invokes the state’s secrets privilege to preclude production of information 
necessary to Boeing’s defense or to Plaintiffs’ prima facie case.”); see also Complaint and 
Demand for Jury Trial at 2, Kerwood v. Lear Siegler Servs., No. 05-61790 (S.D. Fla. 
Nov. 21, 2005), 2005 WL 3522813 (alleging a helicopter crash on November 23, 2003); 
Answer and Affirmative Defenses of Defendant Smith’s Aerospace LLC to Second 
Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 10, Kerwood, No. 05-61790 (S.D. Fla. 
Jan. 30, 2005), 2005 WL 3791283 (claiming a denial of due process if the United States 
invokes the state secrets privilege to limit discovery).  The state secrets privilege was 
similarly asserted in a sister suit.  See Answer and Affirmative Defenses of Defendant 
Smith’s Aerospace LLC to Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 10, La-
Pointe-Plumhoff v. Lear Siegler Servs., Inc., No. 05-61791 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 30, 2006), 
2006 WL 424023 (“Invocation of the state secrets privilege by the United States gov-
ernment will preclude SMITHS from obtaining full and necessary discovery, and the-
reby result in a denial of due process.”). 
225 Many more cases, ripe for state secrets assertions, loom on the horizon.  For 
example, on September 9, 2007, Blackwater employees opened fire in Al Wathba 
Square, Baghdad, killing unarmed civilians in an incident described in the complaint 
as merely “one episode in a lengthy pattern of egregious misconduct by Xe-Blackwater 
acting in Iraq, Afghanistan and around the world.”  Complaint at 4, In re Xe Servs. 
Alien Tort Litig., 665 F. Supp. 2d 569 (E.D. Va. 2009) (No. 09-00616), 2009 WL 
2390908.  This case was one of five similar claims brought against the company, alleging 
violation of the Alien Tort Statute and the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations 
Act—suits consolidated for purposes of discovery and retrial motions.  See In re Xe Servs. 
Alien Tort Litig., 665 F. Supp. 2d at 569, 573 (combining Nos. 09-0615, 09-0616, 09-
0617, 09-0618, and 09-0645).  In total, some sixty-four plaintiffs (forty-five Iraqi nationals 
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approach:  it only joins once it is clear that a suit is going to move for-
ward, and, even then, only in a subset of cases.  At the broadest level, it 
appears that breach of contract, patent disputes, trade secrets, and tort 
cases centered on traditional military equipment give rise to more fed-
eral intervention than do class action torts or conduct-of-war disputes.  
But hedging must accompany any such tentative conclusions, as it is 
really too early to ascertain what the executive will do.226 
What does appear to be consistent is that once an administration 
becomes involved and invokes the privilege, subsequent administra-
tions hold the line.  Why they do so may be important:  for instance, it 
may be that, in every case, the new administration scrutinizes the list 
of cases it has inherited and concludes that the invocation of the privi-
lege is valid.  This explanation suggests that a merits analysis would 
find little out of order in how the doctrine operates in the courts.  As 
a practical matter, however, this explanation is unlikely, not least be-
cause the Obama Administration appears to be the first to try to com-
pile a list of state secrets cases.  It is also highly doubtful that, over the 
past seven decades, not a single case out of hundreds demonstrated 
an improper invocation.  Reynolds itself was based on a questionable 
claim.227  More plausible explanations might point to bureaucratic in-
ertia or the continued presence of the same civil servants that played a 
key role in the earlier period.  Or it may be that there is very little 
downside to continuing the previous administration’s policies while, 
on the other hand, there is much to gain by invoking state secrets.  In 
some cases, it may simply relate to agencies’ broad policies—such as 
intelligence organizations’ blanket refusal to confirm or deny em-
ployment contracts—and to raise the state secrets privilege whenever 
such issues reach court. 
 
and the estates of nineteen deceased Iraqi nationals) sought damages for wrongful death 
and personal injury when Blackwater contractors shot or beat them.  Id. at 573-74.  Thus 
far, the suit has turned in large measure on the political question doctrine, but the pat-
tern closely fits other tort clams in which the defendants assert the state secrets privilege. 
226 Dozens of cases are still working their way through the courts, the outcomes of 
which could significantly skew the statistics.  
227 United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953).  The declassified report later 
demonstrated that the crash was caused by a fire in the aircraft’s engine.  Petition for a 
Writ of Error Coram Nobis to Remedy Fraud Upon This Court app. at 10a, In re Herring, 
539 U.S. 940 (2003) (No. 02-0076) (Report of Special Investigation of Aircraft Acci-
dent Involving TB-29-100XX No. 45-21866).  A subsequent application to the Supreme 
Court for a writ of error coram nobis failed.  In re Herring, 539 U.S. at 940.  The case was 
refiled.  See Herring v. United States, 424 F.3d 384, 392 (3d Cir. 2009) (finding no 
fraud in the government’s assertion of the privilege in 1953 on the grounds that some 
of the information contained in the report, in historic context, might have compro-
mised national security). 
DONOHUE FINAL REVISED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/18/2010  11:10 AM 
2010] The Shadow of State Secrets 131 
Setting aside questions of justice, practical arguments militate 
against the use of state secrets in regard to breach of contract and pa-
tent disputes.  Under such conditions, the state secrets privilege may 
prevent whistleblowers from being able to draw attention to contrac-
tors’ failure to perform.  For example, in a June 4, 2001, whistleblower 
qui tam action alleging that Raytheon had failed to perform on a de-
fense contract, the Bush Administration invoked the state secrets privi-
lege on January 15, 2003, and moved to dismiss the case, a request 
granted on February 24, 2003.228  The state secrets privilege may similar-
ly encourage contractors to engage in poor business practices with re-
gard to subcontractors.  Thus, pilots and flight crewmembers denied 
promised “hazard pay” for flights into and out of Baghdad, Iraq and 
Kabul, Afghanistan brought a class action lawsuit against Vision Air-
lines.229  The defendant in the case claimed state secrets in relation to its 
contracts and payments with upstream contractors.230  Smaller compa-
nies that specialize in cutting-edge technologies, moreover, may be-
come reluctant to partner with corporations who essentially steal their 
technologies and then draw the veil of state secrets over the dispute.  
And larger companies may see little incentive not to adopt such preda-
tory behavior. 
 
228 Civil Minutes, United States ex rel. Schwartz v. Raytheon Co., No. 01-4937 (C.D. 
Cal. Feb. 24, 2003). 
229 Class Action Complaint at 2, Hester v. Vision Airlines, Inc., No. 09-00117 (D. 
Nev. Jan. 20, 2009), 2009 WL 274237. 
230 The docket records dispute the degree to which Vision Airlines is asserting 
state secrets.  Compare Plaintiff’s Reply in Support of the Motion to Compel at 5-6, Hes-
ter, No. 09-00117 (D. Nev. Aug. 6, 2009), 2009 WL 2481871 (“Vision’s statement that its 
‘objections on the basis of the State Secrets Doctrine [are] limited to items requesting 
discovery related to its contracts and payments there under [sic] with upstream con-
tractors, mainly Capital and McNeil’ is demonstrably false.  It has made no such effort 
to limit the assertion of this privilege, which it has no right to assert in any event, and 
instead has made blanket use of it in response to requests for production number 1, 9, 
13, 15, and 19, and as to interrogatories number 1, 2, and 4.  As we understand it, only 
the government contract itself is classified.  Further, we do not believe that Vision is in 
possession of any classified documents, making its objections on this ground bad 
faith.”), with Defendant Vision Airlines, Inc.’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion to 
Compel and Defendant Vision Airlines, Inc.’s Countermotion to Compel at 13-14, Hes-
ter, No. 09-00117 (D. Nev. July 27, 2009), 2009 WL 2350802 (arguing that the defen-
dants successfully invoked the privilege), and Defendant Vision Airlines, Inc.’s Opposi-
tion to Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel and Defendant Vision Airlines, Inc.’s 
Countermotion to Compel at 13, Hester, No. 09-00117 (D. Nev. July 27, 2009), 2009 WL 
2350803 (“Defendant VISION’S objections on the basis of the State Secrets Doctrine is 
limited to items requesting discovery related to its contracts and payments there under 
[sic] with upstream contractors, mainly Capital and McNeil.”). 
DONOHUE FINAL REVISED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/18/2010  11:10 AM 
132 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 159: 77 
On the contractor side, the suits implicate a spectrum of legal 
claims, and they involve a range of industries.  The changing role of 
contractors in mainstream military activities, though, sits uneasily in 
the current legal regime.  Private companies are not subject to the 
same constraints as the military.  They do not fall directly within the 
U.S. command-and-control structure, and they often provide services 
that blur the lines between civilian and military functions.  A U.S. mili-
tary study on DoD contractors, created in response to concern that 
private entities were engaging in criminal activity, found that although 
contract employees were considered part of the military fighting 
force, they were “not subject to the same restrictions that are placed 
on U.S. Service members.”231  The study explained: 
[C]ontractor employees are sometimes permitted to live outside U.S.-
controlled military installations and, with few restrictions, to circulate in 
host country communities. . . . DoD contractors also employ many host 
country nationals, all of whom live in local communities and whose be-
havior is neither restricted nor monitored by DoD authorities.  As mem-
bers of SFOR and KFOR, contractor employees are forbidden from pa-
tronizing establishments designated by the United Nations or the 
European Union Police Mission as off-limits because of illegal prostitu-
tion and human trafficking concerns.  However, we found that while 
some contractors make an effort to monitor their employees’ activities 
and address employee misconduct, contractor behavior in this regard is 
not uniform.  Not surprisingly, anecdotal evidence suggested some level 
of DoD contractor employee involvement in activities related to human 
trafficking in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo.
232
 
Efforts to control corporate entities through contractual require-
ments may only be of limited effect.  Between 2001 and 2009, for in-
stance, Blackwater (recently renamed Xe Services), obtained some 
$1.5 billion in government contracts.233  The company’s founder and 
former Navy SEAL, Erik Prince, later confirmed that the company had 
participated in highly sensitive military and intelligence operations, 
including raids on suspected militants in Iraq and Afghanistan, and 
claimed that at one point the CIA asked the company to assassinate 
Pakistani nuclear scientist, A. Q. Khan.234 
 
231 OFFICE OF DEPUTY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 180, at 2. 
232 Id. 
233 Adam Ciralsky, Tycoon, Contractor, Soldier, Spy, VANITY FAIR, Jan. 2010, at 74, 75-76. 
234 Ciralsky, supra note 233, at 121; see also Blackwater USA:  Hearing Before the H. 
Comm. On Oversight and Gov’t Reform, supra note 141, at 23 (statement of Erik D. Prince, 
Chairman, The Prince Group, LLC and Blackwater USA) (examining the impact of 
privatization on U.S. military forces); James Risen, Blackwater Chief at Nexus of Military 
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On September 16, 2007, Blackwater contractors were assigned to a 
Tactical Support Team, call sign “‘Raven 23,’ whose function was to 
provide back-up fire support for other Blackwater personal security 
details operating in the city of Baghdad.”235  The contractors “opened 
fire with automatic weapons and grenade launchers on unarmed civi-
lians located in and around Nisur Square in central Baghdad, killing 
at least fourteen people, wounding at least twenty people, and assault-
ing but not injuring at least eighteen others.”236  In December 2008, a 
federal grand jury indicted five of the company’s security guards on 
charges of manslaughter and weapons violations, while a sixth pled 
guilty to charges of voluntary manslaughter.237 
In this case, the defendants’ signing of conditions for employment 
as State Department contractors played a role in the plea, as the State 
Department’s Mission Firearms Policy required that the use of deadly 
force to be objectively reasonable under all the circumstances known 
to the individual at the time.238  The State Department contract, how-
ever, was not sufficient for a District of Columbia court to uphold a 
parallel civil action brought for war crimes under the Alien Tort 
 
and Business, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2007, at A6 (analyzing the relationship between Erik 
Prince’s political connections and his success). 
235 Factual Proffer in Support of Guilty Plea at 2, United States v. Ridgeway, No. 
08-0341 (D.D.C. Nov. 18, 2008); see also United States v. Slough, 677 F. Supp. 112, 115 
(D.D.C. 2009) (“In their zeal to bring charges against the defendants in this case, the 
prosecutors and investigators aggressively sought out statements the defendants had 
been compelled to make to government investigators in the immediate aftermath of 
the shooting and in the subsequent investigation.”); Information, Ridgeway, No. 08-
0341 (D.D.C. Dec. 4, 2008) (alleging voluntary manslaughter and attempt to commit 
voluntary manslaughter). 
236 Factual Proffer in Support of Guilty Plea, supra note 235, at 2.  However, Slough 
describes the factual circumstances differently. 
[A] shooting incident erupted, during which the defendants allegedly shot 
and killed fourteen persons and wounded twenty others.  The government 
contends that the dead and wounded were unarmed civilians who were the 
victims of unprovoked violence by the defendants.  The defendants maintain 
that they came under attack by insurgents and that their actions constituted a 
legitimate response to a mortal threat. 
Slough, 677 F. Supp. 2d at 116 (citation omitted). 
237 Indictment at 1, 3, Slough, 677 F. Supp. 2d 112 (No. 08-0360); see also Factual 
Proffer in Support of Guilty Plea, supra note 235, at 2 (describing the factual circums-
tances surrounding the deaths that occurred in Nisur Square).  Judge Urbina later 
dismissed the indictment against Paul Slough, Evan Liberty, Dustin Heard, Donald 
Ball, and Nicholas Slatten on the grounds that the government utilized statements 
made to Department of State investigators that had been compelled under threat of 
job loss.  Slough, 677 F. Supp. 2d at 115-16, 166. 
238 Factual Proffer in Support of Guilty Plea, supra note 235, at 3. 
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Claims Act, assault and battery, wrongful death, intentional and negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress, and negligent hiring, training, 
and supervision.239 
Contractor use of the state secrets privilege as an affirmative de-
fense does have important benefits:  it gives the other party early notice 
that concerns about confidential state material may hamper discovery 
or the development of the suit.  In this capacity, private corporations’ 
reference to the privilege may end up saving litigants money and re-
sources, even as it alerts the courts to potentially problematic aspects of 
the claims in question.  Such reference may also serve as a trigger for 
executive branch action, thus putting the burden on private corpora-
tions and not on the state to alert it to the public release of potentially 
damaging information.  This does not absolve the government of its 
responsibility to recognize where its interests might be implicated, but 
it may be thought of as providing a safety net. 
The mention of state secrets also may have other intended or un-
intended consequences:  as illustrated above, federal courts may re-
move cases from the state level, based in part on the state secrets 
claim.240  Such claims often appear to lead to lengthy lawsuits.  In an 
altercation with Overland Storage, Inc., for example, Raytheon 
claimed that its “government customer of the programs at issue ha[d] 
informed Raytheon that these programs are state secrets”; however, 
efforts to obtain “a formal letter asserting the state secrets privilege” 
had “required the use of intermediaries,” which had slowed the 
 
239 See Estate of Abtan v. Blackwater Lodge & Training Ctr., 611 F. Supp. 2d 1, 1, 4 
(D.D.C. 2009) (staying the defendants’ motion to allow plaintiffs to request discovery 
on venue).  
240 In addition to the documents cited above, see Plaintiffs’ Opposition in Getz, 
supra note 121, at 1, which contends that the defendants had not identified the addi-
tional, specific information they needed from the Army.  See also Defendant The Boe-
ing Company’s Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion to Remand, supra note 217, at 2 (ar-
guing that the removal was not “defective”); Motion to Remand, supra note 160, at 6 
(pointing out defendant’s “weak” assertions).  For example, Defendant’s Notice of 
Removal in Finnegan contains the following:   
 In addition, because Plaintiffs’ claims may implicate military classified in-
formation, the federal doctrine of state secrets is potentially applicable.  Un-
der United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953), the Executive Branch may in-
voke an absolute evidentiary privilege encompassing state secrets whose 
disclosure would harm the national security. . . . 
 Removal to this Court is proper in that federal question jurisdiction exists . . . . 
Notice of Removal at 4, Finngean v. Lucent Techs. Inc., No. 07-03261 (D.N.J. July 13, 
2007), 2007 WL 4648084. 
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process.241  In another Raytheon case, at the defendant’s urging, the 
court extended the deadline for the government to intervene and in-
voke state secrets—with a consequence of further drawing out the liti-
gation.242  Lengthy time delays have become a common complaint of 
those involved in such suits.243 
Facing a long process, which, in light of the credible threat de-
termination, may well end in dismissal prior to trial, may prove a sig-
nificant deterrent to litigants.  Plaintiffs in tort cases, who may be 
suing for medical and other basic expenses, may not have the re-
sources to engage in litigation, particularly if there is a high probabili-
ty that the suit will be voided owing to the presence of state secrets 
further down the line.  The same may hold for small technology com-
panies, suing over patent rights or breach of contract.  This may be no 
less true for suits lodged against the U.S. government where the po-
tential applicability of the state secrets privilege is claimed or a stay of 
proceedings is requested to consider the state secrets implications.244 
 
241 Raytheon Company’s Opposition to Overland Storage Inc’s Motion to Compel 
Production of Documents Relating to Classified Programs at 2, Raytheon Co. v. Over-
land Storage, Inc., No. 03-0013 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 3, 2004), 2004 WL 3359781. 
242 See Wells v. Raytheon Sys. Co., No. 00-10922, at 2 (C.D. Cal. May 29, 2001) (or-
der extending the deadline for government assertion of the state secrets privilege to July 
13, 2001); Wells, No. 00-10922, at 23-25 (C.D. Cal. July 11, 2001) (order granting in part 
and denying in part defendant’s motion for review and reconsideration) (extending the 
state secret assertion deadline to August 3, 2001, and refusing plaintiff’s argument that 
Raytheon waived the privilege by failing to assert it); Wells, No. 00-10922, at 1, 35 (C.D. 
Cal. Jan. 17, 2002) (order from January 17, 2002, granting summary judgment for the 
defendant, which was then filed on January 25, 2002). 
243 See, e.g., Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Individual Capacity Defendants’ Motion for 
Relief from the Court’s Orders of April 27, 2009, and May 8, 2009 at 1, Jewel v. Nat’l 
Sec. Agency, No. 08-4373 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2009), 2009 WL 2876650 (“In the over 
three years that these cases have been pending, despite the ongoing nature of the 
harms and the accumulation of a mountain of pleadings and boxes of evidence in 
support of Plaintiffs’ claims, the Government’s strategy of raising and re-raising the 
same arguments based on the state secrets privilege and other governmental privileges 
has successfully limited forward motion toward the merits.  This, despite repeated re-
jection of those arguments . . . .”); Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Opposition to Defen-
dants’ Motion to Dismiss at 5, Whitehead v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., No. 08-0421 
(E.D. Mo. Feb. 23, 2009), 2009 WL 1092206 (“The tangled web of issues was due large-
ly, in part, to what ultimately had nothing to do with the Whitehead Plaintiffs:  state 
secrets privilege.  Nonetheless, the state secrets issue plagued the Whiteheads for over 
one year, beginning on March 2, 2007.” (emphasis omitted)). 
244 See, e.g., Defendant United States of America’s Reply Memorandum in Support 
of Its Motion to Stay Proceedings at 2, Stevens v. United States, No. 03-81110 (S.D. Fla. 
Mar. 5, 2004), 2004 WL 3705982 (“It is understandable that Plaintiff wishes a speedier 
resolution of the anthrax murders, but Plaintiff’s good intentions will not lessen the 
damage that proceeding with this action would cause to the criminal investigation.”); 
see also discussion infra Part III. 
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If the privilege is casting this shadow, the obvious question is 
whether we should be concerned about it.  The government does have 
information that would, in the public domain, have a significant im-
pact on U.S. national security.  Dependent on the help of private con-
tractors, the government is not the sole entity with access to such data.  
As for removal, we may well want cases potentially affecting state se-
crets to be dealt with in a federal forum.  Whatever delays that exist 
may be minimal, and the intimidation that other parties may feel may 
be no different, or even less concerning than other power disparities 
that mark litigation.  As long as the claim that state secrets may apply 
is a legitimate assertion, should the shadow matter? 
 But the cases studied point to an additional consideration:  the 
potential for what could be considered a form of “graymail.”  An in-
creasing number of companies have intimate access to a broad range 
of government data.  Although properly classified materials may be 
subject to other constraints, companies may threaten to reveal legally 
damaging or politically embarrassing information in the course of the 
lawsuit unless the state steps in to protect it.  If the state refuses, the 
company may then start lodging subpoenas in an effort to draw out 
even more information with the knowledge of where weaknesses may 
be exploited—thus spurring the government to become involved.245 
Even where the companies do not intend to elicit a protective re-
sponse from the government, the nature of the information that would 
be required for the private entity to mount a reasonable defense may 
legally or politically compromise the government.  The effect would 
thus be similar to efforts to involve the state in the judicial proceedings. 
Quite apart from the potential use of sensitive information to draw 
the government into a suit, the government independently may have 
every motivation to do so:  its security, after all, may depend on the 
viability of the corporate entity.  Consider Raytheon, the fifth-largest 
U.S. government contractor.246  According to the U.S. government, the 
company obtained between $15.7 and $16.2 billion in government 
contracts for fiscal year 2009.247  The company produces the Patriot 
 
245 This appears to be precisely what happened in White v. Raytheon Co., No. 07-
10222, at *1-2 (D. Mass. Dec. 17, 2008), 2008 WL 5273290.  See also supra notes 128-33 
and accompanying text. 
246 See Federal Contractor Misconduct Database, PROJECT ON GOV’T OVERSIGHT, 
http://www.contractormisconduct.org/index.cfm (last visited Sept. 15, 2010). 
247 See id. (listing Raytheon as receiving an award of $15.7 billion in fiscal year 
2009); Raytheon Company, USASPENDING.GOV, http://www.usaspending.gov (search 
“Raytheon Company,” then check “2009” in the “By Fiscal Year” box) (last visited Sept. 
15, 2010) (noting over $16 billion dollars awarded to Raytheon). 
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ground-based air-defense missile system; ground-based phased-array 
radars integral to the U.S. Army’s Theater Missile Defense Program; 
the Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM), which is 
the primary air-to-air missile for the U.S. Air Force and Navy fighter 
aircraft; as well as the Tomahawk, TOW, Stinger, Maverick, Standard, 
High Speed Anti-Radiation Missile, Paveway laser-guided bombs, Ex-
tended Range Guided Munitions, and others.248  It is also the prime 
contractor for the NATO Sea Sparrow Surface to Air Missile System.249  
Its Electronic Systems business segment focuses on electronic warfare, 
infrared, laser, and GPS technologies, as well as surveillance, recon-
naissance, targeting, navigation, commercial, and scientific systems.250  
With the company so deeply embedded in the U.S. national security 
establishment, Raytheon can become indispensible during wartime.  
The bankruptcy of or significant financial losses to Raytheon could 
threaten national defense, as well as the provision of vital services. 
Occasionally, the executive files a statement of interest, or explicit-
ly reserves the right to invoke the state secrets privilege, without ac-
tually doing so.251  At other times, it takes no action whatsoever.  Un-
der these circumstances, the tactical importance of state secrets claims 
ought not to be overlooked.  In In re September 11 Litigation, the plain-
tiffs claimed state secrets as a tactical argument for why discovery in-
volving the National Security Council (NSC) might be bothersome.252  
 
248 Raytheon Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 4 (Mar. 24, 2003). 
249 Id. 
250 Id. 
251 See, e.g., Penn v. Aerospace Corp., No. 08-0620, 2009 WL 585839, at *1 (E.D. Va. 
Mar. 6, 2009) (noting that the case was filed on June 13, 2008); Penn, No. 08-0620 
(E.D. Va. Nov. 12, 2008) (order advising the government to be prepared on December 
5, 2008, to report whether it intends to assert the state secrets privilege); Penn, No. 08-
0620 (E.D. Va. Mar. 6, 2009) (order granting the defendant’s summary judgment mo-
tion and dismissing the case with prejudice); see also Amidax Trading Grp. v. S.W.I.F.T. 
SCRL, 607 F. Supp. 2d 500, 508 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (acknowledging that the defendants 
raised the possible invocation of the state secrets privilege in their memorandum, po-
tentially obstructing the defendants’ data from all plaintiffs); Ibrahim v. Dep’t of Ho-
meland Sec., No. 06-00545, 2009 WL 5069133, at *6 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (reserving the 
federal defendants’ right to assert the state secrets privilege if the other privileges 
claimed relating to sensitive security information and law enforcement are found not 
to apply); Defendants’ Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary 
Judgment and in Support of Defendants’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment at 29 
n.22, Amnesty v. McConnell, 646 F. Supp. 2d 633 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (No. 08-6259), 2008 
WL 4819852 (“To the extent classified information concerning the operation of sur-
veillance under FAA did become an issue in this case or necessary to its resolution, the 
Government reserves the right to assert the privilege at such time.”). 
252 See, e.g., Revised Memorandum of Law in Opposition to the Motion of the Avia-
tion Defendants for So-Called “Focused” Discovery from the Government at 20 n.17, In re 
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Los Alamos National Security, LLC also argued that “retaliatory ac-
tions will require judgments about classified information.  The Spon-
sor may well intervene in this matter to assert a state secrets defense 
under U.S. v. Reynolds . . . .”253  Overtly threatening language per-
meates these and other suits.254 
Such claims, especially but not exclusively when supported by a 
statement of interest, may well be regarded as a credible threat be-
cause these companies do have access to a range of classified materials.  
While it is not known what the executive will do in the future, there is 
precedent in each of these areas where the government has inter-
vened to invoke the state secrets privilege, and there is a framework of 
statutes and executive orders that supports such claims.  The privilege, 
even when only threatened and not actually invoked by the executive, 
may thus affect both the courts and the litigants. 
In conclusion, a final point deserves notice:  set against the paltry 
number of corporate cases that have thus far made their way into the 
state secrets debate (e.g., D.T.M. Research, L.L.C. v. AT&T Corp., Unit-
ed States ex rel. Schwartz v. TRW, Inc., Schwartz v. Raytheon Co., and the 
earlier McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States),255 the multitudinous 
 
September 11 Litig., Nos. 21-0097, 21-0101 (S.D.N.Y. June 5, 2007) [hereinafter Revised 
Memorandum of Law in In re September 11 Litig.], 2007 WL 2272256 (“[I]t is questionable 
whether the Aviation Defendants could depose any individual from the NSC without 
running afoul of the executive privilege or state secrets privilege given that the very func-
tion of the NSC . . . is to advise the president on national security.”).  
253 Defendants’ Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand at 
15, Files v. Los Alamos Nat’l Sec., LLC, No. 08-0636 (D.N.M. July 31, 2008), 2008 WL 
5706495 (footnote omitted).  
254 See, e.g., Revised Memorandum of Law in In re September 11 Litig., supra note 252, 
at 20 n.17; Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to 
Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure at 2-3 n.1, White v. Raytheon 
Co., No. 07-10222 (D. Mass. 2007), 2007 WL 1910325 (“[A]ny further prosecution or 
defense of this case may trigger protections of the state secrets privilege because classi-
fied information is implicated in virtually every fact and circumstance necessary to ad-
judicate this matter.”); Answer and Affirmative Defenses of Defendant Smith’s Aero-
space LLC to Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 10, Walters v. Lear 
Siegler Servs., Inc., No. 05-61789 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 30, 2000), 2000 WL 34602661 (“Invoca-
tion of the state secrets privilege by the United States government will preclude 
SMITHS from obtaining full and necessary discovery.”). 
255 See Schwartz v. Raytheon Co., 150 F. App’x 627, 628 (9th Cir. 2005) (acknowl-
edging that the United States asserted the privilege and Schwartz failed to show how 
the parties could litigate the case without access to privileged and sensitive material); 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States, 323 F.3d 1006, 1022 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (not-
ing, in a breach of contract case, that the state secrets privilege’s proper invocation by 
the government precluded the hearing of plaintiff’s superior knowledge claim); 
D.T.M. Research, L.L.C. v. AT&T Corp., 245 F.3d 327, 334-35 (4th Cir. 2001) (allowing 
the case to proceed despite the assertion of state secrets); United States ex rel. Schwartz 
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suits discussed above—many of which are pending in relation to mili-
tary contractual relationships—point to significant gaps in our under-
standing of the privilege.  A similar situation holds for the telecom-
munications cases, despite scholarly and public attention.256 
II.  TELECOMMUNICATIONS CASES 
More than four-dozen state secrets cases between 2001 and 2009 
stem from President Bush’s authorization of the NSA’s Terrorist Sur-
veillance Program (TSP) in the aftermath of 9/11 and the program’s 
 
v. TRW, Inc., 211 F.R.D. 388, 393 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (noting, in a wrongful death case, 
the government’s failure to assert the state secrets privilege validly through a formal 
claim by a head of a government department); see also Crater Corp v. Lucent Techs., 
Inc., 423 F.3d 1260, 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (finding that the privilege was properly in-
voked but the district court wrongly dismissed the suit).   
 Chesney’s and Frost’s discussion includes all five of these cases.  See Chesney, supra 
note 6, at 1301 (concluding the Bush Administration does not differ substantially in its 
use of the privilege).  But see Frost, supra note 6, at 1939 (“I disagree, however, with 
[Professor Chesney’s] conclusion that these numbers prove that the Bush Administra-
tion’s assertion of the privilege does not differ from that of previous administrations.”).  
 Other publications discussed the uniqueness of these five state secrets corporate 
cases. See Martha Bellisle, eTreppid Case Gets Special Treatment:  Justice Department Engages 
in Unusual Fight to Bypass State Secrets Privilege, RENO GAZETTE-J., Apr. 19, 2007, at A01, 
available at 2007 WLNR 27960663 (discussing the Department of Justice’s unusual at-
tempt to use a protective order to preserve sharing of information over which the Di-
rector of National Intelligence asserted the state secrets privilege, unlike in the Crater 
litigation, where the government followed the assertion with a motion to dismiss that 
was granted at the trial stage); William J. Broad, Missile Defense Hits Bump in Court:  A 
Whistleblower Says Her Lawsuit Will Show the System Doesn’t Work. The Government Says a 
Trial Will Jeopardize Military Secrets, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Feb. 9, 2003, at A10, available 
at 2003 WLNR 13822408 (summarizing the controversy over the TRW litigation); Su-
man Guha Mozumder, MIT Researcher Drops Bombshell on Missile Defense Contracts, INDIA 
ABROAD (New York), Apr. 14, 2006, at A12, available at 2006 WLNR 11109534 (report-
ing on an accusation by a government analyst that the Government Accountability Of-
fice had falsely exonerated Boeing and TRW of wrongdoing); Hampton Stephens, Su-
preme Court Filing Claims Air Force, Government Fraud in 1953 Case, INSIDE THE AIR FORCE, 
Mar. 14, 2003, available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/2003/03/iaf031403.html (de-
scribing the letter Sen. Charles Grassley and Rep. Howard Berman sent to Attorney 
General John Ashcroft, warning him against misuse of the privilege, after it was invoked 
in U.S. ex rel. Schwartz v. TRW, Inc. in a claim by Schwartz under the whistleblower-
protection law Grassley and Berman authored). 
256 See, e.g., Michael Avery, The Constitutionality of Warrantless Electronic Surveillance of 
Suspected Foreign Threats to the National Security of the United States, 62 U. MIAMI L. REV. 
541, 569-82 (2008) (discussing the viability of judicial review of the Terrorist Surveil-
lance Program in the face of the state secrets privilege); Paul M. Schwartz, Warrantless 
Wiretapping, FISA Reform, and the Lessons of Public Liberty:  A Comment on Holmes’s Jorde Lec-
ture, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 407, 428 (2009) (advocating narrowing the state secrets privilege 
so as not to duplicate the FAA’s telecommunications privilege). 
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continuing reauthorization every forty-five days.257  Yet, owing in part 
to the incredible complexity of the litigation and the consolidation of 
most of the suits through the multidistrict litigation (MDL) process, 
little has been understood about how the privilege played out in the 
suits.  Of the fifty cases brought before the Northern District of Cali-
fornia through the MDL process, moreover, not one of the forty-six 
dismissals that ensued was based on state secrets—-a result likely, un-
der the current academic approach, to disqualify each of these from 
being considered a state secrets case.  Yet the privilege has had a pro-
found effect on the course of the litigation. 
These cases draw attention to the dynamics surrounding state se-
crets claims.  The Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) played a key role in 
developing the legal underpinnings for the presidential authoriza-
tions that became the foundation for the government’s defense of 
state secrets—-suggesting a close relationship between a closely held 
executive office jurisprudence and state secrets.258  Similar to both de-
fense contractor and criminal cases, in the telecommunications suits, 
courts have at times simply assumed the state secrets privilege applies 
without requiring the government to invoke it, suggesting a parallel, 
carryover effect from prior suits in which the privilege was asserted.  
Finally, the visible machinations between the executive, the judiciary, 
and Congress in the telecommunications cases serve to highlight the 
deeper separation-of-powers issues that attend. 
 
257 OFFICES OF INSPECTORS GEN. OF THE DEP’T OF DEF., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CENT. IN-
TELLIGENCE AGENCY, NAT’L SEC. AGENCY, OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, 
UNCLASSIFIED REPORT ON THE PRESIDENT’S SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM 1, 6 (2009) [herei-
nafter OFFICERS OF INSPECTORS GEN.], available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/ 
pdf/IGTSPReport090710.pdf (providing a review of the President’s Surveillance Pro-
gram to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, the Senate Committee on the 
Judiciary, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and the House 
Committee on the Judiciary as required by Title III of the Foreign Intelligence Surveil-
lance Act Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436 (codified in 
scattered sections of 18 and 50 U.S.C.)).  Thirty-eight of the multidistrict litigation tele-
communications cases discussed in this Part are suits filed against corporate actors; 
they could thus be equally included in the foregoing Part, looking at constitutional 
challenges brought to corporate actors.  However, because of the strong links between 
the telecommunications cases, regardless of whether the state acts as plaintiff, interve-
nor, or defendant, this Article considers this group of cases under a separate heading. 
258 A Deputy Assistant Attorney General would not normally speak for the entire De-
partment of Justice; indeed, the Attorney General’s role in neither recusing himself nor 
signing the memos should here be noted.  For the ensuing discussion, however, this Ar-
ticle focuses on the author of the memos with the understanding that broader conclu-
sions about the Department of Justice’s position on the questions posed thereby apply. 
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A.  Executive Branch Jurisprudence and State Secrets 
TSP, a warrantless wiretapping program that President Bush insti-
tuted in the weeks following September 11, 2001, relied heavily on the 
OLC to justify its continuance.  Before each presidential authorization, 
OLC reviewed CIA (later, National Counterterrorism Center) memo-
randa on terrorist threats and intelligence obtained through the pro-
gram and then advised the attorney general whether a Fourth 
Amendment constitutional standard of reasonableness had been met 
such that continuing the program was warranted.259  These OLC me-
mos, as well as related documents, provide detail about the Administra-
tion’s reasoning regarding the NSA program and its subsequent invo-
cation of state secrets. 
One of the first and most important memos, written September 
25, 2001, focused on whether the proposed shift under FISA from for-
eign intelligence being “the purpose” of a search to being “a purpose” 
was consistent with the Fourth Amendment.260  Deputy Assistant At-
torney General John Yoo found the new standard constitutional but 
cautioned that the historical deference granted to the Department of 
Justice depended in some measure on ensuring that criminal investi-
gations would not become the primary purpose of FISA.261  He offered 
a strong Hamiltonian rationale: 
After the attacks on September 11, 2001, the government interest in 
conducting searches related to fighting terrorism is perhaps of the high-
est order—the need to defend the nation from direct attack.  As the Su-
preme Court has said, “It is ‘obvious and unarguable’ that no govern-




259 OFFICES OF INSPECTORS GEN., supra note 257, at 2, 6-8. 
260 Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., to David S. Kris, 
Assoc. Deputy Att’y Gen. (Sept. 25, 2001), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/ 
documents/memoforeignsurveillanceact09252001.pdf. 
261  The memorandum from John Yoo explains:   
Some warrant applications might be rejected by the courts if prosecutors be-
come too involved in the planning and execution of FISA searches.  Nonethe-
less, as we observed in 1995, “the courts have been exceedingly deferential to 
the government and have almost invariably declined to suppress the evidence, 
whether they applied the ‘primary purpose’ test or left open the possibility of 
a less demanding standard.”  We believe that the Department would continue 
to win such deference from the courts if it continues to ensure that criminal 
investigation not become a primary purpose of FISA surveillance. 
Id. at 1-2 (citation omitted) (describing the Dellinger memorandum, the full contents 
of which remain classified).  
262 Id. at 5 (quoting Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981)). 
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In the context of Federalist No. 23, “‘circumstances which may affect 
the public safety’” are not “‘reducible within certain determinate lim-
its’”; therefore, “‘it must be admitted, as a necessary consequence, that 
there can be no limitation of that authority, which is to provide for the 
defen[c]e and protection of the community, in any matter essential to 
its efficacy.’”263  Yoo’s constitutional argument presaged the President’s 
subsequent claim of legal authority for the NSA wiretapping program. 
 The text, structure and history of the Constitution establish that the 
Founders entrusted the President with the primary responsibility, and 
therefore the power, to ensure the security of the United States in situa-
tions of grave and unforeseen emergencies.  Intelligence gathering is a 
necessary function that enables the President to carry out that authority.  
The Constitution, for example, vests in the President the power to dep-
loy military force in the defense of the United States by the Vesting 
Clause, art. II, § 1, cl. 1, and by the Commander in Chief Clause, § 2, 
cl. 1.  Intelligence operations, such as electronic surveillance, very well 
may be necessary and proper for the effective deployment and execution 
of military force against terrorists.
264
 
Yoo then alluded to executive branch jurisprudence:  “This Office 
has maintained, across different administrations and different politi-
cal parties, that the President’s constitutional responsibility to defend 
the nation may justify reasonable, but warrantless, counter-
intelligence searches.”265  In support, he cited a string of OLC deci-
sions that reached back to 1980.266  The President’s Commander-in-
Chief authorities included, by implication, the authority to collect 
whatever information may be necessary for their exercise.267  When 
considered alongside the Authorization for Use of Military Force 
(AUMF),268 the constitutional authority provided sufficient grounds 
for the legal underpinnings.269  Yoo wrote, 
 
263 Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 23, at 147-48 (Alexander Hamilton) ( Jacob E. 
Cooke ed., 1961)).  The memo also cites various cases supporting a broad understanding 
of presidential power.  See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 662 (1981) (not-
ing that the President “exercis[es] the executive authority in a world that presents each 
day some new challenge with which he must deal”); Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of 
Cal., 293 U.S. 245, 264 (1934) (observing that federal war powers are “well-nigh limitless” 
in extent).   
264 Memorandum from John C. Yoo, supra note 260, at 6. 
265 Id. at 7. 
266 Id. 
267 Id. 
268 Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat 224, 224 (2001) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1541 note 
(2006)). 
269 Memorandum from John C. Yoo, supra note 260, at 8.  
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The courts have observed that even the use of deadly force is reasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment if used in self-defense or to protect oth-
ers.  Here, for Fourth Amendment purposes, the right to self-defense is 
not that of an individual, but that of the nation and of its citizens.  If the 
government’s heightened interest in self-defense justifies the use of 
deadly force, then it certainly would also justify warrantless searches.
270
 
Within weeks of writing the September 25, 2001, memo, Yoo was “read 
into” the compartmented NSA program.271  The only other non-FBI 
officials from the Department of Justice brought into the program 
were Attorney General John Ashcroft and Counsel for Intelligence 
Policy James Baker.272 
On October 23, 2001, Yoo developed the reasoning behind his  
FISA analysis in a memo addressing domestic military operations.  Al-
though intended to apply to active military operations, the arguments 
he put forward would appear again in relation to the NSA initiative.  
He wrote, “[T]he Fourth Amendment does not apply to domestic mili-
tary operations designed to deter and prevent further terrorist at-
tacks.”273  Even if it did apply, the reasonableness requirement pro-
vided a loophole: 
[W]e believe that the courts would not generally require a warrant, at least 
when the action was authorized by the President or other high executive 
branch officials.  The Government’s compelling interest in protecting the 
nation from attack and in prosecuting the war effort would outweigh the 
relevant privacy interests, making the search or seizure reasonable.274 
Although “courts could decide otherwise,” Yoo “conclude[d] that 
the President has both constitutional and statutory authority to use 
the armed forces in military operations, against terrorists, within the 
United States.”275 
On the day Yoo sent this memo, Representative Sensenbrenner in-
troduced the USA PATRIOT bill into the House of Representatives.276  
 
270 Id. (citations omitted). 
271 OFFICES OF INSPECTORS GEN., supra note 257, at 10.  
272 Id.  On the same day that he was read into the program, Ashcroft certified that 
it was consistent with the Constitution.  Id. at 11. 
273 Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., and Robert J. De-
lahunty, Special Counsel, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, and William 
J. Haynes, II, General Counsel, Department of Defense 25 (Oct. 23, 2001), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/memomilitaryforcecombatus10232001.pdf. 
274 Id. at 2.   
275 Id. at 34, 37. 
276 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required 
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, H.R. 3162, 
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Two days later, White House officials and Lieutenant General Michael 
Hayden, NSA Director, began providing briefings on the NSA war-
rantless intercept program to members of Congress and their staffs.277  
It was not until November 2, 2001, however, after the NSA program 
was underway, that Yoo was asked to provide a memo directly on the 
wiretapping initiative.278  This memo closely followed the reasoning of 
the earlier two missives. 
Yoo acknowledged that FISA “‘purports to be the exclusive statutory 
means for conducting electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence,’” 
but, he argued, “‘[s]uch a reading of FISA would be an unconstitutional 
infringement on the President’s Article II authorities.’”279  FISA was 
merely a “‘safe harbor for electronic surveillance’”—it could not “‘re-
strict the President’s ability to engage in warrantless searches that pro-
tect the national security.’”280  The test for warrantless searches was the 
Fourth Amendment—which did not apply to electronic surveillance in 
“‘direct support of military operations.’”281  Yoo suggested that “‘unless 
Congress made a clear statement in FISA that it sought to restrict presi-
dential authority to conduct warrantless searches in the national securi-
ty area—which it has not—then the statute must be construed to avoid 
such a reading.’”282 
 
107th Cong. (introduced to the House on Oct. 23, 2001) (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 8, 15, 18, 22, 31, 42, 49, and 50 U.S.C.). 
277 OFFICES OF INSPECTORS GEN., supra note 257, at 6-7.  The first briefings were 
given to Nancy Pelosi and Porter Gross, the Chairman and Ranking Member of the 
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.  Id. at 16.  From October 25, 
2001, to January 17, 2007, Hayden and NSA Director Keith Alexander conducted ap-
proximately forty-nine briefings on the NSA warrantless wiretapping program to mem-
bers of Congress and their staff; seventeen took place before the December 2005 me-
dia reports.  Id.  For reference to earlier briefings on NSA electronic surveillance 
programs, see Letter from Nancy Pelosi, Ranking Democrat on House Intelligence 
Comm., to Lieutenant General Michael Hayden, Nat’l Sec. Agency Dir. (Oct. 11, 
2001), available at http://pelosi.house.gov/news/press-releases/2006/01/releases-
Jan06-declassified.shtml, which expressed concern about NSA electronic surveillance 
activities and the authority under which surveillance was being conducted. 
278 OFFICES OF INSPECTORS GEN., supra note 257, at 11. 
279 Id. (quoting Yoo’s memo from November 2, 2001). 
280 Id. (same). 
281 Id. at 12 (same). 
282 Id. at 11-12 (same). Subsequent memos left the analysis largely intact.  See 
Second Redacted Declaration of Steven G. Bradbury at 9, Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. 
Dep’t of Justice, 584 F. Supp. 2d 65 (D.D.C. 2008) (No. 06-00096) (discussing OLC 
115, a two-page memorandum for the Attorney General from the Deputy Assistant At-
torney General regarding the Attorney General’s review of the legality of the Presi-
dent’s Authorization for the NSA wiretapping program); OFFICES OF INSPECTORS GEN., 
supra note 257, at 13 (noting that on October 11, 2002, Yoo drafted another opinion 
DONOHUE FINAL REVISED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/18/2010  11:10 AM 
2010] The Shadow of State Secrets 145 
For nearly two years, these memoranda provided the legal ratio-
nale for upholding the constitutionality of the TSP.  But following 
Yoo’s resignation from the Department of Justice in 2003 and his re-
placement by Patrick Philbin, the November memo, which ignored 
the fifteen-day war exemption that FISA authorized,283 began to cause 
substantial concern.  Equally distressing was the absence of any discus-
sion of Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,284 a leading case on the 
distribution of government power between the executive and legisla-
tive branches.  Indeed, there was no detailed description of the activi-
ties actually taking place under the NSA program.285  Once he was 
read into the program, Philbin convinced David Addington, Counsel 
to the Vice President, to read Jack Goldsmith, Jay Bybee’s replace-
ment, into the program.286  Philbin and Goldsmith further noted that 
FISA prevents intentional electronic surveillance “under color of law 
except as authorized by [statute].”287  In autumn 2003, Philbin and 
Goldsmith therefore began to develop an alternative analysis that 
drew heavily from the AUMF.288  They alerted Ashcroft, Addington, 
and White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales to their concerns.289 
B.  The Onslaught of Litigation 
With TSP classified at security clearance level “Top Secret-SCI” 
and OLC memoranda hidden, the program remained largely shielded 
from public view.  However, in autumn 2004, journalists Eric Lich-
tblau and James Risen uncovered TSP’s existence.290  Citing the ex-
treme danger that would be created for national security, the White 
 
concerning the TSP at Ashcroft’s request, reiterating legal analysis laid out in the No-
vember 2, 2001, memo).   
283 See 50 U.S.C. § 1811 (2006) (limiting the duration of electronic surveillance 
without a court order to fifteen days). 
284 343 U.S. 579 (1952).   
285 See OFFICES OF INSPECTORS GEN., supra note 257, at 13 (describing Yoo’s omis-
sion of the Youngstown case from his memoranda as an “important factor” in OLC’s 
reconsideration of Yoo’s work and describing Yoo’s “factual discussion” of spying activi-
ties as “insufficient”). 
286 Id. at 19-20. 
287 Id. at 20 (quoting 50 U.S.C. § 1809(a)(1)). 
288 Id. 
289 Id.  
290 See ERIC LICHTBLAU, BUSH’S LAW 186-211 (2008) (discussing the story’s genesis); 
see also Eric Lichtblau, The Education of a 9/11 Reporter:  The Inside Drama Behind the Times’ 
Warrantless Wiretapping Story, SLATE (Mar. 26, 2008, 7:08 PM), http://www.slate.com/ 
id/2187498/pagenum/all (retelling a portion of the story). 
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House pressured the New York Times not to publish the information.291  
For thirteen months, the newspaper held the story.292  The journalists 
desisted, but their renewed interest in the story earned them an invita-
tion to the White House in early December 2005.293  Secretary of State 
Condoleezza Rice and other officials threatened that publication 
would not only hurt national security but also financially devastate the 
telephone carriers who had cooperated, causing them public embar-
rassment.294  Officials argued that the reporters’ patriotic duty was to 
prevent the information from becoming public. 
On December 15–16, 2004, as a coronal mass ejection hit Earth, 
causing severe geomagnetic storms,295 a political storm of equal inten-
sity broke:  Lichtblau discovered that the Bush Administration had 
considered seeking a Pentagon Papers–type injunction to prevent the 
story from becoming public.296  Sensitive to this historic event, in 
which their paper had played a prominent role, the editors of the New 
York Times decided to put the story online the night before it was due 
to run in the paper.297  According to Lichtblau, “The administration 
might be able to stop the presses with an injunction, but they couldn’t 
stop the Internet.”298 
The article, which appeared online Thursday evening, December 
15, 2005, reported that President Bush had signed an order in 2002 
authorizing the NSA to intercept telephone and e-mail communica-
 
291 See LICHTBLAU, supra note 290, at 193-95 (describing his meetings with top gov-
ernment officials); Lichtblau, supra note 290 (depicting the anxiety of New York Times 
staff as they met with “White House VIPs”). 
292 James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at A1.   
293 Lichtblau, supra note 290. 
294 Id.  The argument that information should not become public because it would 
embarrass the corporations who engaged in the behavior and lead to financial harm has 
also arisen in the academic literature in relation to corporate complicity in rendition.  See 
Dhooge, supra note 6, at 509-10 (arguing that potential damage to a company’s reputa-
tion is reason to prevent disclosure of its involvement in rendition programs). 
295 Dec. 15, 2004, SPACEWEATHER.COM, http://www.spaceweather.com/archive.php? 
day=15&month=12&year=2004&view=view (last visited Sept. 15, 2010); Dec. 16, 2004, 
SPACEWEATHER.COM, http://www.spaceweather.com/archive.php?day=16&month=12& 
year=2004&view=view (last visited Sept. 15, 2010). 
296 Lichtblau, supra note 290. 
297 Id. 
298 Id.  Risen and Lichtblau went on to win the 2006 Pulitzer Prize for National 
Reporting for their coverage of the NSA warrantless wiretapping program.  2006 Win-
ners and Finalists, THE PULITZER PRIZES, http://www.pulitzer.org/awards/2006 (last 
visited Sept. 15, 2010). 
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tions within the United States, without court-approved warrants.299  
Other newspapers quickly picked up the story, and by Monday, the 
White House was on the defensive.300 
In his first press conference that addressed the program, the Presi-
dent announced that he had authorized the NSA to intercept interna-
tional communications into and out of the United States by individuals 
linked to Al Qaeda.301  Echoing Yoo’s legal memoranda, he cited as his 
authority “the Constitution, as well as the authorization of force by the 
United States Congress.”302  He added, “I want to make it clear to the 
people listening that this program is limited in nature to those that are 
known al Qaeda ties and/or affiliates.”303  The calls were “not inter-
cepted within the country, they are from outside the country to in the 
country or vice versa.  So in other words, if you’re calling from Hou-
ston to L.A., that call is not monitored.”304  FISA would be the appro-
priate vehicle for such interceptions.  When pressed on the legal under- 
pinnings, the President said, “I think I’ve got the authority to move for-
ward.  I mean, this is what—and the attorney general was out briefing 
this morning about why it’s legal to make the decisions I make.”305  He 
then warned that it would be imprudent to discuss the legal questions:  
“[A]n open debate about law would say to the enemy, ‘Here’s what 
we’re going to do.’  And this is an enemy which adjusts.”306 
It soon appeared that the scope of the program was broader than 
first admitted.307  Lawsuits challenging the legal and constitutional 
 
299 Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 292. 
300 See, e.g., Dan Eggen, Bush Authorized Domestic Spying, WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 2005, 
at A01 (reporting on the Times story and discussing Eggen’s pursuit of a response from 
the Bush Administration). 
301 See Bush:  U.S. Must Think, Act Differently, CNN.COM, Dec. 19, 2005, 
http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/12/19/bush.transcript/index.html (transcrib-
ing President Bush’s press conference on December 19, 2005). 
302 Id. 




307 See, e.g., Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 27 (2006) 
(statement of Alberto Gonzales, Att’y Gen.) (stating that he could 
“not . . . rule . . . out” that the White House had legal authority to monitor domestic 
traffic without a warrant); see also Eric Lichtblau, Gonzales Suggests Legal Basis for Domestic 
Eavesdropping, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2006, at A23 (“The attorney general made his com-
ments, which critics said reflected a broadened view of the president’s authority . . . .”); 
Leslie Cauley, NSA Has Massive Database of Americans’ Phone Calls, USA TODAY, May 11, 
2006, http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-05-10-nsa_x.htm (reporting 
that the NSA wiretapping program was significantly more expansive than the White 
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underpinnings followed.  The Center for Constitutional Rights lodged 
the first action just over a month after the New York Times ran the sto-
ry.308  On January 30, 2006, the Electronic Frontier Foundation 
launched the second case, Hepting v. AT&T.309  The third case, Al-
Haramain Islamic Foundation, Inc. v. Bush, emerged in late February.310  
Thereafter, it was relatively quiet, until May of that year—-which was a 
bad month to be a telecommunications company.  In all, some twenty-
seven cases were filed, most of which targeted private companies.311  In 
June, six more cases followed.312 
 
House acknowledged in 2005 and naming AT&T, Verizon, and BellSouth as the three 
largest telecommunications companies involved).   
 Senator Russ Feingold expressed his displeasure on the program’s scope from the 
Senate floor: 
 The President was blunt.  He said that he had authorized the NSA’s domes-
tic spying program, and he made a number of misleading arguments to de-
fend himself.  His words got rousing applause from Republicans, and I think 
even from some Democrats.   
 The President was blunt, so I will be blunt.  This program is breaking the 
law, and this President is breaking the law.  Not only that, he is misleading the 
American people in his efforts to justify this program . . . .   
 Congress has lost its way if we don’t hold this President accountable for his 
actions.  
152 CONG. REC. 5758 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 2006) (statement of Sen. Russ Feingold).  
308 See Complaint at 1, Ctr. for Constitutional Rights v. Bush, No. 06-00313 (N.D. 
Cal. Jan. 17, 2006) (requesting injunctive relief halting the program). 
309 439 F. Supp. 2d 974 (N.D. Cal. 2006). 
310 Complaint, Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 451 F. Supp. 2d 1215 (D. 
Or. 2006) (No. 06-0274) (bearing a date of February 29, 2006). 
311 See, e.g., Herron v. Verizon Global Networks, Inc., No. 06-2491 (E.D. La. filed 
May 12, 2006); Fuller v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., No. 06-0077 (D. Mont. filed May 12, 
2006); Hines v. Verizon Nw., Inc., No. 06-0694 (D. Or. filed May 12, 2006); Conner v. 
AT&T, No. 06-01557 (Cal. Sup. Ct. filed May 12, 2006); Joll v. AT&T Corp., No. 06-
2680 (N.D. Ill. filed May 15, 2006); Dolberg v. AT&T Corp., No. 06-0078 (D. Mont. 
filed May 15, 2006); Bissitt v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., No. 06-0220 (D.R.I. filed May 
15, 2006); Mahoney v. AT&T Commc’ns, Inc., No. 06-0223 (D.R.I. filed May 15, 2006); 
Mahoney v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., No. 06-0224 (D.R.I. filed May 15, 2006); Shubert 
v. Bush, No. 06-2282 (E.D.N.Y. filed May 17, 2006); Trevino v. AT&T Corp., No. 06-
0209 (S.D. Tex. filed May 17, 2006); Suchanek v. Sprint Nextel Corp., No. 06-0071 
(W.D. Ky. filed May 18, 2006); Harrington v. AT&T, Inc., No. 06-0374 (W.D. Tex. filed 
May 18, 2006); Marck v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., No. 06-2455 (E.D.N.Y. filed May 19, 
2006); Terkel v. AT&T Inc., No. 06-02837 (N.D. Ill. filed May 22, 2006); Waxman v. 
AT&T Corp., No. 06-2900 (N.D. Ill. filed May 24, 2006); Solomon v. Verizon 
Commc’ns, Inc., No. 06-02193 (E.D. Pa. filed May 24, 2006); Lebow v. BellSouth Corp., 
No. 06-1289 (N.D. Ga. filed May 25, 2006); Cross v. AT&T Commc’ns, Inc., No. 04-
0605 (Ind. Sup. Ct. filed May 25, 2006); Riordan v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., No. 06-
03574 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed May 26, 2006); Campbell v. AT&T Commc’ns of Cal., No. 
06-452626 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed May 26, 2006); Dubois v. AT&T Corp., No. 06-00085 
(W.D. Mich. filed May 26, 2006); Electron Tubes, Inc. v. Verizon Commc’ns, No. 06-
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At the end of June, the Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld 313 opened the field even more to legal challenge.  If the AUMF 
was insufficient grounds to overcome the limits on military commissions 
implicit in 10 U.S.C. §§ 821, 836(b), then it was rather a stretch to say 
that the AUMF superseded FISA’s express requirement that FISA and 
Title III provide the “exclusive means” of engaging in surveillance—or 
for it to overcome the fifteen-day wartime surveillance provision, allow-
ing surveillance until December 3, 2001, but no longer.314 
As more cases emerged,315 the multidistrict panel ordered on Au-
gust 9, 2006, for the cases to be consolidated and transferred to Chief 
Judge Vaughn Walker of the Northern District of California, who had 
been presiding over Hepting since January and Al-Haramain since Feb-
ruary and was furthest along in the telecommunications suits.316  By 
 
04048 (S.D.N.Y. filed May 26, 2006); Roe v. AT&T Corp., No. 06-3467 (N.D. Cal. filed 
May 30, 2006); Hardy v. AT&T Corp., No. 06-2853 (E.D. La. filed May 30, 2006); Ba-
sinski v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., No. 06-4169 (S.D.N.Y. filed May 31, 2006). 
312 See, e.g., Payne v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., No. 06-4193 (S.D.N.Y. filed June 2, 
2006); Fortnash v. AT&T Corp., No. 06-60828 (S.D. Fla. filed June 12, 2006); Chulsky 
v. Cellco P’ship, No. 06-2530 (D.N.J. filed June 13, 2006); United States v. O’Donnell, 
06-02683 (D.N.J. filed June 14, 2006); Crockett v. Verizon Wireless (VAW) LLC, No. 
06-00345 (D. Haw. filed June 26, 2006); Derosier v. Cingular Wireless LLC, No. 06-
00917 (W.D. Wash. filed June 28, 2006). 
313 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
314 Letter from Curtis A. Bradley, Professor of Law, Duke Univ., et al. to Sen. Bill 
Frist et al. 4 (Feb. 2, 2006), available at http://balkin.blogspot.com/FISA.AUMF. 
ReplytoDOJ.pdf. 
315 Spielfogel-Landis v. MCI, LLC, No. 06-04221 (N.D. Cal. filed July 7, 2006); 
Mink v. AT&T Commc’ns of the Sw., Inc., No. 06-01113 (E.D. Mo. filed July 20, 2006); 
Bready v. Verizon Md., Inc., No. 06-05961 (Md. Cir. Ct. filed July 21, 2006). 
316 In re Nat’l Sec. Agency Telecomm. Records Litig., No. 06-1791 (N.D. Cal. filed 
Aug. 14, 2006).  This case appears to be the first time that the Judicial Panel on Multi-
District Litigation ( JPMDL) has transferred and consolidated national security consti-
tutional challenges into a single federal district court.  It raises important questions 
about whether the MDL process is appropriate for this type of suit as opposed to 
commercial mass tort lawsuits.  Such consolidation prevents circuit splits on questions 
of first impression, which may be particularly helpful to the Supreme Court’s subse-
quent attention to novel challenges.  It also risks glossing over important nuances be-
tween the cases:  in the telecommunications context, for instance, there are multiple 
defendants, with the government itself acting variously as plaintiff, defendant, and in-
tervenor.  Further, the inclusion of state secrets matters alters the incentive structure.  
Instead of being more efficient, many cases may be tied up for a much longer period 
of time, owing to the difficulties that attend the use of classified materials.  Additional-
ly, the question of distribution of resources postjudgment plays out very differently 
when injunctive relief, and not monetary remuneration, is sought.   
 These unique challenges posed by the use of MDLs in the national security con-
text have not been addressed by writers focused on this process.  See, e.g., RICHARD A. 
NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETTLEMENT 21-22 (2007) (focusing on more 
conventional mass torts such as asbestos, tobacco, and pharmaceuticals); Deborah R. 
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June 3, 2009, a total of fifty telecommunications cases had been as-
sembled before his court; the scene was set for a monumental battle 
between the branches.317 
C.  State Secrets, Judicial Independence, and Congressional Action 
Between May 2006 and March 2008, the federal government in-
voked the state secrets privilege in thirty-three out of fifty telecommu-
nications cases (including all cases against Verizon from April 2007).318  
 
Hensler, Revisiting the Monster:  New Myths and Realities of Class Action and Other Large 
Scale Litigation, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 179, 185-86 (2001) (addressing antitrust, 
securities, and mass tort multidistrict litigation); Deborah R. Hensler, The Role of Multi-
Districting in Mass Tort Litigation:  An Empirical Investigation, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 883, 
895-96 (2001) (neglecting to include national security as a relevant type of MDLs); Ri-
chard L. Marcus, Cure-All for an Era of Dispersed Litigation?  Toward a Maximalist Use of the 
Multidistrict Litigation Panel’s Transfer Power, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2245, 2295 (2008) (analyz-
ing the critical role the JPMDL has played in the resolution and “posttransfer han-
dling . . . of the cases it has transferred”); Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Quasi-
Class Action Method of Managing Multi-District Litigations:  Problems and a Proposal, 63 VAND. 
L. REV. 107, 114-18 (2010) (examining MDLs generally using three medical products 
examples). 
317 In addition to the foregoing cases, see Clayton v. AT&T Commc’ns of the Sw., 
Inc., No. 06-04177 (W.D. Mo. filed Aug. 10, 2006); United States v. Adams, No. 06-
00097 (D. Me. filed Aug. 21, 2006); Souder v. AT&T Corp., No. 06-01058 (S.D. Cal. 
filed Aug. 22, 2006); United States v. Palermino, No. 06-01405 (D. Conn. filed Sept. 6, 
2006); United States v. Volz, No. 06-00188 (D. Vt. filed Oct. 2, 2006); Cross v. AT&T 
Commc’ns, Inc., No. 06-0932 (S.D. Ind. filed Oct. 3, 2006); Guzzi v. Bush, No. 06-0136 
(N.D. Ga. filed Oct. 3, 2006); Roche v. AT&T Corp., No. 06-4252 (D. Minn. filed Oct. 
23, 2006); Jacobs v. AT&T Corp., No. 07-60365 (S.D. Fla. filed Mar. 14, 2007); Ander-
son v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., No. 06-03650 (S.D.N.Y. filed Apr. 10, 2007); and 
McMurray v Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., No. 08-6264 (S.D.N.Y. filed July 10, 2008).  
318 For cases in which the government intervened or acted as defendant or where 
it also asserted state secrets privilege, see Ctr. for Constitutional Rights v. Bush, No. 06-
00313 (S.D.N.Y. filed Jan. 17, 2006); Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, No. 06-
00274 (N.D. Cal. filed Feb. 28, 2006); Herron v. Verizon Global Networks, Inc., No. 06-
2491 (E.D. La. filed May 12, 2006); Fuller v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., No. 06-0077 (D. 
Mont. filed May 12, 2006); Hines v. Verizon Nw., Inc., No. 06-0694 (D. Or. filed May 
12, 2006); Conner v. AT&T, No. 06-01557 (Cal. Sup. Ct. filed May 12, 2006); Hepting 
v. AT&T Corp., No. 06-00672 (N.D. Cal. filed May 13, 2006); Bissitt v. Verizon 
Commc’ns, Inc., No. 06-0220 (D.R.I. filed May 15, 2006); Shubert v. Bush, No. 06-2282 
(E.D.N.Y. filed May 17, 2006); Marck v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., No. 06-2455 (E.D.N.Y. 
filed May 19, 2006); Solomon v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., No. 06-02193 (E.D. Pa. filed 
May 24, 2006); Cross v. AT&T Commc’ns, Inc., No. 04-0605 (Ind. Sup. Ct. filed May 25, 
2006); Dubois v. AT&T Corp., No. 06-00085 (W.D. Mich. filed May 26, 2006); Camp-
bell v. AT&T Commc’ns of Cal., No. 06-452626 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed May 26, 2006); 
Riordan v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., No. 06-03574 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed May 26, 2006); 
Roe v. AT&T Corp., No. 06-3467 (N.D. Cal. filed May 30, 2006); Basinski v. Verizon 
Commc’ns, Inc., No. 06-4169 (S.D.N.Y. filed May 31, 2006); Payne v. Verizon 
Commc’ns, Inc., No. 06-4193 (S.D.N.Y. filed June 2, 2006); Chulsky v. Cellco P’ship, 
No. 06-2530 (D.N.J. filed June 13, 2006); Crockett v. Verizon Wireless (VAW) LLC, No. 
DONOHUE FINAL REVISED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/18/2010  11:10 AM 
2010] The Shadow of State Secrets 151 
In the state cases—a handful of suits brought by the federal govern-
ment against state entities to enjoin investigation into matters linked 
to the NSA wiretapping program—the government stated that the 
subject at issue in the suits was the same as in the telecommunications 
cases.  The government had invoked state secrets in those cases, and 
state secrets similarly applied to these cases.  It did not, however, enter 
formal motions to recognize the privilege.319  This strategy would be 
 
06-00345 (D. Haw. filed June 26, 2006); Spielfogel-Landis v. MCI LLC, No. 06-04221 
(N.D. Cal. filed July 7, 2006); Bready v. Verizon Md., Inc., No. 06-05961 (Md. Cir. Ct. 
filed July 21, 2006); Clayton v. AT&T Commc’ns of the Sw., Inc., No. 06-04177 (W.D. 
Mo. filed Aug. 10, 2006); Jacobs v. AT&T Corp., No. 07-60365 (S.D. Fla. filed Mar. 14, 
2007); and Anderson v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., No. 06-03650 (S.D.N.Y. filed Apr. 10, 
2007).  Note that on July 10, 2008, a new Verizon case, McMurray v. Verizon Communica-
tions, was filed after the motion to stay all proceedings against Verizon, but Chief Judge 
Walker subsequently included it in these cases.  McMurray v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 
No. 08-6264 (S.D.N.Y. filed July 10, 2008). 
319 United States v. Gaw, No. 06-01132 (E.D. Mo. filed July 25, 2006), provides a 
good example.  There, the plaintiff argued that   
in other related proceedings, the Director of National Intelligence, supported 
by the Director of the National Security Agency, has asserted the federal state 
secrets privilege, in part, to protect information directly implicated by the Mis-
souri subpoenas:  whether to confirm or deny that telecommunications carri-
ers are (or are not) assisting the NSA. . . . [A]ctions of the State Defendants 
are therefore preempted under this authority as well.  
 Indeed, the DNI recently successfully asserted the state secrets privilege with 
regard to the kind of information requested, including whether or not the in-
formation even existed. 
Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Its Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment at 1, 7, Gaw, No. 07-01242 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2006), 2006 WL 2618346.  
Additionally, the plaintiff’s complaint provided:   
 The Federal Government also has an absolute privilege to protect military 
and state secrets from disclosure.  Only the Federal Government can waive that 
privilege, which is often called the “state secrets privilege.” . . . In both the Hept-
ing and Terkel cases, the state secrets privilege has been formally asserted by the 
Director of National Intelligence, John D. Negroponte, and the Director of the 
National Security Agency, Lieutenant General Keith B. Alexander. 
Complaint at 5, 7, Gaw, No. 06-01132 (E.D. Mo. July 25, 2006), 2006 WL 2362967; see 
also Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition the State Defen-
dants’ Motion to Dismiss at 2, United States v. Rabner, No. 06-2683 (D.N.J. Oct. 13, 
2006), 2006 WL 3037955 (“State Defendants’ expansive discussion of the state secrets 
privilege misses the mark.  [They] are simply incorrect that the United States must ac-
tually invoke the state secrets privilege in order to state a claim for relief.  It is beyond 
argument that the complaint states a claim . . . .”); Complaint at 7-9, United States v. 
Volz, No. 06-00188 (D. Vt. Oct. 2, 2006) (discussing the government’s use of the state 
secrets privilege in other cases); Complaint at 7-9, United States v. Palermino, No. 06-
01405 (D. Conn. Sept. 6, 2006) (citing invocation of the state secrets privilege in Hept-
ing and Terkel); Complaint at 6, United States v. Adams, No. 06-00097 (D. Me. Aug. 21, 
2006) (pointing toward state secrets claims in Hepting and Terkel); Complaint at 7, 
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missed in studies narrowly focused on cases in which government ac-
tually invokes the state secrets privilege; yet the approach—treating 
related cases as though the state secrets privilege applied, even in the 
absence of express declaration or any judicial ruling—is not unique.320  
The telecommunications cases in which state secrets seemingly did 
not appear were granted either formal or informal stays pending the 
outcome of Hepting—again, suggesting a parallel effect implicit in the 
invocation of the state secrets privilege.321 
Hepting itself illustrates the application and influence of the state 
secrets privilege; it underscores the importance of looking at the un-
derlying executive branch jurisprudence.  On April 28, 2008, the De-
partment of Justice, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 517, issued a Statement of 
Interest, saying that it intended to invoke the state secrets privilege 
and requesting dismissal of the case.322  Approximately three weeks 
later, on May 13, 2006, the United States formally intervened and 
moved to dismiss the suit on grounds of state secrets.  The govern-
ment included declarations by John Negroponte, Director of National 
Intelligence, and Keith Alexander, NSA Director, as well as additional 
classified material.323  The government argued all three grounds laid 
 
United States v. O’Donnell, No. 06-02683 (D.N.J. June 14, 2006) (mentioning invoca-
tion of state secrets by Negroponte in the Hepting case). 
320 In Project on Government Oversight v. Ashcroft, for instance, the government merely 
noted that the same information was at issue in the case as that classified under the state 
secrets privilege in Edmonds v. Department of Justice, without formally asserting state secrets.  
Compare Edmonds v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 323 F. Supp. 2d 65, 81-82 (D.D.C. 2004) (con-
cluding the government’s invocation of the state secrets privilege was proper and dismiss-
ing the suit), and Plaintiff’s Reply in Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgment, and 
Opposition to Defendants’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment at 7, Project on Gov’t 
Oversight v. Ashcroft, No. 04-01032 (D.D.C. Dec. 13, 2004), 2004 WL 3628302 
(“[D]efendants emphasize that the information POGO desires to disseminate was classi-
fied on October 18, 2002, in an original classification of the mosaic of information re-
lated to Ms. Edmonds’ employment case . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)), with 
Burnett v. Al Baraka Inv. & Dev. Corp., 323 F. Supp. 2d 82, 82-83 (D.D.C. 2004) (involv-
ing deposition of Sibel Edmonds in which court granted the government’s July 6, 2004, 
refusal to release documents falling under the state secrets privilege exception). 
321 AT&T requested the stay, which Chief Judge Walker explicitly granted on 
March 14, 2007.  See In re Nat’l Sec. Agency Telecomms. Record Litig., No. 06-01791, at 
3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2007) (stipulation and order granting stay in Roe, Campbell, Ma-
honey, Souder, Trevino, Dolberg, Terkel, Herron, Harrington, Joll, Conner, both Cross cases, 
Waxman, Fortnash, Dubois, Chulsky, Hardy, Mink, Roche, and Mayer, but excluding “cases 
against non-AT&T Defendants,” “cases in which the United States is a plaintiff,” Clay-
ton, and Hepting). 
322 See First Statement of Interest of the United States at 2, 5, Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 
439 F. Supp. 2d 974 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (No. 06-0672) (noting that the government would 
assert the state secrets privilege pursuant to its authority under 28 U.S.C. § 517 (2006)). 
323 Hepting, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 979. 
DONOHUE FINAL REVISED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/18/2010  11:10 AM 
2010] The Shadow of State Secrets 153 
out in Reynolds :  the “very subject matter” of the litigation related to 
privileged information; the plaintiffs could not make out a prima facie 
case without secret material; and the defendants could not mount a 
defense.324  Moreover, because the contract in question had been 
forged between the government and AT&T, dismissal under Totten 
was warranted.325 
As related suits rapidly proliferated, Chief Judge Walker an-
nounced in June 2006 that in order to ascertain whether and to what 
extent state secrets applied, the court would need to review certain 
classified materials.326  He directed the government to produce the 
materials for in camera review, explaining: 
 The court is mindful of the extraordinary due process consequences 
of applying the privilege the government here asserts.  The court is also 
mindful of the government’s claim of exceptionally grave damage to the 
national security of the United States that failure to apply the privilege 
could cause.  At this point, review of the classified documents affords the 
only prudent way to balance these important interests.
327
 
On July 20, 2006, Chief Judge Walker denied the government’s 
motion to dismiss, announcing that Totten was not applicable because 
the program, and AT&T’s participation in it, was already in the public 
domain.328  Moreover, there was simply no precedent for dismissing a 
case under state secrets when plaintiffs alleged “ongoing, widespread 
violations of individual constitutional rights.”329  Based on the public 
and classified materials, it did not appear that permitting a case to 
proceed would create a “reasonable danger” to national security.330  It 
was too early in the case’s development to determine whether a prima 
facie case or a valid defense could be established.331  And unlike the 
 
324 Id. at 984.  
325 Id. 
326 See Hepting, No. 06-0672, at 1 (N.D. Cal. June 6, 2006) (order on access to se-
cret documents), 2006 WL 1581965, at *1 (stating that “this case cannot proceed and 
discovery cannot commence until the court examines the classified documents to as-
sess whether and to what extent the state secrets privilege applies.”). 
327 Id. at *4 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
328 See Hepting, 439 F. Supp. 2d. at 993 (“[T]he government has disclosed the gen-
eral contours of the ‘terrorist surveillance program,’ which requires the assistance of a 
telecommunications provider, and AT&T claims that it lawfully and dutifully assists the 
government in classified matters when asked.”). 
329 Id. 
330 Id. at 994. 
331 See id. (finding that deciding these claims would be “premature,” but that plain-
tiffs could proceed with some discovery). 
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court’s decision in El-Masri, no blanket grant would be given to the 
executive branch: 
[I]t is important to note that even the state secrets privilege has its limits.  
While the court recognizes and respects the executive’s constitutional 
duty to protect the nation from threats, the court also takes seriously its 
constitutional duty to adjudicate the disputes that come before it.  To 
defer to a blanket assertion of secrecy here would be to abdicate that du-
ty . . . . The compromise between liberty and security remains a difficult 
one.  But dismissing this case at the outset would sacrifice liberty for no 
apparent enhancement of security.
332
 
To afford the plaintiff an opportunity to seek judicial remedy for the 
alleged violation of his constitutional rights, discovery would pro-
ceed.333  Chief Judge Walker certified the case for immediate interlo-
cutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).334 
In addition, the court considered the appointment of a special 
expert, under Federal Rule of Evidence 706, to help in determining 
whether disclosure of certain evidence would create a reasonable 
danger to national security.335  This potential solution echoes a host of 
similar judicial efforts over time to balance the national security inter-
ests of the government and the interests of the plaintiffs in seeking 
redress for their grievances; however, many of these cases, which have 
been sealed or unreported, or which do not ultimately turn on the 
state secrets question, have escaped academic analysis.336 
In August 2006, as aforementioned, the multidistrict panel began 
consolidating and transferring cases to the Northern District of Cali-
 
332 Id. at 995 (citations omitted). 
333 See id. at 993-94 (observing that, because an alleged violation of constitutional 
rights was the state interest at issue, the plaintiff was entitled to limited discovery). 
334 Id. at 1011. 
335 See id. (ordering the parties to show cause for why the court should not appoint 
an expert); see also FED. R. EVID. 706 (permitting a court to appoint an expert witness 
on its own motion). 
336 See, e.g., In re Under Seal, 945 F.2d 1285, 1287 (4th Cir. 1991) (indicating that a 
lower court issued a protective order requiring a deposition to be conducted in a se-
cure facility with government officers present to direct what information could be re-
vealed); Loral Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 558 F.2d 1130, 1132-33 (2d Cir. 
1977) (deeming the appointment of a special master, without parties’ consent, appro-
priate; applying Federal Magistrate’s Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(2) (1976); and indicating 
that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53(b) “permits reference to a master on a showing 
that some exceptional condition requires it”); In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 
97 F.R.D. 427, 431-32 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (upholding a special master’s recommended 
procedures for discovery, including having the government submit documents to the 
special master for in camera review). 
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fornia.337  Accordingly, on November 22, 2006, Chief Judge Walker re-
quired all parties to “show cause in writing [as to] why the Hepting or-
der should not apply to all cases or claims to which the government 
assert[ed] the state secrets privilege.”338  The government moved for a 
stay of proceedings, pending disposition of an interlocutory appeal in 
Hepting.339  On January 5, 2007, Chief Judge Walker ordered all plain-
tiffs to prepare, file, and serve consolidated complaints on each tele-
communications defendant.340  On July 24, 2007, Walker took steps 
similar to those in Hepting, denying without prejudice the govern-
ment’s motion to dismiss the state cases, as well as denying as moot 
the state officials’ motions for summary judgment.341 
What started as the invocation of state secrets doctrine, backed by 
executive jurisprudence, morphed into a power struggle between the 
branches of government.  Four days after the court’s order, President 
Bush announced that he had submitted a bill to amend FISA, a statute 
that he considered to be out of date and technologically behind the 
times:  it fit uneasily in a world dominated by mobile phones and In-
ternet-based communications.342  He requested that Congress pass the 
bill before the August 2007 recess, suggesting that any future attacks, 
in the absence of new legislation, would be on the backs of the legisla-
tors.343  A sentence that was deleted from the draft of the broadcast 
explained, “[E]very day that Congress puts off these reforms increases 
the danger to our nation.”344 
 
337 See supra note 316 and accompanying text (describing the challenges inherent 
in consolidating cases involving questions of national security). 
338 In re Nat’l Sec. Agency Telecomms. Records Litig., No. 06-1791, at 2 (N.D. Cal. 
Nov. 22, 2006) (pretrial order scheduling hearings) (emphasis omitted). 
339 Motion of United States for a Stay Pending Disposition of Interlocutory Appeal 
in Hepting v. AT&T Corp., In re Nat’l Sec. Agency, No. 06-1791 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2006). 
340 See In re Nat’l Sec. Agency, No. 06-1791, at 1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2007) (order reset-
ting deadlines) (ordering service of “Master Complaints”). 
341 See In re Nat’l Sec. Agency, No. 06-1791, at 2 (N.D. Cal. July 24, 2007) (order de-
nying summary judgment) (stating that, as Hepting’s appeal was pending, and as the 
court would not address the government’s state secrets argument, both motions would 
be denied). 
342 See George W. Bush, President’s Radio Address (Office of the Press Secretary radio 
broadcast July 28, 2007), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/ 
news/releases/2007/07/print/20070728.html (noting that technology has changed 
dramatically in the thirty years since FISA’s passage). 
343 See id. (“Congress needs to act immediately to pass this bill, so that our national 
security professionals can close intelligence gaps and provide critical warning time for 
our country.”). 
344 Jim Rutenberg, Wielding the Threat of Terrorism, Bush Outmaneuvers the Democrats, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2007, at A14. 
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On August 3, 2007, in a rough party-line divide, the Senate passed 
Senate Bill 1927 (60-28),345 and the House its equivalent (227-183).346  
The resultant Protect America Act of 2007 superseded the litigation.347  
The Act authorized direct communications service providers to help 
the federal government acquire foreign intelligence when such acqui-
sitions targeted third persons reasonably believed to be outside the 
United States.348  The Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and At-
torney General (AG) became empowered to authorize, for up to one 
year, “the acquisition of foreign intelligence information concerning 
persons reasonably believed to be outside the United States”349 where 
five criteria were met:  (a) reasonable procedures were in place to en-
sure that the target was reasonably believed to be located outside the 
United States, (b) acquisitions did not constitute “electronic surveil-
lance,”350 (c) surveillance would require the help of a communications 
service provider, (d) a significant purpose was to obtain foreign intel-
ligence information, and (e) the minimization procedures met the 
requirements of 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h).351  With a few exceptions, the de-
termination was to be made in the form of a written certification 
“supported as appropriate by affidavit of appropriate officials in the 
national security field.”352 
The executive branch appears to have quickly issued directives 
under the Act to communications service providers, requesting the as-
 
345 See Roll Call Votes 110th Congress—1st Session, U.S. SENATE (Aug. 3, 2007), 
http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress= 
110&session=1&vote=00309 (indicating that the Senate passed S. 1927 as amended with 
sixty “yeas” and twenty-eight “nays”). 
346 See Final Vote Results for Roll Call 836, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (Aug. 
4, 2007), http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2007/roll836.xml (passing the House with 227 
“yeas” and 183 “nays,” with most of the support from Republicans and most of the op-
position from Democrats). 
347 See Protect America Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-55, 121 Stat. 552 (granting 
greater authority to access electronic communications concerning foreign intelligence 
related to persons outside the United States), repealed by Foreign Intelligence Surveil-
lance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436 (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 50 U.S.C.). 
348 Id. §§ 2–3. 
349 Id. § 2. 
350 The Protect America Act of 2007 conceived of electronic surveillance as excluding 
surveillance of anyone believed to be outside the United States.  See id. (“Nothing in the 
definition of electronic surveillance . . . shall be construed to encompass surveillance di-
rected at a person reasonably believed to be located outside of the United States.”). 
351 Id. 
352 Id. 
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sistance needed.353  The legislation required officials to notify the FISA 
Court within seventy-two hours of surveillance authorization, allowed 
for data monitoring, and removed the foreign-agent requirement that 
previously had been included in the statute.354  The Act further limited 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court’s (FISC’s) role to simply 
accepting or rejecting the guidelines for targeting individuals for in-
telligence information.355 
In accordance with the six-month sunset provisions, the new pow-
ers were to expire on February 5, 2008.356  Following repeated exten-
sions,357 however, the existing directives and authorizations remained 
in place through the formal repeal of the Protect America Act and its 
effective replacement in July 2008, the FISA Amendments Act (FI-
SAAA).358  This new legislation removed the warrant requirement for 
government surveillance of foreign intelligence targets “reasonably 
believed” to be outside the United States.359  In an unusual move, it 
provided retroactive immunity to telecommunications providers for 
any past violations of FISA when the attorney general certified to one 
of five conditions: 
(1) any assistance by that person was provided pursuant to an order of 
the court established under section 103(a) directing such assistance; 
(2) any assistance by that person was provided pursuant to a certification 
in writing under section 2511(2)(a)(ii)(B) or 2709(b) of title 18, United 
States Code; 
(3) any assistance by that person was provided pursuant to a directive un-
der section 102(a)(4), 105B(e), as added by section 2 of the Protect Amer-
ica Act of 2007 (Public Law 110-55), or 702(h) directing such assistance; 
 
353 See In re Directives [redacted text] Pursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign In-
telligence Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d 1004, 1007 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008) (“Beginning in 
[redacted text] 2007, the government issued directives to the petitioner commanding it 
to assist in warrantless surveillance of certain customers . . . .” (alteration in original)).  
354 Protect America Act § 2. 
355 Id. 
356 Id. § 6(c). 
357 See ELIZABETH B. BAZAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34143, P.L. 110-55, THE 
PROTECT AMERICA ACT OF 2007:  MODIFICATIONS TO THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SUR-
VEILLANCE ACT 20 (2008), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL34143.pdf 
(discussing repeated extensions, which failed to allow the powers to sunset). 
358 See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008 (FI-
SA Amendments Act of 2008), Pub. L. No. 110-261, § 403, 122 Stat. 2436, 2473-74 (re-
pealing selected sections of the Protect America Act).  For continuation of existing or-
ders, see id. § 404(a)(1). 
359 FISA Amendments Act of 2008 § 703, 50 U.S.C. § 1881(b) (Supp. II 2009). 
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(4) in the case of a covered civil action, the assistance alleged to have 
been provided by the electronic communication service provider was— 
(A) in connection with an intelligence activity involving communi-
cations that was— 
(i) authorized by the President during the period beginning on 
September 11, 2001, and ending on January 17, 2007; and 
(ii) designed to detect or prevent a terrorist attack, or activities in 
preparation for a terrorist attack, against the United States; and 
(B) the subject of a written request or directive, or a series of written 
requests or directives, from the Attorney General or the head of an 
element of the intelligence community (or the deputy of such per-
son) to the electronic communication service provider indicating 
that the activity was— 
(i) authorized by the President; and 
(ii) determined to be lawful; or 
(5) the person did not provide the alleged assistance.
360
 
Efforts to challenge the directives and authorizations through the 
FISC met with little success and resulted in the second public opinion 
the FISC appellate court issued.361  The presiding judges in this case 
(Judge Royce Lamberth, followed by Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly) had 
been read into the NSA warrantless wiretap program between January 
2002 and January 2006.362  The resulting opinion for In re Directives was 
published (in redacted form) on January 15, 2009.363  In it, the review 
court considered the petitioner’s refusal to comply with directives is-
sued in 2007 under the Protect America Act.364  Under threat of civil 
 
360 Id. § 802, 50 U.S.C. § 1885a. 
361 See In re Directives [redacted text] Pursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign In-
telligence Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d 1004, 1007 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008) (assessing the 
“validity of the actions at issue” under the Protect America Act).  The first published 
opinion followed the initial en banc FISC opinion, In re All Matters Submitted to the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 218 F. Supp. 2d 611 (FISA Ct. 2002).  See also 
In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 742-45 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002) (holding that amending 
the surveillance requirement for a “significant purpose” into a “primary purpose” was 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment).  Note that in dicta in the 2002 case, the 
court referred to “the President’s inherent constitutional authority to conduct warrant-
less foreign intelligence surveillance”—again echoing the sentiments of the OLC me-
mos underlying the NSA warrantless wiretapping program.  Id. at 746. 
362 OFFICES OF INSPECTORS GEN., supra note 257, at 17. 
363 See In re Directives, 551 F.3d 1004 (No. 08-0001) (order permitting publication of 
redacted opinion); see also In re Directives, 551 F.3d at 1004. 
364 See In re Directives, 551 F.3d at 1007-08 (detailing the history of petitioner’s re-
fusal to follow government orders); see also Protect America Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 
110-55, 121 Stat. 552, repealed by Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amend-
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contempt and with a lack of success in obtaining a stay pending appeal 
to the FISC court, the petitioner had been forced to comply.365 
While the FISC case proceeded behind closed doors, the Ninth 
Circuit consolidated Al-Haramain and Hepting, with Judges Harry Pre-
gerson, Michael Hawkins, and M. Margaret McKeown hearing argu-
ment in August 2007.366  Soon thereafter, the judges severed the cas-
es,367 and a year later, they ordered the district court to reconsider 
Hepting in light of the FISAAA.368 
On September 18, 2008, Attorney General Michael Mukasey issued 
a certification under FISAAA section 802 to immunize the telecommu-
nications companies for their actions.369  Based on Mukasey’s certifica-
tion, the following day, the Department of Justice filed a motion in rela-
tion to thirty-eight of the consolidated telecommunications cases.370  
Without specifying which of the five conditions applied, Mukasey stated 
that “the claims asserted in the civil actions pending in these consoli-
dated proceedings . . . fall within at least one provision contained in 
Section 802(a).”371  The government moved to dismiss all claims against 
the electronic communications service providers in the MDL.372 
 
ments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436 (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 18 and 50 U.S.C.). 
365 In re Directives, 551 F.3d at 1008. 
366 Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190, 1192, 1196 (9th Cir. 
2007), see also id. at 1196 (“We granted interlocutory review and consolidated this ap-
peal with Hepting v. AT&T Corp. . . . .”). 
367 See id. at 1196 n.3 (“[W]e are concurrently entering an order stating that the 
cases are no longer consolidated for any purpose.”). 
368 Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 539 F.3d 1157, 1158 (9th Cir. 2008) (order remanding 
the case to district court). 
369 Certification of the Attorney General of the United States, In re Nat’l Sec. 
Agency Telecomms. Records Litig., No. 06-1791 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2008); see also 
Plaintiffs’ Federal Rule of Evidence Section 1006 Summary of Voluminous Evidence 
Filed in Support of Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Motion of the United States Seeking to 
Apply FISAAA § 802 (50 U.S.C. § 1885a) to Dismiss These Actions, In re Nat’l Sec. Agen-
cy, No. 06-1791 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2008) (arguing in support of Mukasey’s certification 
to immunize the telecommunications companies). 
370 See United States’ Notice of Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, for Summary 
Judgment, In re Nat’l Sec. Agency, No. 06-1791 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2008) [hereinafter U.S. 
Motion to Dismiss in In re NSA] (moving to dismiss all claims against the electronic com-
munications service providers in a multidistrict-litigation matter brought by individu-
als against telecommunications companies). 
371 In re Nat’l Sec. Agency, No. 06-1791, at 6 (N.D. Cal. June 3, 2009) (order granting 
motion to dismiss) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
372 U.S. Motion to Dismiss in In re NSA, supra note 370, at 2.  
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On December 2, 2008, Chief Judge Walker heard oral argument 
on the motion to dismiss.373  The FISC appellate decision was made 
public the following January.374  Then, on July 21, 2009, Chief Judge 
Walker formally dismissed Hepting under FISAAA section 802.375  Ten 
days later, the plaintiffs appealed.376 
D.  State Secrets in the Aftermath 
With substantial jurisprudence undergirding its assertion of con-
stitutional authority, the executive branch had proven itself willing 
and able to prevent a challenge to the wiretapping program.  The en-
suing battle essentially rendered the invocation of state secrets moot.  
So what, then, of the fifty related cases? 
Two of these cases resulted in voluntary dismissal.377  The effect of 
state secrets on these cases, as in others, was that upon the govern-
ment’s invocation of state secrets, plaintiffs voluntarily withdrew their 
case.  This effect has largely escaped academic analysis.  In light of FI-
SAAA, Hepting no longer controlled for the forty-eight remaining cas-
es.  On June 3, 2009, Chief Judge Walker issued two orders, dismissing 
forty-four of the remaining cases.378  The first order applied to thirty-
eight cases, and stated that the FISA amendments at 50 U.S.C. 
§ 1885(a) preempted all claims, granting immunity to the telecom-
 
373 Civil Minutes, In re Nat’l Sec. Agency, No. 06-1791 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2008). 
374 See In re Directives [redacted text] Pursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign In-
telligence Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d 1004 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008) (showing text of rul-
ing); James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Court Affirms Wiretapping Without Warrants, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 16, 2009, at A13 (discussing the unsealing of the opinion several months 
after the judgment was handed down). 
375 See Hepting v. AT&T Commc’ns, No. 06-0672 (N.D. Cal. July 21, 2009) (render-
ing judgment in favor of the defendants according to the court’s June 3, 2009, order); 
In re Nat’l Sec. Agency, No. 06-1791, at 1-2 (N.D. Cal. June 3, 2009) (order granting mo-
tion to dismiss) (noting that the basis for the government’s motion to dismiss was FISA 
Section 802); see generally FISA Amendments Act of 2008 § 802, 50 U.S.C. § 1885a 
(Supp. II 2009). 
376 Joint Notice of Appeal of Designated Plaintiffs and Actions, In re Nat’l Sec. Agency, 
No. 06-1791 (N.D. Cal. July 31, 2009) [hereinafter Joint Notice of Appeal in In re NSA]. 
377 In re Nat’l Sec. Agency, No. 06-1791 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2007) (order on notice of 
voluntary dismissal), dismissing Complaint, Electron Tubes Inc. v. Verizon Commc’ns, 
No. 06-06433 (S.D.N.Y. filed May 26, 2006); In re Nat’l Sec. Agency, No. 06-1791 (N.D. 
Cal. Feb. 22, 2007) (order on notice of voluntary dismissal), dismissing Complaint, Tre-
vino v. AT&T Corp., No. 06-05268 (S.D. Tex. filed May 17, 2006). 
378 In re Nat’l Sec. Agency, No. 06-1791 (N.D. Cal. June 3, 2009) (order granting mo-
tion to dismiss), ECF No. 639; In re Nat’l Sec. Agency, No. 06-1791 (N.D. Cal. June 3, 
2009) (order granting motion for summary judgment), ECF No. 640. 
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munications companies.379  (All thirty-eight cases are currently on ap-
peal.380)  The second order applied to the state cases (i.e., the cases in 
which states were subpoenaing documents from telecommunications 
companies, with the exception of Clayton, where Clayton is the plain-
tiff).381  The controlling provision for these state cases fell within FI-
SAAA’s amendments to section 803 of FISA, codified at 50 U.S.C. 
§ 1885b (a provision which authorizes the federal government to bring 
suit to enforce the provisions that deny states the authority to investi-
gate, regulate, or impose administrative sanctions, or to commence a 
civil action or other proceeding in regards to disclosure of information 
concerning electronic communication service providers’ alleged assis-
tance to the intelligence community).382  This provision applied to any 
action pending on or commenced after the date of the amendment’s 
enactment.383  None of the state cases were appealed. 
According to the approach taken to date within the academic lite-
rature, none of these cases is a state secrets case, as the court did not, in the 
end, rule on whether state secrets doctrine applied; rather, FISAAA 
preempted the state secrets question.  Yet the executive branch juri-
sprudence underlying the cases, the manner of their development, and 
 
379 See In re Nat’l Sec. Agency, No. 06-1791, at 18 (N.D. Cal. June 3, 2009) (order 
granting motion to dismiss), ECF No. 639 (“[S]ection 802 creates an immunity, albeit 
one that is activated in an unusual way.”).  
380 Joint Notice of Appeal in In re NSA, supra note 376. 
381 See, e.g., Clayton v. AT&T Commc’ns of the Sw., Inc., No. 07-1187 (N.D. Cal. 
transferred Feb. 28, 2007) (originating in W.D. Mo.); Complaint, United States v. Volz, 
No. 06-0188 (D. Vt. filed Oct. 2, 2006).  In 2006, the Vermont Department of Public 
Service petitioned the Vermont Public Service Board to open investigations of Verizon 
and AT&T.  The Board ordered the carriers to respond.  On October 2, 2006, the fed-
eral government sued to enjoin the investigation.  See In re Nat’l Sec. Agency Tele-
comms. Records Litig., No. 06-1791, at 5-7 (N.D. Cal. June 3, 2009) (order granting 
motion for summary judgment), ECF. No. 640; see also United States v. Palermino, 238 
F.R.D. 118, 120 (D. Conn. 2006) (showing intervention by the U.S. government in an 
action by a Connecticut agency to compel telecommunications carriers to disclose gov-
ernment information); Complaint, United States v. Adams, No. 06-00097 (D. Me. Aug. 
21, 2006) (arguing that the states do not have the authority to access federal govern-
ment information); Complaint, United States v. Gaw, No. 06-01132 (E.D. Mo. July 25, 
2006) (same); Complaint, United States v. Farber, No. 07-01324 (D.N.J. June 14, 2006) 
(same); Procedural Order, Nos. 7183, 7192 & 7193 (Vt. Pub. Serv. Bd. July 18, 2008) 
(inviting comment on how to proceed in light of FISA amendments significantly limit-
ing the permissible scope of investigation).  For the renaming of the cases, see In re 
Nat’l Sec. Agency Telecomms. Records Litig., No. 06-1791 (N.D. Cal. June 3, 2009) 
(order granting motion for summary judgment), ECF No. 640. 
382 See FISA Amendments Act of 2008 § 803, 50 U.S.C. § 1885b (Supp. II 2009) 
(providing that states have no authority to investigate these national intelligence mat-
ters, and that the United States may bring suit to enforce this provision). 
383 Id. § 803(d). 
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the impact of state secrets throughout litigation are central to under-
standing the privilege and how the courts deal with allegations of con-
stitutional violations and national security interests.  The battle, moreo-
ver, went to the heart of the separation-of-powers principle.  The 
manner in which the cases unfolded, additionally, sheds new light on 
the relationship between FISA and state secrets. 
The remaining four cases represent suits brought against govern-
mental entities (as opposed to telecommunication companies in the 
first court order and state governments in the second court order).  In 
regard to the first of these cases, Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation v. Ob-
ama, in March 2010, Chief Judge Walker ruled that the warrantless in-
terception of an Islamic charity’s telephone calls had violated FISA.384  
The court said that the plaintiffs had been subjected to unlawful sur-
veillance, making the government liable for civil damages.385  Plaintiffs 
subsequently requested punitive damages of $183,600 for each plain-
tiff.386  As of this writing, the second case, Center for Constitutional Rights 
v. Bush, is awaiting motions for summary judgment.387  The third, Shu-
bert v. Bush, is currently on appeal,388 following a judgment in favor of 
defendants.389  The fourth, Guzzi v. Bush, was dismissed in March 
2010.390  In each of these, the state secrets doctrine has been central to 
the case.  Careful examination of the related transcripts, memoranda, 
and legal documents sheds important light on the manner in which 
the executive branch invokes the privilege; how the courts respond to 
in camera, ex parte examination of the materials; how the judiciary 
treats information already in the public domain; and the relationship 
between FISA and state secrets. 
 
384 Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Claim for Pu-
nitive Damages at 1, Al-Haramain Islamic Found. v. Obama, Nos. 07-010, 06-1791 (N.D. 
Cal. May 7, 2010) [hereinafter Plaintiffs’ Claim for Damages in Al-Haramain].  
385 Id.  The plaintiffs also requested punitive damages.  See id. at 1-7 (“Defendants 
sought to put themselves above the law, in the manner of a monarch.  That is a pro-
found abuse of America’s trust.  It calls for strong medicine.”).  Cf. Defendants’ Oppo-
sition to Plaintiffs’ Request for Punitive Damages, Al-Haramain, Nos. 07-0109, 06-1791 
(N.D. Cal. May 21, 2010). 
386 Plaintiffs’ Claim for Damages in Al-Haramain, supra note 384, at 1. 
387 Motion for Summary Judgment, Ctr. for Constitutional Rights v. Bush, No. 07-
01115 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2010). 
388 Brief of Shubert Appellants, Shubert v. Bush, Nos. 10-15616, 06-1791 (9th Cir. 
Aug. 13, 2010). 
389 Shubert v. Bush, Nos. 07-00693, 06-1791 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2010).  
390 See Guzzi v. Bush, No. 06-6225 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2010) (order dismissing case) 
(dismissing the case based on the stipulated dismissal by the parties). 
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In Al-Haramain, for instance, District Court Judge King decided on 
August 18, 2006, to review the documents submitted after the govern-
ment invoked the state secrets privilege in camera and ex parte, but 
he declined to review in kind documents submitted prior to the decla-
ration.391  He subsequently found that “[a]s a result of these official 
statements and publications, the existence of the Surveillance Pro-
gram is not a secret.”392  Confirming or denying whether the plaintiffs 
had been subject to surveillance would not create a reasonable danger 
to national security, at least in regard “to the surveillance event or 
events disclosed in the Sealed Document, and without publicly disclos-
ing any other information in the Sealed Document.”393  The court 
found that disclosure of further surveillance efforts, however, “could 
harm national security.”394  But since the government had “lifted the 
veil of secrecy on the existence of the Surveillance Program,” the “very 
subject matter of the plaintiffs’ action” was not a state secret.395  Judge 
King proved remarkably unwilling “to dismiss this case without first 
examining all available options and allowing plaintiffs their constitu-
tional right to seek relief in this Court.”396  The court drew attention to 
the surrounding network of statutory authorities and secondary in-
struments used to prevent information from becoming public.397  
While the court denied the plaintiff access to the classified material, it 
simultaneously shifted the burden to the government to file further 
affidavits in camera to show that sealed documents would be required 
for the plaintiff to make a prima facie case.398  The court opted to moni-
tor discovery closely in order to allow it to move forward, while denying 
plaintiffs’ request to unseal the record.399  Although the court sides-
tepped the FISA question and the attendant constitutional questions, 
 
391 Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 451 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1219-20 (D. 
Or. 2006). 
392 Id. at 1222.  
393 Id. at 1224. 
394 Id. 
395 Id. at 1224-25. 
396 Id. at 1227. 
397 Id. at 1227-28 (citing National Security Act, 50 U.S.C. § 402 (2006); Intelligence 
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, 50 U.S.C. § 403-1(i)(1) (2006); Exec. 
Order No. 12,958, § 1.1(b), 60 Fed. Reg. 19,825 (Apr. 20, 1995), as amended by Exec. 
Order No. 13,292, 3 C.F.R. 196 (2004)). 
398 Id. at 1229. 
399 Id. at 1232-33. 
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the underlying legal documents explored the arguments in detail.400  
Throughout the litigation, the specter of state secrets loomed.401 
The fifty suits discussed above are not the only ones to come out 
of the NSA’s warrantless wiretapping program.  One of the most im-
portant cases was ACLU v. National Security Agency,402 an earlier case not 
included in the MDL, in which the Director of National Intelligence, 
John D. Negroponte, and the NSA’s Signals Intelligence Director, Ma-
jor General Richard J. Quirk, invoked state secrets and related privi-
leges.403  The executive branch sought a motion to dismiss or, in the 
alternative, summary judgment.404  Following examination of classified 
in camera materials, the lower court rejected the invocation of the 
state secrets privilege as a bar to the litigation moving forward.405 
In Jewel v. National Security Agency, the Obama Administration re-
quested dismissal based not only on state secrets406 but also on sove-
 
400 See, e.g., Plaintiffs’ Reply to Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for 
Order Compelling Discovery at 5-17, Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, No. 06-
0274 (D. Or. July 2006), 2006 WL 1909808 (contending that FISA abrogates the state 
secrets privilege in foreign electronic surveillance cases); Defendants’ Response to the 
Oregonian’s Motion to Intervene and to Unseal Records at 9-17, Al-Haramain, No. 06-
0274 (D. Or. Apr. 14, 2006), 2006 WL 1465726 (arguing against the unsealing of classi-
fied documents). 
401 See, e.g., Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion for a Protective Or-
der Barring the Deposition of Barbara C. Hammerle at 4, Al-Haramain, No. 06-0274 
(D. Or. June 9, 2006), 2006 WL 1716659 (“Defendants are preparing a dispositive mo-
tion, based on an assertion of the state secrets privilege, that will demonstrate that this 
case should not proceed.”). 
402 438 F. Supp. 2d 754 (E.D. Mich. 2006), overruled by ACLU v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 
493 F.3d 644 (6th Cir. 2007). 
403 See Declaration of John D. Negroponte, Director of National Intelligence at 2, 
ACLU, No. 06-10204 (E.D. Mich. May 27, 2006), 2006 WL 1868157 (asserting the state 
secrets privilege); Declaration of Major General Richard J. Quirk, Signals Intelligence 
Director, National Security Agency at 2, ACLU v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, No. 06-10204 (E.D. 
Mich. May 27, 2006), 2006 WL 1868158 (supporting the assertion of the state secrets 
privilege, as well as a statutory privilege); see also Defendants’ Memorandum of Points 
and Authorities in Support of a Stay Pending Appeal at 11-15, ACLU, No. 06-10204 
(E.D. Mich. Sept. 1, 2006), 2006 WL 2791162 (referencing depositions). 
404 Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of the United States’ Asser-
tion of the Military and State Secrets Privilege; Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or, in 
the Alternative, for Summary Judgment; and Defendants’ Motion to Stay Considera-
tion of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 5, ACLU, No. 06-10204 (E.D. Mich. 
May 26, 2006), 2006 WL 1868156. 
405 See Defendants’ Reply in Support of a Stay Pending Appeal at 1, ACLU, No. 
06-10204 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 22, 2006), 2006 WL 2769326 (explaining the lower 
court’s order). 
406 See Jewel v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, No. 06-1791, 2010 WL 235075, at *4 (N.D. Cal. 
Jan. 21, 2001) (asserting the state secrets privilege first on April 3, 2009); Government 
Defendants’ Response to Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Brief at 3, Jewel, No. 08-4373 (N.D. 
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reign immunity.407  The government drew on the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act (FOIA) exemptions and the surrounding classification statu-
tory framework, similar to its position the Al-Haramain litigation.408  
The following September, the defendants requested what amounted 
to an indefinite stay:  that is, an order that they “not be required to 
answer or otherwise respond to plaintiffs’ complaint until there is a 
final resolution of whether information subject to the state secrets and 
related statutory privileges is necessary to litigate plaintiffs claims.”409  
The plaintiffs expressed frustration at the length of time it had taken 
for the case to work its way through the courts:  “While the NSA’s pro-
gram of wholesale warrantless surveillance of millions of Americans 
has been ongoing for at least eight years, this case, along with multiple 
others seeking judicial review of the serious underlying legal and con-
stitutional questions, has essentially languished in preliminary proce-
dural challenges.”410  The plaintiffs had first brought a case against the 
NSA three and a half years prior.  Following congressional action, the 
plaintiffs brought the current case: 
In the over three years that these cases have been pending, despite the 
ongoing nature of the harms and the accumulation of a mountain of 
pleadings and boxes of evidence in support of Plaintiffs’ claims, the 
Government’s strategy of raising and re-raising the same arguments 
 
Cal. Sept. 4, 2009) [hereinafter Government Response in Jewel], 2009 WL 2876653 
(maintaining that FISA does not preempt the state secrets privilege); Government De-
fendants’ Statement in Support of Individual Capacity Defendants’ Motion for Relief 
from Court Orders at 1, Jewel, No. 08-4373 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2009), 2009 WL 2876652 
(stating that defendants are barred from revealing information subject to the state secrets 
privilege); Government Defendants’ Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss and for 
Summary Judgment at 1, Jewel, No. 08-4373 (N.D. Cal. June 26, 2009), 2009 WL 
1883020 (“As the recently [sic] President made clear, while the state secrets privilege is 
necessary to protect national security, the United States will not invoke the privilege to 
prevent disclosure of the violation of a law or embarrassment to the government.” (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)); Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Government Defendants’ Mo-
tion to Dismiss and for Summary Judgment at 14-16, Jewel, No. 08-4373 (N.D. Cal. June 
3, 2009), 2009 WL 1683967 (“For purposes of Plaintiffs’ claims, FISA preempts the 
common-law state secrets privilege.”). 
407 See Jewel, 2010 WL 235075, at *1 (noting that the various government defendants 
have argued similarly in stating that Congress has not waived sovereign immunity). 
408 See Government Response in Jewel, supra note 406, at 3-4 (arguing that FISA 
does not preempt the state secrets privilege). 
409 Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Individual Capacity Defendants’ Motion for Relief 
from the Court’s Orders of April 27, 2009, and May 8, 2009, at 1, Jewel, No. 08-4373 
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2009) (citations omitted). 
410 Id. 
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based on the state secrets privilege and other governmental privileges 
has successfully limited forward motion toward the merits.
411
 
Defendants argued in reply that information potentially protected by 
state secrets was required to establish a qualified immunity defense—
making them unable to defend themselves adequately until the state 
secrets questions had been resolved.412  In January 2010, the court 
ruled in favor of the NSA.413 
In each of these cases, the government acted as defendant, invok-
ing the state secrets privilege in the process.  It is not just the suits re-
lated to the NSA’s wiretapping program, though, that have found the 
government in this position. 
III.  LEGAL CHALLENGES BROUGHT AGAINST  
U.S. OFFICIALS AND AGENCIES 
From 2001 to 2009, a range of legal claims against federal officials 
and agencies prompted executive invocation of the state secrets privi-
lege.  Since the early to mid-twentieth century, as treatises and scho-
larly works recognized, such assertions have been treated as distinct 
from executive privilege, law enforcement evidentiary privilege, and 
informer’s protection.414  The claims in cases where the federal gov-
 
411 Id. 
412 See Individual Capacity Defendants’ Reply in Support of Their Motion for Re-
lief from the Court’s Orders of April 27, 2009, and May 8, 2009 at 1, Jewel, No. 08-4373 
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2009) (arguing that an order for the individual defendants to re-
spond should be stayed until the privilege issues have been decided).  The Individual 
Capacity Defendants included George W. Bush, Richard B. Cheney, David S. Adding-
ton, Keith B. Alexander, Michael V. Hayden, John D. McConnell, John D. Negroponte, 
Michael B. Mukasey, Alberto R. Gonzales, and John D. Ashcroft.  Id. at 12.  The Gov-
ernment Defendants entered a brief in support of the Individual Capacity Defendants’ 
Motion.  See Government Defendants’ Statement in Support of Individual Capacity De-
fendants’ Motion for Relief from Court Orders, Jewel, No. 08-4373 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 
2009) (arguing for a stay of the order until privilege issues are decided). 
413 Jewel v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, No. 06-01791, 2010 WL 235075 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 
2010). 
414 See, e.g., Chesney, supra note 6, at 1273-76 (explaining the historical develop-
ment of the privilege in treatises).  The relationship between executive privilege and 
state secrets, however, continues to be confused in legal documents.  See, e.g., Plaintiffs’ 
Reply to Defendant’s Invalid Assertion of Executive Privilege to Deny Production of 
Thousands of Pages of Documents Underlying Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2 at 2, Jade Trading, 
LLC v. United States, 64 Fed. Cl. 85 (2005) (No. 03-2164), 2003 WL 25656604 (refer-
ring to the defendant’s assertion of “executive privilege” to withhold documents); City 
of Miami’s Response to Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Concerning the MPD FTAA Op-
erational Plan and Motion for Protective Order at 1, Owaki v. City of Miami, 491 F. 
Supp. 2d 1140 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (No. 06-20737) (asserting an “official information privi-
lege”); Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike Defendant’s Claims of Privilege Regarding the Tes-
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ernment, as the defendant, invokes the state secrets privilege include 
 
timony of Former Deputy Police Chief Pamela Evans at 2, Lewis v. City of Detroit, 234 
F.R.D. 157 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (No. 05-70667), 2006 WL 1035838 (noting the assertion 
of the “executive privilege”).  
 Notably, the invocation of the “state secrets” privilege has not been differentiated 
into the categories that mark federal law.  Instead, the privilege appears to be unders-
tood broadly, incorporating such varied material as institutional files, prison records, 
personnel records, the method of lethal injection, the names of executioners, infor-
mer’s identity, and more.  See, e.g., Porter v. Ray, 461 F.3d 1315, 1324 (11th Cir. 2006) 
(finding a statutory basis for considering prison records to be state secrets); Taylor v. 
Nix, 451 F. Supp. 2d 1351, 1354 (N.D. Ga. 2006) (denying access to prison records on 
grounds of state secrets); Pack v. Beyer, 157 F.R.D. 226, 233 (D.N.J. 1994) (finding that 
the state secrets privilege applied to prison documents); Beckett v. Trice, No. 08-0029, 
1994 WL 319171, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. June 6, 1994) (deeming information between 
witnesses and prosecutor a state secret); Plaintiff’s Request for Reconsideration by the 
District Court of Magistrate Judge’s Ruling on Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Production 
and Further Responses at 3-4, Jadwin v. County of Kern, 610 F. Supp. 2d 1129 (E.D. 
Cal. 2009) (No. 07-00026), 2008 WL 2817302 (arguing that personnel records should 
be considered a state secret); Motion for Stay of Execution at 37, Nooner v. Norris, No. 
06-00110 (E.D. Ark. Oct. 22, 2007), 2007 WL 3224262 (noting that the defendant’s le-
thal injection method was considered a state secret); Plaintiff’s Reply to Defendants’ 
Brief Filed on May 30, 2007, at 5, Press-Citizen Co. v. Iowa Bd. of Regents, No. 07-6443 
(D. Iowa June 3, 2007), 2007 WL 6335525 (referring to an informant’s privilege as a 
state secret); Response to Non-Party Objection and Motion to Quash Subpoena and 
Motion to Compel Compliance with Subpoena and Notice of Deposition of Represent-
ative of the Georgia Department of Corrections Under FRCP Rule 30(b)(6) and Re-
quest for an Immediate Order at 11, Graham v. Rich, No. 06-0095 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 24, 
2006), 2006 WL 1436664 (treating criminal files as a “state secret”); Response to De-
fendants’ Efforts to Keep Names of Executioners Including One Who Is a Board Certified 
Surgeon Secret from Plaintiffs’ Counsel Even Subject to a Protective Order at 8, Taylor 
v. Crawford, No. 05-4173 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 13, 2005), 2005 WL 6070480 (“If the name 
of the board-certified surgeon were not a state secret, we would see how long he or she 
retained that distinction.”); Opposition to Motion to Compel and Request for Sanc-
tions at 6, Lott v. Greystar Corp., No. 01-0312 (E.D. La. Aug. 28, 2001), 2001 WL 
34673784 (referring to New Jersey state prisoner files as state secrets). 
 Even when addressed to criminal matters and executive privilege, such cases may 
nevertheless rely on Reynolds, among other things.  See, e.g., Pack v. Beyer, 157 F.R.D. 
226, 231 (D.N.J. 1994) (citing Reynolds for the proposition that “[t]he state secrets pri-
vilege protects official information from disclosure if disclosure might otherwise en-
danger the public interest” (citation omitted)).  Like many of the federal cases, they 
are often unreported.  See, e.g., Brady v. Ocean Farm Ltd. P’ship, No. 2036-S, 2002 WL 
259955 (Del. Ch. Feb. 14, 2002).  Perhaps even more extraordinary is the situation in 
which state governments have invoked the privilege in its national security sense.  In 
Cedar and Washington Associates, for instance, the state of New York claimed state secrets 
as its twenty-fifth defense, arguing that the September 11, 2001, attacks amounted to 
an act of war.  Amended Answer and Counterclaim of Defendants UAL Corporation 
and United Air Lines, Inc. at 22, Cedar & Washington Assoc., LLC v. Port Auth. of N.Y. 
& N.J., No. 08-9146 (S.D.N.Y. June 18, 2009), 2009 WL 1897295; see also Answer with 
Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim of Defendant Host Hotels & Resorts, Inc. at 17, 
Cedar & Washington Assoc., No. 08-9146 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2009), 2009 WL 319560 (as-
serting the state secrets privilege as a defense). 
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constitutional violations (such as Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims 
and violations of international law), environmental cases, employ-
ment-related suits (such as wrongful termination and unlawful dis-
crimination), libel, and defamation. 
Three characteristics of the suits are of note:  First, when the gov-
ernment acts as defendant, the executive branch appears more likely 
to invoke the state secrets privilege early in the suit than in cases in 
which the government is an intervenor.  One explanation for this may 
be simply that the government is more aware of the suit moving for-
ward than in situations where a corporation is lobbying the executive 
to become more involved.  It may also be that the type of activities 
such suits target is more likely to involve clandestine operations.  
Second, the executive branch does not appear to change its position 
in a suit once it has invoked the state secrets privilege, even when it 
does not appear advantageous for the government to hold its course.  
Third, when positioned as a defendant, the government tends to seek 
not just suppression of evidence, but dismissal of the case.  The prolife-
ration of cases against the government since the September 11, 2001, 
attacks may thus partially explain why the government appears to be us-
ing state secrets differently than before.  As Professor Chesney points 
out, though, the government has previously sought full dismissal.415 
What appears to be different now, at least judging from the in-
stant research project, is that there are many visible cases alleging ex-
treme and possibly criminal behavior, as well as constitutional viola-
tions, in which the government seeks to dismiss the case as part of its 
own defense.  The claims are thus different from the more traditional 
state secrets cases—that is, those centered on tortious conduct or con-
tractual disputes.  Instead, the plaintiffs are alleging constitutional vi-
olations and criminal activity.  This suggests that a rather different 
cost is at stake than contemplated, for instance, by the court in Rey-
nolds.416  The claims also arise within a different context:  while in 
torts, for example, privilege plays into litigation in a number of ways 
(e.g., marital privilege and attorney-client privilege); in cases that 
reach questions of the separation of powers or constitutional rights, 
 
415 See Chesney, supra note 6, at 1297-98 (identifying twenty-eight cases decided 
before September 11, 2001, in which the government sought dismissal of “some or all 
claims” under the state secrets privilege). 
416 See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 9-12 (1953) (weighing the necessity of 
the evidence to plaintiffs’ wrongful death claims against the “danger that compulsion 
of the evidence will expose military matters which, in the interest of national security, 
should not be divulged”). 
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privileging an entire class of defendants raises a different set of 
(foundational) costs. 
A.  Fourth and Fifth Amendment Violations 
Fourth Amendment claims similar to those raised with respect to 
the NSA’s warrantless wiretapping program have previously appeared in 
a range of lawsuits that challenge federal surveillance.417  The period 
from 2001 to 2009 proves no different.418  In such circumstances, the 
state secrets privilege invocations may play a role in preventing plaintiffs 
from establishing standing, essentially acting as a bar to any litigation. 
In 2005, for instance, following repeated detentions in less-than-
ideal facilities during the course of their travels, the Rahman family, 
consisting of two parents and two small children, brought suit.419  The 
family alleged Fourth and Fifth Amendment violations in connection 
 
417 See, e.g., Black v. United States, 62 F.3d 1115, 1119-20 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding 
that the plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment allegations, even if true, did not prevent the 
government from asserting the state secrets privilege); Halkin v. Helms, 598 F.2d 1, 8-
12 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (ordering reconsideration of the state secrets privilege raised to 
protect intelligence collection); United States v. Ahmad, 499 F.2d 851, 854 (3d Cir. 
1974) (affirming the state secrets protection in an action involving alleged wiretaps by 
the government); Spock v. United States, 464 F. Supp. 510, 512-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) 
(finding the state secrets privilege validly established in a suit alleging unlawful inter-
ception of wire communications); Paton v. La Prade, 469 F. Supp. 773, 776-77 (D.N.J. 
1978) (analyzing assertions of Fourth Amendment protection against FBI seizure of 
items in the mail); Kinoy v. Mitchell 67 F.R.D. 1, 9 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (preventing the dis-
closure of surveillance documents in an action alleging Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth 
Amendment violations); Elson v. Bowen, 436 P.2d 12, 13-14 (Nev. 1967) (finding the 
government’s privilege to withhold evidence from plaintiffs alleging illegal surveillance 
at hotels to be “subject to the requirement that the government has the duty in seeing 
that justice is done”).  Such cases often allege multiple constitutional violations.  See, 
e.g., Jabara v. Kelley, 75 F.R.D. 475, 478 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (noting plaintiff’s allegations 
of First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Amendment violations).  
418 See, e.g., Amidax Trading Grp. v. S.W.I.F.T. SCRL, 607 F. Supp. 2d 500, 501 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (dismissing plaintiffs’ claim that the Treasury Department unlawfully 
obtained the plaintiff’s financial information by administrative subpoena).  The case 
arose when the Bush Administration allegedly served an administrative subpoena (Na-
tional Security Letter) on a Belgian banking cooperative, requesting that the company 
forward private financial data to the United States.  Id. at 502.  The federal defendants 
raised the potential invocation of the state secrets privilege early in the suit to alert the 
court to problems of standing that would ensue.  Id.  The court duly took notice of the 
government’s assertion, even as it ruled to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction.  Id. at 508-09. 
419 Class Action Complaint at 2-3, Rahman v. Chertoff, 244 F.R.D. 443 (N.D. Ill. 
2007) (No. 05-3761), 2005 WL 1768574.  Defendants, in their official capacities, in-
cluded Michael Chertoff, Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security; Robert 
C. Bonner, Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection; and Michael J. Gar-
cia, Assistant Secretary of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement.  Id. at 1. 
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with their inclusion in the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB), ad-
ministered by the Terrorist Screening Center.420  Approximately one 
year later, the plaintiffs moved for class certification.421  Eight of the 
named plaintiffs claimed to have been improperly detained or mi-
streated because either the TSDB incorrectly identified them as pos-
ing a serious threat (the “overclassification” claim) or because they 
were mistaken for someone on the list (the “misidentification” 
claim).422  Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief in relation 
to the travel delays to which they had been subjected.423 
The court initially concluded that a protective order would be ap-
propriate under the law enforcement and investigatory files privi-
lege.424  However, following a memorandum opinion and order on 
May 1, 2007,425 which required defendants to produce a range of doc-
uments, in July 2007, the government moved for a ruling that state se-
crets privilege barred the discovery of some materials.426  The govern-
ment claimed as excluded any information tending to confirm or 
deny whether the plaintiff had ever been placed in the TSDB, FBI files 
on any plaintiffs who may have been listed in the TSDB, any records in 
the Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE) pertaining to 
the plaintiffs, and policy and procedure documents containing classi-
fied information about terrorist screening practices.427 
 
420 Rahman v. Chertoff, No. 05-3761, 2008 WL 4534407, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 16, 
2008). 
421 Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Support of Motion for Class Certification at 1, 
Rahman, 244 F.R.D. 443 (No. 05-3761), 2006 WL 5940391; see also Rahman, 244 F.R.D. 
at 452 (adopting the magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendation on class certifi-
cation, and granting in part and denying in part defendants’ motion to dismiss). 
422 Rahman, 2008 WL 4534407, at *1. 
423 Rahman v. Chertoff, No. 05-3761, 2007 WL 2892972, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 
2007). 
424 See id. at *1 (recounting that the court had initially concluded “the parties had 
established good cause to protect information relating to the alleged border stops”). 
425 Rahman, No. 05-3761 (N.D. Ill. May 1, 2007) (sealed order). 
426 Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendants’ Motion 
for a Protective Order Barring Discovery of Matters Subject to the State Secrets Privi-
lege at 1, Rahman, 244 F.R.D. 443 (No. 05-3761), 2007 WL 5336227. 
427 Id. at 3.  John P. Clark, Deputy Assistant Secretary (Operations) of U.S. Immi-
gration and Customs Enforcement, and William S. Heffelfinger III, Deputy Assistant 
Commissioner, Office of Field Operations, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, filed 
affidavits in support of the investigatory law enforcement privilege (not the state se-
crets privilege).  Rahman, 2007 WL 2892972, at *5-6.  Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney 
General; J. Michael McConnell, Director of National Intelligence; Gale Rossides, Act-
ing Deputy Administrator (TSA); Andrew Colsky, Director of Sensitive Security Infor-
mation (TSA); and Robert Jacksta, Executive Director (Traveler’s Security and Facilita-
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On December 4, 2007, the court heard oral argument on the mo-
tion and subsequently considered further written supplements to the 
record.428  Strict procedures accompanied court examination of the 
documents in camera and ex parte:  one copy of the classified mate-
rials was brought into chambers, read, and returned—along with any 
notes made on the materials—to a secure location outside the court’s 
control.429  Judge Ronald A. Guzmán and Magistrate Judge Sidney I. 
Schenkier, who were not permitted to discuss the material with their 
staff, concluded that the government would be required to confirm or 
deny whether the plaintiffs had ever been listed in the TSDB, but 
would not be required to provide FBI files or access to the TIDE data-
base (the bank of information on terrorists that was created by the In-
telligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004).430 
Upon the government’s interlocutory appeal from district court, 
Chief Judge Easterbrook and Circuit Judges Kanne and Tinder heard 
oral argument on May 13, 2008, and issued their decision June 26, 
2008.431  Before them was neither the district court’s refusal to dismiss 
the suit (an interlocutory decision and thus not yet reviewable), nor 
the scope of the state secrets privilege, but rather the court’s decision 
to certify two nationwide classes (the “Primary Traveler Class” and the 
“Family Detainee Class”).432  On these grounds, the circuit court re-
versed and remanded the case, but not without noting its discomfort 
at being forced into the national security realm.433  Judge Easterbrook 
concluded his opinion: 
Plaintiffs are entitled to relief that will redress any discrete wrong done 
them.  That can be accomplished without certifying a class.  There is no 
risk that the defendants can moot the litigation by offering compromises 
to all named plaintiffs.  Defendants have shown no inclination to do so, 
 
tion) submitted public declarations in support of the state secrets assertion.  Rahman, 
2008 WL 4534407, at *2 n.4. 
428 Supplemental Brief in Support of Defendants’ Motion for a Protective Order 
Barring Discovery of State Secrets, Pursuant to the Court’s Order of December 4, 2007, 
at 1, Rahman, No. 05-3761 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 17, 2008), 2008 WL 2810560. 
429 Rahman, 2008 WL 4534407, at *2 n.4. 
430 Id. at *11; see also Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, 
Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 1016, (codified as amended at 6 U.S.C. § 485) (establishing an 
“information sharing environment” to facilitate “the sharing of terrorism information” 
by “any methods determined necessary and appropriate”). 
431 Rahman v. Chertoff, 530 F.3d 622, 622-23 (7th Cir. 2008). 
432 See id. at 625 (indicating that the district court had certified two classes in the 
case, and that the defendants claimed that plaintiffs’ membership in a given class 
could, as the classes were defined, change with every court filing). 
433 Id. at 627-28. 
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and the strategy could not work, because other travelers could intervene 
to carry on.  Decisions favorable to particular plaintiffs will have their ef-
fect in the normal way:  through the force of precedent.  If this seems a 
modest vision of the judiciary’s role, we answer that modesty is the best posture for 
the branch that knows the least about protecting the nation’s security and that 
lacks the full kit of tools possessed by the legislative and executive branches.  Presi-
dents, Cabinet officers, and Members of Congress can be dismissed by the people if 
they strike an unwise balance between false positives and false negatives, between 
inconvenience today and mayhem tomorrow; judges are immune from that super-
vision and must permit those who bear the blame for errors (in either direction) to 
assume the responsibility for management.
434
 
Speaking on behalf of the court, Judge Easterbrook was reluctant to 
tread into an area in which he had neither the expertise nor the ca-
pacity that those tasked with overseeing national security had. 
One of the dangers of Judge Easterbrook’s approach is that, in the 
context of official intelligence operations, state secrets—even where 
properly invoked—may play a key role in covering up officials’ bad 
behavior.  Perhaps the best illustration of this danger is a 1993 case in-
volving a DEA employee, a State Department official, and a CIA 
agent.435  That case, Horn v. Huddle, has been omitted from most state 
secrets analyses, in large part because it was sealed.  Recently partially 
unsealed, the case illustrates in detail the potential misuse of state se-
crets to cover officials’ misdeeds.  It highlights the deference frequent-
ly afforded to the executive branch by the courts, and it reinforces the 
idea that successive administrations tend to hold the line once the 
state secrets privilege has been invoked.  However, the extent to which 
Horn v. Huddle is sui generis is unclear. 
The case began as a Bivens action,436 in which a former DEA agent 
tried to prove that the CIA illegally spied on him to thwart his mission 
in Rangoon, Burma.437  Richard A. Horn, the DEA’s country attaché, 
“had a strained professional relationship with the State Department 
Chargé d’Affaires, Franklin ‘Pancho’ Huddle, Jr., arising from the dif-
fering policy goals of their agencies.”438  Horn alleged that Huddle 
 
434 Id. (emphasis added). 
435 In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d 139 (D.C. Cir. 2007).  Note that In re Sealed Case on 
remand later became Horn v. Huddle, 647 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C. 2009), vacated, 699 F. 
Supp. 2d 236 (D.D.C. 2010). 
436 See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 
388, 391-95 (1971) (finding an implied cause of action for violations by federal officials 
of the Fourth Amendment freedom from unreasonable search and seizure). 
437 In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d at 141.  
438 In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d at 141; see also Horn v. Huddle, No. 94-1756 (D.D.C. 
July 28, 2004) (order granting motion to dismiss) (identifying the plaintiff as a former 
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sent his superiors in Washington, D.C., a classified State Department 
cable transcribing a telephone call Horn had made from his residence 
in Rangoon on August 12, 1993, to one of his subordinates.439  During 
the call, Horn “expressed concern that Huddle was trying to expel 
him from Burma and that DEA might respond by closing its Burma 
office.”440  According to the D.C. Circuit opinion, the cable from Hud-
dle, sent the following day, read, “Horn shows increasing signs of evi-
dent strain.  Late last night, for example, he telephoned his junior 
agent to say that ‘I am bringing the whole DEA operation down here.’  
‘You will be leaving with me . . . . We’ll all leave together.’”441 
The DEA removed Horn from his post, prompting Horn to bring 
a Fourth Amendment claim against the CIA and the State Depart-
ment.442  The case was originally assigned to Judge Harold H. Greene, 
a Johnson (and then Carter) appointee, one of the principal archi-
tects of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the presiding judge in the 
case that resulted in the breakup of AT&T Co.443  In 1997, Judge 
Greene allowed most of In re Sealed Case to proceed, despite a sum-
mary judgment motion filed by the government.  In early 2000, how-
ever, Greene passed away.444  The case was then assigned to Judge 
Royce C. Lamberth, former Chief of the Department of Justice Civil 
Division and presiding judge of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Court until May 18, 2002.445 
In addition to the wiretapping incident, Horn alleged that the 
State Department was trying to undermine the DEA in Burma—
including turning over a DEA document with the name of informants 
to the Burmese government without DEA permission.446  On August 
 
U.S. DEA employee bringing suit for actions occurring while he was stationed in Ran-
goon, Huddle as a State Department employee and Chief of Mission of the U.S. Embas-
sy in Rangoon, and Arthur Brown as a CIA employee in Burma); id. at 2-3 (noting 
Horn’s contention that Huddle wanted him removed from Burma in retaliation for 
Horn’s sending reports to congressional members that conflicted with State Depart-
ment reports prepared by Huddle, and noting the CIA’s unauthorized transfer of DEA 
documents to the Burmese government); Complaint at 6-10, Horn v. Huddle, 647 F. 
Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C. 2009) (No. 94-1756) (discussing interagency political issues). 
439 Complaint, supra note 438, at 10. 
440 In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d at 145. 
441 Id. at 145-46 (citation omitted). 
442 Complaint, supra note 438, at 12. 
443 Martin Weil, Harold Greene, AT&T Case Judge, Dies, WASH. POST, Jan. 30, 2000, 
at A01. 
444 Id. 
445 An Interview with Judge Royce C. Lamberth, THE THIRD BRANCH, June 2002, at 9, 10. 
446 Complaint, supra note 438, at 6-7. 
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15, 2000, Judge Lamberth held that the CIA’s Inspector General re-
ports of both incidents were protected under the state secrets privi-
lege.447  He ascertained four categories of information in the reports 
that were protected from disclosure: 
(1) information that “would threaten to reveal the identities of certain 
covert CIA officers”; (2) information as to the “location of certain covert 
CIA installations and activities”; (3) “information as to the organizational 
structure and functions of the CIA”; and (4) information on “intelli-
gence gathering sources, methods and capabilities, including liaison re-
lationships with foreign governments.”
448
 
Judge Lamberth invited Horn to demonstrate at an August 21, 
2000, hearing how the case could possibly proceed after the privilege 
had attached.449  At that hearing, the court invited parties to submit 
follow-up briefings.450  Nearly three months later, the government filed 
a classified motion to dismiss the complaint.451  Horn did not file an 
opposition to the motion, but he did file several motions to extend the 
time allotted to oppose the motion to dismiss.452  He also requested 
that the court order investigations and, if found appropriate, provide 
top-secret clearances to plaintiff and plaintiff’s counsel’s secretary 
(plaintiff’s counsel had been given top-secret clearance earlier in the 
case).453  Judge Lamberth declined:  “Having found that the state se-
crets privilege provides an absolute bar keeping certain information 
out of the litigation, the Court finds its interest in having the assis-
tance of plaintiff’s counsel outweighed by the United States’ interest 
 
447 See Horn v. Huddle, No. 94-1756, at 3 (D.D.C. July 28, 2004) (order granting 
motion to dismiss) (providing the case’s relevant procedural history). 
448 Id. at 9 (quoting Horn v. Albright, Nos. 96-2120, 94-1756, at 11-12 (D.D.C. Aug. 
15, 2000) (order sustaining assertion of state secrets privilege), ECF No. 340); see also 
In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d 139, 144 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (finding no abuse of discretion in 
the district court’s decision to apply the state secrets privilege to the Inspector General 
reports).   
449 See Horn v. Huddle, No. 94-1756, at 2 (D.D.C. Aug. 15, 2000) (order directing 
plaintiff to address plan for discovery), ECF No. 342 (asking plaintiff to “explain what 
non-state secrets evidence he has in support of his remaining claim”).  
450 See Transcript of Aug. 21, 2000 Status Hearing at 12, 19, Horn v. Huddle, 647 F. 
Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C. 2009) (No. 94-1756) (requesting that the parties submit further 
briefs within thirty days). 
451 United States’ Motion to Dismiss Civil Action 94-1756 Based on the State Se-
crets Privilege, Horn v. Huddle, 647 F. Supp. 2d 55 (No. 94-1756). 
452 Horn v. Huddle, No. 94-1756, at 3-4 (D.D.C. July 28, 2004) (order granting mo-
tion to dismiss). 
453 Id. at 3-4. 
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in national security.”454  Horn also filed a motion to proceed with dis-
covery under the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA).455 
It took nearly four years for the judge to issue an opinion.  On July 
28, 2004, the court found three independent grounds for dismissal:  
(1) the plaintiff could not make out a prima facie case absent the pro-
tected material;456 (2) the state secrets privilege deprived defendants 
of “information required in their defense”;457 and (3) the subject mat-
ter of the plaintiff’s action was a state secret.  As to the last ground, the 
court was particularly concerned that “witnesses with knowledge of se-
cret information may divulge that information during trial because 
the plaintiffs ‘would have every incentive to probe as close to the core 
secrets as the trial judge would permit.  Such probing in open court 
would inevitably be revealing.’”458  Finally, Judge Lamberth added, 
“the Court cannot and will not adopt CIPA as a mechanism for allow-
ing the case to go forward.”459 
Horn appealed, and on December 14, 2006, Circuit Judges Rog-
ers, Brown, and Griffith heard the case.460  The Court of Appeals af-
firmed the dismissal of the case as to Arthur Brown, the CIA operative, 
but reversed and remanded the case to district court as to Huddle, 
stating that Horn should be given the opportunity to “establish a prima 
facie case without using the privileged information.”461 
In January 2008, the case took an unexpected turn.  Department 
of Justice (DOJ) attorney Paul Freeborne submitted a filing, stating 
that the basis for the government’s invocation of the privilege in In re 
Sealed Case (that is, the “covert agent” status of CIA agent Arthur 
 
454 Id. at 7-8. 
455 Horn v. Huddle, No. 94-1756, at 8 (D.D.C. Aug. 26, 2009) (order denying gov-
ernment’s proposal); see also 18 U.S.C. app. (2006). 
456 See Horn v. Huddle, No. 94-1756, at 8 (D.D.C. July 28, 2004) (order granting 
motion to dismiss) (stating that Halkin found “dismissal appropriate where state secrets 
prevented plaintiffs from making a prima facie case” (citing Halkin v. Helms, 690 F.2d 
977, 988-89 (D.C. Cir. 1982))). 
457 See id. (indicating that Molerio mandated that the case “be dismissed because 
[the] court’s evaluation of state secrets privilege revealed existence of valid defense 
that defendants could not assert because of privilege” (citing Molerio v. FBI, 749 F.2d 
815, 825 (D.C. Cir. 1984))).  The Horn court also cited Bareford v. General Dynamics 
Corp., 973 F.2d 1138, 1141 (5th Cir. 1992), for further support of the proposition that 
dismissal is necessary where the state secrets privilege deprives defendants of their de-
fense.  Id. 
458 Horn v. Huddle, No. 94-1756, at 8-9 (D.D.C. July 28, 2004) (order granting mo-
tion to dismiss) (quoting Bareford, 973 F.2d at 1141). 
459 Id. at 14. 
460 In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d 139, 141 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
461 See id. (affirming that the state secrets provision was properly invoked). 
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Brown) had been incorrect:  “Counsel for the United States recently 
learned that in 2002, Defendant II’s cover was ‘lifted’ and ‘rolled back’ 
to his entrance on duty date with the Central Intelligence Agency.”462  
In short, Brown had listed his employment with the CIA during the 
course of a job search, with the CIA’s knowledge and, presumably, its 
consent.  Horn immediately filed a motion seeking relief from the ap-
pellate judgment against him.463  He further requested that the judge 
reinstate Brown as a defendant and sanction or hold contempt pro-
ceedings against the government attorneys who failed to alert the dis-
trict court and court of appeals of the change in Brown’s cover sta-
tus.464  Horn anchored his claim in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
60(b)(3), which allows the court to relieve a party from a final judg-
ment for “fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), mi-
srepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party.”465  Although it 
had been more than a year since the appellate court had issued its 
holding, there was no statute of limitations for fraud on the court (that 
is, “‘fraud which is directed to the judicial machinery itself and is not 
fraud between the parties or fraudulent documents, false statements or 
perjury’”466). 
CIA Acting General Counsel John Rizzo filed an affidavit in re-
sponse, stating that he had personally conducted an inquiry into the 
matter and that the Office of General Counsel (OGC) of the CIA had 
not been put on notice of the change in Brown’s cover status until 
2005.467  In January of that year, an attorney within the Litigation Divi-
sion of OGC had been made aware of the circumstances but had cho-
 
462 Horn v. Huddle, No. 94-1756, at 2 (D.D.C. Jan. 15, 2009) (order granting mo-
tion for relief from judgment) (citing the government’s filing on January 31, 2008). 
463 See id. at 1-2 (detailing the procedural history leading up to Horn’s motion). 
464 Id. 
465 FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(3). 
466 Baltia Air Lines, Inc. v. Transaction Mgmt., Inc. 98 F.3d 640, 642 (D.C. Cir. 
1996) (quoting Bulloch v. United States, 721 F.2d 713, 718 (10th Cir. 1983)); see also id. 
(holding that a Rule 60(c) motion under Rule 60(b)(3) must be made within one year 
after the judgment was entered).  But see FED. R. CIV. P. 60(d)(3) (indicating that the 
above rules “do not limit a court’s power to . . . set aside a judgment for fraud on the 
court”).  The relevant test was laid out in Workman v. Bell, which requires conduct that 
is (1) performed “on the part of an officer of the court”; (2) directed against the judi-
cial machinery; (3) “intentionally false, willfully blind to the truth, or in . . . reckless 
disregard for the truth”; (4) a “positive averment or concealment when one is under a 
duty to disclose”; and (5) deceptive to the court.  227 F.3d 331, 336 (6th Cir. 2000). 
467 See Declaration of John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelli-
gence Agency at 2-3, Horn v. Huddle, 647 F. Supp. 2d 55 (No. 94-1756) (explaining 
why the district court and the court of appeals were not made aware of Brown’s 
change in cover status). 
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sen not to inform his supervisors, the district court, or the appellate 
court.468  Two more affidavits accompanied Rizzo’s filing:  the first, by 
Robert Eatinger, Associate General Counsel of the OGC (saying that 
he had not been informed of any change in Brown’s cover status prior 
to January 2008),469 and the second by John Radsan, Assistant General 
Counsel in CIA’s OGC from April 2002 to July 2004 (saying that, while 
he was generally familiar with the case, he did not recall hearing 
about a change in Brown’s cover status until March 2008).470 
Accordingly, on January 14, 2009, now–Chief Judge Lamberth en-
tered an opinion censuring the government:  the CIA had “lifted” 
Brown’s cover in 2002 and “rolled back” his cover to February 19, 
1980 (meaning that Brown could publicly admit that he was employed 
by the CIA from that date forward).471  According to the court, the CIA 
never informed the DOJ, nor was the CIA’s OGC aware of the change 
in cover until 2005.472  The court held that this may qualify as misre-
presentation, but not fraud on the court, because there had been no 
false submission “directed to the judicial machinery itself.”473  But it 
was the conduct of one attorney within the CIA’s office that had “esca-
lated this case from one of simple misrepresentation to fraud on the 
court.”474  The OGC advisor to the East Asia Division had deliberately 
concealed this information from his OGC supervisors and the DOJ.475  
Chief Judge Lamberth reinstated Brown as the defendant, holding 
that the CIA attorney involved in litigation committed fraud on the 
court by misleading the Court of Appeals as to the change in Brown’s 
cover status and by failing to notify the court of the change in his cov-
er status upon remand.476  The judge declined to impose sanctions or 
to initiate contempt proceedings; instead, he directed the government 
 
468 See id. (recognizing the CIA’s duty to provide notice to the DOJ). 
469 Declaration of Robert J. Eatinger at 4, Horn v. Huddle, 647 F. Supp. 2d 55 (No. 
94-1756). 
470 Declaration of A. John Radsan at 2, Horn v. Huddle, 647 F. Supp. 2d 55 (No. 
94-1756). 
471 See Horn v. Huddle, No. 94-1756, at 4 (D.D.C. Jan. 15, 2009) (order granting 
motion for relief from judgment) (recognizing Brown’s change in cover status). 
472 Workman v. Bell, 227 F.3d 331, 336 (6th Cir. 2000). 
473 See id. (listing the elements of “fraud upon the court”). 
474 Horn v. Huddle, No. 94-1756, at 5 (D.D.C. Jan. 15, 2009) (order granting mo-
tion for relief from judgment); see also id. (stating that the inaccuracy in Brown’s cover 
status had been noted in 2005 by the OGC legal advisor). 
475 Id. at 5-6. 
476 Id. at 12-13. 
DONOHUE FINAL REVISED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/18/2010  11:10 AM 
178 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 159: 77 
to disclose the name of the attorney to the district court’s grievance 
committee for investigation.477 
Brown reentered the suit and took the offensive.  On January 27, 
2009, he filed an affidavit with the court, stating that the “Rizzo Decla-
ration makes two assertions that, based on my personal knowledge, are 
inaccurate.”478  The OGC had been informed of the change in his cover 
status:  “I recall notifying, in person, two attorneys in the Office of 
General Counsel (‘OGC’) Litigation Division, A. John Radson [sic] 
and Robert J. Eatinger, about the change in my cover status in 2002, 
within a few months of the agency’s action” (i.e., rolling back his sta-
tus).479  Brown further stated that he had no recollection of reviewing 
the draft motion for summary affirmance submitted to the Court of 
Appeals with an East Asia Division OGC legal advisor.480 
The judge observed: 
 If what Brown says is true, the OGC attorneys intentionally misled this 
Court even prior to its original 2004 ruling that dismissed the case.  His 
declaration, if true, indicates that the OGC of the CIA was aware of the 
change in Brown’s cover status while the motion to dismiss the case was 
pending in this Court.
481
 
More than one person knowing and hiding the information was 
substantially different than the “one bad apple” argument the CIA 
had previously put forward. 
 If multiple attorneys of the OGC within the CIA were aware of the 
change in Brown’s cover status, and failed to report it to the Court, it 
would be a material misrepresentation to both this Court and the Court 
of Appeals.  The CIA was well-aware that the assertion of the state secrets 
privilege as to Brown was a key strategy in getting the case dismissed.
482
 
The problem extended to the top of the hierarchy: 
The Department of Justice submitted an ex parte, classified declaration 
of CIA Director Tenet on February 5, 2000, in support of its motion to 
dismiss.  In the declaration, Tenet stated that to allow the case to go for-
ward would cause “damage to United States national security” because it 
would “identify one or more covert CIA employees.  Of obvious concern 
 
477 Id.  The name the CIA later disclosed was Jeffrey W. Yeates.  Horn v. Huddle, 
No. 94-1756, at 2 (D.D.C. Feb. 6, 2009) (order staying any referrals of misconduct). 
478 Declaration of Arthur M. Brown at 1, Horn v. Huddle, 647 F. Supp. 2d 55 
(D.D.C. 2009) (No. 94-1756). 
479 Id. at 1-2. 
480 Id. at 2. 
481 Horn v. Huddle, No. 94-1756, at 4 (D.D.C. Feb. 6, 2009) (order staying any re-
ferrals of misconduct). 
482 Id. at 5. 
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Chief Judge Lamberth went so far as to invite Horn to file a mo-
tion with the court “to reconsider and vacate its ruling denying the 
plaintiff’s motion for sanctions and/or contempt proceedings.”484  He 
ordered a stay on the referral of misconduct on the part of the gov-
ernment attorneys, adding far from subtly in a footnote: 
If the plaintiff wishes to file a motion, he should also state, that if he be-
lieves contempt proceedings are appropriate, whether he believes the 
proceeding should be civil or criminal in nature.  See International Union 
v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 827-28 (1994) (stating that “a contempt sanction 
is considered civil if it is remedial, and for the benefit of the complai-
nant.  But if it is for criminal contempt the sentence is punitive, to vindi-
cate the authority of the court.”).
485
 
The change in administration did little to change the govern-
ment’s position.  In 2009, CIA Director Panetta intervened, invoking 
the state secrets privilege and requesting a protective order.486  Lam-
berth objected to continued executive efforts to keep the case sealed—
and to CIA arguments to reclassify some of the material previously dec-
lassified.487  The judge refused Panetta’s request:  “After examining the 
motion for a protective order and supporting declarations, the redac-
tions made by the government, and keeping in mind the twisted history 
of this case, the Court is not prepared to uphold the government’s re-
newed assertion of the state secrets privilege without more information 
from the government.”488  Pretrial CIPA-like procedures would suffice—
an option the D.C. Circuit had left open in 2007.489 
 
483 Id. at 5 (quoting Ex Parte Declaration of George J. Tenet ¶ 22, Horn v. Huddle, 
647 F. Supp. 2d 55 (No. 94-1756)).  
484 Id. at 6 (citation omitted). 
485 Id. at 6 n.9. 
486 See Horn v. Huddle, No. 94-1756, at 6-7 (D.D.C. July 16, 2009) (order denying 
assertion of state secrets privilege) (recounting the government’s reassertion of the 
state secrets privilege). 
487 See, e.g., Transcript of Status Hearing at 42-45, Horn v. Huddle, 647 F. Supp. 
2d 55 (D.D.C. 2009) (No. 94-1756) (disputing the government’s position that docu-
ments in which classified information had been redacted were still subject to the state 
secrets privilege).   
488 Horn v. Huddle, No. 94-1756, at 3 (D.D.C. July 16, 2009) (order denying asser-
tion of state secrets privilege). 
489 See id. at 11-12 (believing that the CIPA-like procedures would best enable the 
parties to argue whether known information is a state secret); see also In re Sealed Case, 
494 F.3d 139, 154 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“[N]othing in this opinion forecloses a determina-
tion by the district court that some of the protective measures in CIPA, 18 U.S.C. app., 
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The government had lost credibility:  “The Court does not give 
the government a high degree of deference because of its prior mis-
representations regarding the state secrets privilege in this case.  
Moreover, the plaintiff has made convincing arguments that the gov-
ernment has asserted the state secrets privilege too broadly.”490  Lam-
berth suggested that the fact that the CIA conducts surveillance could 
hardly be considered a state secret; quite apart from information rea-
dily available through the Internet, the Spy Museum in Washington, 
D.C., included a range of eavesdropping equipment historically used 
by the CIA.491  Inconsistencies in classified and unclassified govern-
ment affidavits did not inspire any more confidence in the Executive 
branch.492  Chief Judge Lamberth ordered the government “to provide 
the Court with justifications for all of the redactions to the documents 
and Inspector General reports that have been filed in this case so that 
the Court can undertake a meaningful in camera review of the pur-
portedly privileged information.”493  In the interim, Horn and the de-
fendants were to file motions indicating (1) any relevant information 
in regard to which they thought or knew that the government in-
tended to invoke state secrets, and (2) explanations or other evidence 
as to why that information was not a state secret.494 
Four days after issuing his Memorandum Opinion, Lamberth is-
sued a Memorandum and Order partially unsealing the case:  “Al-
though this case has been sealed since its inception to protect sensi-
tive information, it is clear from reading the Court of Appeals’s 2007 
public opinion in this case and seeing the unclassified appendix that 
was filed on appeal that many of the issues are unclassified.”495  The 
judge ordered the government to file with the court unclassified ver-
sions of every document; the unclassified documents were given a 
June 9, 2009, date of filing.496 
 
which applies in criminal cases, would be appropriate, as Horn urges, so that this case 
could proceed.”). 
490 Horn v. Huddle, No. 94-1756, at 8 (D.D.C. July 16, 2009) (order denying asser-
tion of state secrets privilege). 
491 See, e.g., Horn v. Huddle, No. 94-1756, at 2 (D.D.C. Aug. 26, 2009) (order deny-
ing government’s proposal) (referencing an eavesdropping device that was “publicly 
available” since it was present at the Spy Museum). 
492 See id. (indicating that the government’s declarations were inconsistent). 
493 Horn v. Huddle, No. 94-1756, at 13 (D.D.C. July 16, 2009) (order denying as-
sertion of state secrets privilege). 
494 Id. 
495 Horn v. Huddle, No. 94-1756, at 1 (D.D.C. July 20, 2009) (order to partially 
unseal case). 
496 Id. 
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Continued efforts by the executive branch to get the judge to re-
consider his opinion hit a stone wall.497  If anything, such attempts ap-
pear to have made him angrier: 
If the intention of the government’s continued obstinance in this case is 
to demonstrate to the Court that this case is simply impossible and can-
not proceed in light of sensitive national security concerns and the inter-
connectedness of privileged and nonprivileged information, the gov-
ernment should save its theatrics for the Court of Appeals.
498
 
 It was unlikely, though, that the government would find much 
support from above:  it was the Court of Appeals that had reversed the 
case in the first place.499  According to the district court, the executive 
branch itself was responsible for the court’s unwillingness to entertain 
further invocations of the state secrets privilege: 
The government apparently laments the fact that the Court required it 
to reassert the privilege upon remand following the discovery that the 
government had committed fraud on the Court and the Court of Ap-
peals.  Of course, the government has no one to blame but itself for the 
Court’s reexamination of the assertion of the state secrets privilege.  The 
government committed fraud on the Court and the Court of Appeals by 
knowingly failing to correct a declaration of Director Tenet . . . [and, 
further, the government] represented to the Court of Appeals that 
Brown’s identity was covert, in an action that can only be construed as an 
attempt to dishonestly gain dismissal. . . . The fraud . . . diminished the 
government’s credibility and led the Court to believe that perhaps the 
government had misrepresented other facts in the litigation.500 
The judge then went one step further, ordering the government to 
provide justifications for every redaction in the Inspector General re-
ports by September 4, 2009.501  Additionally, within ten days of the rul-
ing, “the Executive must grant counsel for plaintiff and defendants, 
who have been favorably adjudicated for access to classified informa-
tion, security clearances commensurate with the level of information 
known by their clients.”502  On September 2, 2009, the government 
moved for an emergency motion for a stay, pending appeal of the 
 
497 See, e.g., Horn v. Huddle, No. 94-1756, at 8 (D.D.C. Aug. 26, 2009) (order de-
nying government’s proposal) (noting that the motion filed by the government was 
inconsistent with the district court’s earlier order, “misconstrues or misunderstands 
what the Court has already done in this case,” and “fails to address the Court’s fun-
damental concerns”). 
498 Id. at 3 n.2. 
499 Id.  
500 Id. at 4 n.3 (citations omitted). 
501 Id. at 18. 
502 Id. 
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Court’s August 26, 2009, order.503  Two days later, Chief Judge Lam-
berth denied the motion.504  He noted that “[t]he practical effect of 
such a stay would . . . bring all proceedings in this already protracted 
litigation to a halt once again.”505  The judge focused on the already 
lengthy time period of the case (fifteen years) and noted that further 
delays, far from amounting to simply a minor delay, “could have major 
consequences as any further delay now has the real possibility of for-
ever depriving the plaintiff of evidence and testimony which may de-
cide whether he prevails on his claims.”506  In the judge’s view, “[t]his 
case ha[d] already been delayed long enough by the government’s 
failure to disclose information that had long been unclassified.”507  
The government appealed the order, winning a stay of proceedings.508  
Appeal was expedited, with briefs due in October 2009.509 
On November 3, 2009, the parties filed a Settlement Agreement, a 
Stipulated Dismissal With Prejudice, and a Proposed Court Order to 
dismiss the case.510  According to the terms of the Settlement Agree-
ment, within two days of the court entering the order dismissing the 
case with prejudice, the United States would request that $3 million 
be paid to Horn and his attorneys for damages, attorneys’ fees, and 
litigation costs.511  On March 30, 2010, the court dismissed the case 
 
503 United States’ Emergency Motion for Stay Pending Appeal, Horn v. Huddle, 
647 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C. 2009) (No. 94-1756).  The motion was made under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 62(c).  See FED. R. CIV. P. 62(c) (indicating that a “court may 
suspend, modify, restore or grant an injunction” while an appeal to a grant, dissolu-
tion, or denial of an injunction is pending).  On April 26, 2010, the court entered an 
order dismissing the appeal.  Horn v. Brown, Nos. 09-5311, 94-1756 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 26, 
2010) (order dismissing case), 2010 WL 2160013, dismissing Horn v. Huddle, 647 F. 
Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C. 2009). 
504 Horn v. Huddle, No. 94-1756, at 7 (D.D.C. Sept. 4, 2009) (order denying mo-
tion for stay). 
505 Id. at 1. 
506 Id. at 2. 
507 Id. at 3. 
508 Horn v. Huddle, No. 94-1756, at 1 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 10, 2009) (order granting 
stay of appeal). 
509 Id. at 2. 
510 Plaintiff’s Notice of Renewed Request for the Court to Promptly Execute the 
Order Dismissing This Case with Prejudice So That the Government’s Obligation to 
Pay the Monetary Settlement Amount is Triggered, and Whereby the Court Can Re-
tain Jurisdiction to Issue Orders, Decisions and Rulings Regarding the Other Issues 
and Motions Pending Before the Court in This Case at 5, Horn v. Huddle, 699 F. 
Supp. 2d 236 (D.D.C. 2010) (No. 94-1756) [hereinafter Plaintiff’s Notice of Renewed 
Request in Horn]. 
511 Settlement Agreement at 2, Horn v. Huddle, 699 F. Supp. 2d 236 (D.D.C. 
2010) (No. 94-1756). 
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with prejudice, vacating the earlier decisions in accordance with the 
terms of the Settlement Agreement.512  In his memorandum accom-
panying the order, Chief Judge Lamberth suggested that the earlier 
decisions would be vacated.  Nonetheless, he also noted: 
Since the July and August opinions have already been published in the 
Federal Supplement, the only consequence of an order vacating them is 
the possibility that they may be considered somewhat less persuasive 
when the vacating order appears with the citation.  The reasoning is un-
altered, to the extent it is deemed persuasive by anyone.
513
 
 The decision, moreover, gave Lamberth pause.  He wrote, “[I]t is 
not without some misgiving that the Court reaches this decision.”514  
He continued: 
Another member of this Court last year approved the settlement of 
another case (involving the FBI’s investigation of the anthrax mailings in 
late 2001) which involved payment to an individual plaintiff of almost 
$6,000,000 by the United States.  It does not appear that any government 
official was ever held accountable for this huge loss to the taxpayer. 
 Now this Court is called upon to approve a $3,000,000 payment to an 
individual plaintiff by the United States, and again it does not appear 
that any government officials have been held accountable for this loss to 
the taxpayer.  This is troubling to the Court.
515
 
Chief Judge Lamberth found it “encouraging” that Attorney Gen-
eral Eric Holder had circulated a memorandum on “Policies and Pro-
cedures Governing Invocation of the State Secrets Privilege”; indeed, 
he attached a copy of the guidelines as an appendix to the decision.516  
He also formally requested that the United States “advise the Court as 
to whether it will, in this case, make the referral to the Inspectors 
General and provide the notifications to the oversight committees of 
Congress” as required under the guidelines, specifically in regard to 
the behavior of both State Department and CIA attorneys in relation 
 
512 Horn v. Huddle, 699 F. Supp. 2d 236, 243 (D.D.C. 2010) (approving stipulated 
dismissal); see also Plaintiff’s Notice of Renewed Request in Horn, supra note 510, at 5 
(attempting to persuade the court to act upon the plaintiff’s previous request for dis-
missal); Plaintiff’s Notice of Request for the Court to Promptly Execute the Order 
Dismissing This Case with Prejudice So That the Government’s Obligation to Pay the 
Monetary Amount in the Settlement Is Triggered, Regardless of the Other Issues Pend-
ing Before the Court on This Case at 2, Horn v. Huddle, 699 F. Supp. 2d 236 (D.D.C. 
2010) (No. 94-1756) (urging the court to dismiss the case with prejudice so that the 
plaintiff could begin receiving the settlement payments promised to him). 
513 Horn v. Huddle, 699 F. Supp. 2d at 238 (footnote omitted). 
514 Id. 
515 Id. (citation omitted). 
516 Id. at 239. 
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to the case at hand.517  If such executive action were taken, then the 
court would find it appropriate to terminate the actions underway by 
the court’s Grievance Committee.518 
B.  Due Process, Torture, and Detention Without Trial 
Precedent, albeit limited, exists for the invocation of the state se-
crets privilege in the context of cases alleging torture.519  During the 
period from 2001 to 2009, there does seem to have been an increase 
in the number of such instances.520  Unlike most of the cases discussed 
thus far, suits against U.S. officials alleging rendition, torture, and in-
definite detention have received considerable public and academic 
attention.521  Thus, only a brief discussion of these cases is warranted. 
One of the most prominent civil suits was brought by Khaled El-
Masri, a German citizen of Lebanese descent, who brought an action 
under Bivens,522 the Alien Tort Statute,523 and international legal norms, 
against ten unnamed CIA agents, three private companies, and ten em-
ployees.524  El-Masri alleged that, in 2003, he was detained for more than 
three weeks in Macedonia and then sent to Afghanistan, where he was 




519 See, e.g., Linder v. Dep’t of Def., 133 F.3d 17, 25 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (upholding 
the decision of the court below to grant the state secrets privilege); Linder v. Nat’l Sec. 
Agency, 94 F.3d 693, 698 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (same); Linder v. Calero-Portocarrero, 183 
F.R.D. 314, 325 (D.D.C. 1998) (finding the state secrets privilege to be properly in-
voked in a case of alleged torture). 
520 This observation is based upon the author’s research of the case law during 
this period. 
521 See, e.g., Chesney, supra note 6, at 1254-63 (detailing “extraordinary rendition” 
and subsequent litigation related to El-Masri); Louis Fisher, Extraordinary Rendition:  The 
Price of Secrecy, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1405, 1406 (2008) (“identif[ying] the legal principles 
that guide extradition, rendition, and kidnappings,” and explaining the changes in 
those principles after 9/11); Victor Hansen, Extraordinary Renditions and the State Secrets 
Privilege:  Keeping Focus on the Task at Hand, 33 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 629, 630 
(2008) (“discuss[ing] the use of the state secrets privilege in the context of civil suits 
brought against the United States government and private contractors working for the 
federal government”).  For a detailed discussion of rendition, see Jane Mayer, Outsourc-
ing Torture:  The Secret History of America’s “Extraordinary Rendition” Program, NEW YORKER, 
Feb. 14, 2005, at 106. 
522 See supra note 436 (explaining Bivens actions). 
523 See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction 
of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of na-
tions or a treaty of the United States.”). 
524 El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530, 534-35 (E.D. Va. 2006). 
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for five months.525  El-Masri further alleged that he was subsequently 
flown to and abandoned in Albania, where he then had to make his way 
back to Germany.526  In December 2005, he sued in the U.S. District 
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.527 
District Court Judge Ellis granted the government’s motion to 
dismiss on state secrets grounds.528  State secrets stood as “a privilege 
of the highest dignity and significance.”529  El-Masri’s personal inter-
ests, the court held, must give way to the national interest: 
In times of war, our country, chiefly through the Executive Branch, must 
often take exceptional steps to thwart the enemy.  Of course, reasonable 
and patriotic Americans are still free to disagree about the propriety and 
efficacy of those exceptional steps.  But what this decision holds is that 
these steps are not proper grist for the judicial mill where, as here, state 
secrets are at the center of the suit and the privilege is validly invoked.
530
 
On March 2, 2007, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit af-
firmed the ruling below, determining that the privilege applied to the 
information El-Masri sought, rendering the defendants unable to 
mount a proper defense.531  Judge King, writing for the court, empha-
sized the constitutional underpinnings: 
 Although the state secrets privilege was developed at common law, it 
performs a function of constitutional significance, because it allows the 
executive branch to protect information whose secrecy is necessary to its 
military and foreign-affairs responsibilities.  Reynolds itself suggested that 
the state secrets doctrine allowed the Court to avoid the constitutional 
conflict that might have arisen had the judiciary demanded that the Ex-
ecutive disclose highly sensitive military secrets.  In United States v. Nixon, 
the [Supreme] Court further articulated the doctrine’s constitutional 
dimension, observing that the state secrets privilege provides exception-
ally strong protection because it concerns areas of Art. II duties [in 




In another case, Syrian-born Canadian citizen Mahar Arar was ar-
rested on September 26, 2002, when he changed planes in New York 
 
525 Id. at 532-33. 
526 Id. at 534. 
527 Id. 
528 Id. at 541. 
529 Id. at 536. 
530 Id. at 540-41. 
531 El-Masri v. U.S., 479 F.3d 296, 313 (4th Cir. 2007). 
532 Id. at 303 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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en route to Canada.533  After being held incommunicado for thirteen 
days, he was flown to Washington, D.C., and then finally, Amman, 
Jordan, whence he was driven to Syria.534  Arar stated that he was tor-
tured and that he had confessed to a number of crimes before being 
released without charge in October 2003.535  On January 22, 2004, 
Arar brought suit in the Eastern District of New York, alleging viola-
tions of the Torture Victim Protection Act536 and a violation of subs-
tantive due process under the Fifth Amendment.537  Arar sought a dec-
laration on the unconstitutional nature of the acts done to him, as 
well as compensatory and punitive damages.538 
On January 18, 2005, the United States invoked state secrets privi-
lege.539  Affidavits submitted by Secretary of the Department of Home-
land Security Tom Ridge and Deputy Attorney General James B. Com-
ey (as the Acting Attorney General) accompanied the invocation.540  
Because he was being sued in his individual capacity, Attorney General 
Ashcroft recused himself from the consideration of whether to invoke 
state secrets privilege; thus, consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 508(a), the 
Deputy Attorney General assumed the authority to do so.541  The de-
fendants individually also filed motions to dismiss based on state se-
crets considerations.542  Although subsequent memoranda focused on 
 
533 Complaint at 10-11, Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (No. 
04-0249). 
534 Id. at 11-16; see also Mayer, supra note 521, at 106 (observing that Arar had been 
flown to Washington, D.C., Portland, Maine, and Rome, Italy, before finally landing in 
Amman, Jordan). 
535 Complaint, supra note 533, at 16-19. 
536 See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2006) (providing a private right of action in tort 
against those who commit torture or extrajudicial killings). 
537 Complaint, supra note 533, at 20-24. 
538 Id. at 3-4. 
539 Memorandum in Support of the United States’ Assertion of State Secrets Privi-
lege, Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (No. 04-0249), 2005 WL 
2547997. 
540 Id. at 3.  
541 Id. at 8 n.4; see also 28 U.S.C. § 508(a) (2006) (outlining the Deputy Attorney 
General’s duties in the event of the Attorney General’s absence). 
542 See, e.g., Notice of Partial Motion to Dismiss the Claims Against Defendant John 
Ashcroft in His Individual Capacity Encompassed by the Claims of State Secrets Privi-
lege, Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250 (No. 04-0249) [hereinafter Notice of Partial 
Motion to Dismiss in Arar], 2005 WL 6140592; Notice of Motion of Defendant James 
Ziglar to Dismiss Complaint Based on State Secrets Privilege, Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. 
Supp. 2d 250 (No. 04-0249) [hereinafter Notice of Ziglar], 2005 WL 6140593; Reply 
Memorandum of Law in Support of the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Claims Against 
Defendant McElroy in his Individual Capacity, Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250 
(No. 04-0249), 2005 WL 6140582; Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Defen-
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the claim,543 the district court eventually determined that Arar lacked 
standing for declaratory relief in relation to his constitutional claims.544  
Judge Trager held that Arar failed to “meet the statutory requirements 
of the Torture Victim Protection Act.”545  And while the Immigration 
and Nationality Act’s jurisdiction-stripping provisions did not foreclose 
a Bivens claim, a remedy under Bivens was foreclosed because of na-
tional security and foreign policy considerations.546  These determina-
tions made moot the assertion of state secrets.547 
C.  Environmental Regulations 
Like the other areas examined in this Article, the invocation of 
state secrets privilege in the face of environmental disputes predates 
the Bush Administration.548  And similar to the other contexts, here, 
too, state secrets may fail to appear in the final judicial opinion, yet 
they nevertheless may play a key role in the evolution of the suit. 
 
dant Larry D. Thompson’s Motion to Dismiss, Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250 
(No. 04-0249), 2005 WL 6140586. 
543 See, e.g., Notice of Partial Motion to Dismiss in Arar, supra note 542; Reply of 
United States of America to Plaintiff’s Opposition to United States’ Invocation of the 
State Secrets Privilege, Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250 (No. 04-0249); Notice of 
Ziglar, supra note 542. 
544 See Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 258-59 (holding that Arar failed to show 
that his claimed “bar to reentry” injury would be “redressed by a favorable decision”). 
545 Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 266. 
546 See id. at 259-60, 280-83 (considering the appropriateness of the remedy, given 
the lack of “explicit direction” by Congress). 
547 See id. at 287 (noting the mootness of consideration of the state secrets privi-
lege, given dismissal of the statutory and constitutional claims); see also Arar v. Ashcroft, 
585 F.3d 559, 582 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc) (affirming decision below). 
548 See, e.g., Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159, 1180-81 (9th Cir. 1998) (Tashima, J., 
concurring) (noting the majority found “a class of information” created under the Re-
source Conservation and Recovery Act that may receive state secrets privilege); see also 
Hudson River Sloop Clearwater, Inc. v. Dep’t of Navy, 891 F.2d 414, 421-22 (2d Cir. 
1989) (discussing the Navy’s invocation of the privilege to avoid disclosure of the envi-
ronmental impact of an alleged proposal to deploy nuclear weapons); Fitzgerald v. 
Penthouse Int’l, Ltd., 776 F.2d 1236, 1242-44 (4th Cir. 1985) (permitting invocation of 
the state secrets privilege in a challenge of the Navy’s use of dolphins in military opera-
tions, submarine warfare, and intelligence gathering); Frost v. Perry, 919 F. Supp. 
1459, 1464-66 (D. Nev. 1996) (permitting the Air Force to assert privilege to avoid dis-
closure of environmental data); Frost v. Perry, 161 F.R.D. 434, 440 (D. Nev. 1995) 
(finding that military defendants satisfied requirements for invocation of privilege for 
claims related to government disposal of hazardous waste); Doe v. Browner, 902 F. 
Supp. 1240, 1248-49 (D. Nev. 1995) (noting that, while the government’s privilege 
precluded plaintiffs’ discovery of environmental information, the court was permitted 
to access such information and evaluate plaintiffs’ argument). 
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One of the most interesting environmental suits to arise over the 
past eight years follows this pattern precisely.  The suit centered on 
the U.S. Department of the Navy’s use of “high-intensity ‘active sonar’ 
systems,” which complainants alleged “cause the death and injury of 
whales, porpoises and other marine species.”549  On October 19, 2005, 
the Natural Resources Defense Council, the International Fund for 
Animal Welfare, the Cetacean Society International, the League for 
Coastal Protection, the Ocean Futures Society, and Jean-Michel Cous-
teau brought suit.550  The complaint alleged that: 
 For decades, the Navy has conducted extensive testing and training 
using active sonar systems without complying with the requirements of 
United States environmental law.  This action challenges the Navy’s con-
duct of certain individual sea exercises and training activities in disre-
gard of the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act 
(“NEPA”), the Marine Mammal Protection Act (“MMPA”), and the En-
dangered Species Act (“ESA”).
551
 
On February 17, 2006, the government moved to dismiss the suit 
or, in the alternative, for summary judgment.552  It was not until March 
16, 2007, however, that Secretary of the Navy Donald C. Winter for-
mally invoked state secrets “to avoid complying with the Discovery Or-
der.”553  On April 19, 2007, the court ordered plaintiffs and defendants 
to meet, discuss the dispute, “and set a schedule for the filing of dis-
covery motions relating to the state secrets privilege.”554  Just over a 
month later, on May 30, 2007, the litigants filed a Joint Notice of 
Agreement Resolving Jurisdictional Discovery Dispute over Invocation 
of the Military and State Secrets Privilege.555  Over the following 
months, the Navy provided more than 400,000 pages of documents, 
 
549 First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1, Natural 
Res. Def. Council v. England, No. 05-7513 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2006), 2006 WL 1525611. 
550 Id. at 3-6. 
551 Id. at 1 (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted). 
552 Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition of Defen-
dants’ Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment at 8, Natural 
Res. Def. Council v. Winter, No. 05-7513 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 10, 2006), 2006 WL 1525597. 
553 Joint Stipulation Regarding Defendants’ Motion to Compel Discovery Res-
ponses at 29, Natural Res. Def. Council v. Winter, No. 05-7513 (C.D. Cal. June 4, 2008), 
2008 WL 2937122.  Donald C. Winter replaced Gordon R. England and became the 
74th Secretary of the Navy on January 3, 2006. US Navy Biographies—The Honorable Do-
nald C. Winter, U.S. NAVY, http://www.navy.mil/navydata/bios/navybio.asp?bioid=325 
(last visited Sept. 15, 2010). 
554 Joint Stipulation Regarding Defendants’ Motion to Compel Discovery Res-
ponses, supra note 553, at 29. 
555 Id. 
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the contours of which were shaped by the state secrets discussions.556  
The parties settled on December 26, 2008, without the court ruling on 
whether the state secrets privilege applied.557 
D.  Employment Suits 
Employment-related suits in which state secrets plays a role also 
are not a novel phenomenon.558  The period from 2001 to 2009 evi-
dences a continuation of this phenomenon.  Some of these suits center 
on racial or religious discrimination or defamation.559  For the most 
part, the government prevails. 
Defamation suits in which state secrets arise have a long history.560  
The 1999 investigation of Dr. Wen Ho Lee, a U.S. Department of 
Energy scientist accused of mishandling sensitive nuclear weapons 
 
556 Id. at 30. 
557 Stipulation of Dismissal with Prejudice Pursuant to F. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(ii), 
Natural Res. Def. Council v. Winter, No. 05-7513 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 26, 2008). 
558 See, e.g., Weston v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 881 F.2d 814, 815 (9th Cir. 
1989) (holding that the state secrets privilege was an independent ground for dismissal 
of a sexual orientation discrimination case); Molerio v. FBI, 749 F.2d 815, 825 (D.C. 
Cir. 1984) (finding that the state secrets privilege properly precluded disclosure of the 
reason for which a prospective employee was denied employment); Tilden v. Tenet, 
140 F. Supp. 2d 623, 626 (E.D. Va. 2000) (finding that the state secrets privilege was 
“properly invoked” by the CIA Director in a case of sex discrimination). 
559 See, e.g., Sterling v. Tenet, 416 F.3d 338, 343-44, 348 (4th Cir. 2005) (consider-
ing the CIA’s invocation of state secrets privilege to prevent disclosure of employ-
ment details, in a case involving an African American ex–CIA operative’s racial dis-
crimination claim). 
560 In 1880, for instance, action was brought against the superintendent of the Na-
val Academy upon the resignation of a professor.  Maurice v. Worden, 54 Md. 233, 254-
58 (1880).  In 1893, a New York court held that absolute immunity applies to words 
spoken by “military officers in reports or statements to their superiors and all acts of 
state.”  Hemmens v. Nelson, 34 N.E. 342, 344 (N.Y. 1893).  By the early twentieth cen-
tury, “[t]he rule [of privilege from disclosure] ha[d] been applied . . . in actions 
against officials for defamatory reports and other communications, thereby conferring 
immunity by refusing the means of proof.”  Van Vechten Veeder, Absolute Immunity in 
Defamation:  Legislative and Executive Proceedings, 10 COLUM. L. REV. 131, 145 (1910).  
During the Cold War, this type of action became particularly salient:  “In the real 
world,” one legal scholar explained, “intelligence agents often strike not with guns but 
with words—allegations that destroy reputations, families, careers.”  Comment, Spying 
and Slandering:  An Absolute Privilege for the CIA Agent?, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 752, 752 
(1967).  Cases like Heine v. Raus thus raised the question of whether actions for defama-
tion within the national security realm would gain ground.  See Heine v. Raus, 261 F. 
Supp. 570, 570-71 (D. Md. 1966) (examining a claim of slander against the CIA in which 
the defendant asserted “absolute privilege”); see also Fitzgerald v. Penthouse Int’l, Ltd., 
776 F.2d 1236, 1242, 1244 (4th Cir. 1985) (outlining elements of the defamation claim 
about espionage and concluding that the subject matter of the suit was a state secret). 
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documents, gave rise to yet another legal action alleging slander.561  In 
this particular instance, Notra Trulock, III, a former Department of 
Energy official, sued Lee and two other federal officials for statements 
they made suggesting that racial bias motivated Trulock’s role in the 
investigation of Lee.562  In May 2001, the government “filed a state-
ment of interest and sought a protective order against discovery of 
classified documents.”563  The government subsequently intervened in 
the case, and CIA Director George Tenet invoked the state secrets pri-
vilege.564  In March 2002, the district court ratified the protective order 
and granted the motion to dismiss.565  In June 2003, the appeals court 
affirmed the dismissal of the suit on state secrets grounds.566 
With judicial relief precluded, plaintiffs at times try to engage 
Congress to redress their grievances.  However, these efforts rarely 
produce the sought-after relief.  On October 14, 1998, for instance, 
David Aaron Tenenbaum, an employee of the United States Army 
Tank-Automotive Armaments Command (TACOM), and his wife, 
Madeline Gail Tenenbaum, sued the United States for ethnic and re-
ligious discrimination.567  Tenenbaum alleged that, as a result of his 
relationship with the Israeli liaison officer to TACOM, he had been 
subjected to more stringent scrutiny than normal during his efforts to 
obtain a higher security classification.568  Tenenbaum brought a Bivens 
claim for Fourth Amendment violations, a common law conspiracy 
claim for unlawful investigation, and claims for false attribution of 
confessions, defamation, gross negligence, and loss of consortium.569  
In June 2001, Lieutenant General Keith Alexander, Director of the 
National Security Agency, invoked the state secrets privilege, stating 
that any further progress of the suit would endanger national securi-
 
561 See Trulock v. Lee, 66 F. App’x 472, 473 (4th Cir. 2003) (discussing two actions 
in which Trulock accused federal officials of racially motivated defamation in the East-
ern District of Virginia).   
562 Id. 
563 Id. at 475. 
564 Brief for the Intervenor United States of America at 13-15, Trulock, 66 F. App’x 
472 (Nos. 02-1476, 02-1477), 2002 WL 32737348, at *13-15. 
565 Trulock, 66 F. App’x at 475. 
566 Id. at 478. 
567 Tenenbaum v. Ashcroft, No. 09-10612, 2009 WL 2222933, at *1-2 (E.D. Mich. 
July 23, 2009). 
568 Tenenbaum v. Simonini, No. 98-74473, at 2-3 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 30, 2002) (or-
der denying plaintiff’s motion to strike and granting defendants’ motion for summary 
judgment).  
569 Id. at 8-11. 
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ty.570  Just over one year later, the district court dismissed the suit—a 
judgment upheld by the Sixth Circuit on May 19, 2004.571 
Tenenbaum, denied a judicial forum, pursued a political solution:  
on March 14, 2006, Senator Carl Levin wrote on Tenenbaum’s behalf 
to the Department of Defense, requesting an investigation into the al-
legations.572  The Department of Defense investigated, and in a July 13, 
2008, report, it found that Tenenbaum’s race and ethnicity had in-
deed “contributed to the unusual and unwelcome scrutiny.”573  The 
plaintiffs initiated a second case against the same defendants in the 
first suit, and as well as against former Attorney General John Ash-
croft, former Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, and former 
Army Litigation Division Chief and General Counsel Uldric Fiore.574  
Tenenbaum alleged a false invocation of state secrets doctrine, depriv-
ing him of his right of access to the courts.575  The court, however, 
found the case barred by the procedural hurdle of res judicata.576 
Outside of discrimination and defamation, loss of employment 
following whistleblower activity also gives rise to the defendant’s invo-
cation of state secrets.577  One such case, which lends further insight 
 
570 Tenenbaum v. Simonini, No. 09-10612 (E.D. Mich. filed Oct. 14, 1998) (listing 
a “Declaration of Keith B. Alexander” as filed on June 21, 2001, on the docket, but un-
der seal and unavailable on PACER). 
571 The opinion stated:   
 Having reviewed the materials Defendants produced under seal, we agree 
with the district court that the state secrets doctrine applies because a reason-
able danger exists that disclosing the information in court proceedings would 
harm national security interests, or would impair national defense capabilities, 
disclose intelligence-gathering methods or capabilities, or disrupt diplomatic 
relations with foreign governments. 
 We further conclude that Defendants cannot defend their conduct with re-
spect to Tenenbaum without revealing the privileged information.  Because the 
state secrets doctrine thus deprives Defendants of a valid defense to the Te-
nenbaums’ claims, we find that the district court properly dismissed the claims. 
Tenenbaum v. Simonini, 372 F.3d 776, 777 (6th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted), cert. de-
nied, 543 U.S. 1000 (2004). 
572 Tenenbaum v. Ashcroft, No. 09-10612, 2009 WL 2222933, at *2 (E.D. Mich. July 
23, 2009). 
573 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
574 Id. 
575 Id. 
576 Id. at *9. 
577 For example, in 1994, Reynolds Electrical and Engineering Company (REECo) 
employed Forrest Darby as an electrician.  Verified Complaint at 2-3, Darby v. U.S. 
Dep’t of the Air Force, No. 00-0661 (D. Nev. May 19, 2000), 2000 WL 34598769.  Con-
cerned about the safety procedures in place at the Tonopah Test Range, Darby and 
twelve coworkers met with U.S. Congressman James Bilbray in March of that year.  Id.  
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into the public and parallel dimensions of the privilege, involved Sibel 
Edmonds, originally from Turkey, who moved to the United States in 
1988.578  In September 2001, Edmonds became a translator for the 
FBI.579  She later alleged that one of her colleagues, Melek Can Dick-
erson leaked information to subjects of FBI investigations.580  Ed-
monds reported that Dickerson told her not to translate certain doc-
uments on grounds that they did not contain any new information, 
thus distorting the information available and hurting the investiga-
tion.581  Edmonds further stated that her signature was forged on some 
documents, but that when she objected, Dickerson responded by 
overtly threatening her.582  Efforts to draw attention to Dickerson’s 
 
Soon thereafter, REECo’s Project Manager informed Darby that if he had spoken to 
the congressman, Darby could be terminated.  Id. at 3.  Darby claimed that Bilbray 
took steps to prevent this from happening, but that in November 1997, the U.S. Air 
Force “deaccessed” Darby from his assigned work location, even though he had a top-
secret Q clearance.  Id.  This action caused his termination since he effectively could 
not work.  Id.  On May 19, 2000, Darby brought suit, claiming the termination was in 
retaliation.  Id.  The government asserted state secrets as its first defense.  Answer to 
Amended Complaint at 2, Darby, No. 00-0661 (D. Nev. Oct. 26, 2001), 2001 WL 
34878033.  The government’s motion for summary judgment suggested that the in-
formation sought related to at least one of the following:  military plans, weapons, and 
operations; vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems or plans; intelligence sources and 
methods; scientific, technological, or economic matters; and foreign government in-
formation.  Defendants’ Assertion of the Military and State Secrets Privilege, and De-
fendants’ Motion to Dismiss, and for Summary Judgment, Darby, No. 00-0661 (D. Nev. 
Aug. 31, 2001), 2001 WL 34877013; see also Defendants’ Reply Memorandum in Sup-
port of Their Assertion of the Military and State Secrets Privilege, in Support of Their 
Motion to Dismiss and for Summary Judgment, and in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Cross-
Motion for Summary Judgment and Rule 56(f) Discovery at 7, Darby, No. 00-0661 (D. 
Nev. Nov. 16, 2001), 2001 WL 34877016 (noting the government had properly asserted 
a claim of privilege).  On March 4, 2002, the court granted summary judgment and 
dismissal on state secrets grounds.  See Plaintiff’s F.R.C.P. Rule 59(e) Motion for Re-
consideration at 1, No. 00-0661 (D. Nev. Mar. 13, 2002), 2002 WL 32976565 (respond-
ing to the court’s summary judgment order). 
 For continued discussion of state secrets in the context of the suit see, for instance, 
Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration F.R.C.P. Rule 59(e) Reply Memorandum at 1-2, 
Darby, No. 00-0661 (D. Nev. Apr. 15, 2002), 2002 WL 32976567; see also Defendants’ 
Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration, Darby, No. 00-0661 (D. Nev. Apr. 5, 
2002), 2002 WL 32976566; Plaintiff’s F.R.C.P. Rule 59(e) Motion for Reconsideration 
at 5-7, Darby, No. 00-0661 (D. Nev. Mar. 13, 2002), 2002 WL 32976565. 
578 Complaint at 2, Edmonds v. United States, 436 F. Supp. 2d 28 (D.D.C. 2006) 
(No. 05-00540), 2005 WL 919242. 
579 Id. at 3. 
580 Id. at 4-5. 
581 Id. 
582 Id. 
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behavior inside the FBI allegedly failed.583  In March 2002, the FBI 
dismissed Edmonds from her post.584 
As in Sterling v. Tenet, the plaintiff in Edmonds v. United States 
sought congressional assistance in mounting a political response.  On 
June 19, 2002, Senators Patrick Leahy and Charles Grassley requested 
that the FBI’s Office of Inspector General investigate Edmonds’s alle-
gations—a request repeated on July 9, 2004.585 
In the interim, Edmonds brought suit in the District Court for the 
District of Columbia, claiming violations of the Privacy Act,586 Adminis-
trative Procedure Act,587 and the First and Fifth Amendments.588  She 
sought damages, reinstatement to her job, and an order prohibiting 
retaliation against her or her family.589  On October 18, 2002, Ashcroft 
invoked state secrets and moved to dismiss the case.590 
The parallel effect noted in the NSA wiretapping cases emerged 
here, as well:  Ashcroft’s effort to restrict Edmonds extended to a 
second case working its way through the court.  In Burnett v. Al Baraka 
Investment & Development Corp., survivors of 9/11, who had filed suit 
against Saudi Arabia and some Saudi corporations, sought to depose 
Edmonds.591  In April 2004, Ashcroft intervened, once again invoking 
state secrets.592  The following month, Ashcroft allegedly retroactively 
classified all Senate Judiciary Committee materials related to Ed-
 
583 Id. 
584 Id. at 10-11.  For further discussion of this case, see also Rapa, supra note 6, at 
233-35, 262-71. 
585 Letter from Patrick Leahy and Charles Grassley, U.S. Senators, to John Ashcroft, 
U.S. Attorney Gen., Robert S. Mueller, III, FBI Director, and Glen A. Fine, Inspector 
Gen. ( July 9, 2004), available at http://www.justacitizen.com/articles_documents/ 
Leahy_Grassley_Letter_to_Ashcroft_7-9-04.pdf. 
586 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2006). 
587 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–552, 701–706. 
588 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Damage at 2-3, Edmonds 
v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 323 F. Supp. 2d 65 (D.D.C. 2004) (No. 02-01448), 2002 WL 
32969560; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I, V. 
589 Id. at 19.  Edmonds simultaneously filed suit against the FBI under the Free-
dom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552.  Edmonds v. FBI, 272 F. Supp. 2d 35, 42 
(D.D.C. 2003). 
590 Edmonds, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 73. 
591 See Statement of Interest of the United States of America in Support of Emer-
gency Motion to Quash Deposition of Sibel Edmonds, or For Protective Order at 1-7, 
Burnett v. Al Baraka Inv. & Dev. Corp., 323 F. Supp. 2d 82 (D.D.C. 2004) (No. 03-
9849) (explaining and opposing the plaintiffs’ subpoena demands). 
592 Burnett, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 82.  Ashcroft successfully asserted state secrets more 
broadly in the case as well with respect to information that, if revealed, might jeopard-
ize U.S. national security or foreign policy interests.  Id. at 83. 
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monds’ case, including information on Senators Leahy and Grassley’s 
websites.593  The DOJ reportedly backed off when the Project on Gov-
ernment Oversight filed suit.594 
Edmonds challenged the executive branch’s invocation of state 
secrets, saying that Ashcroft had not personally considered the in-
formation that was privileged and that he had failed to be specific.595  
The court rejected this argument.596  Having examined the docu-
ments in camera, the court concluded that Edmonds could not build 
a prima facie case without the information properly covered by state 
secrets.597  The court recognized that such a step was extreme:  
“[D]ismissal of a suit, and the consequent denial of a forum without 
giving the plaintiff her day in court . . . is indeed draconian.  Denial 
of the forum provided under the Constitution for the resolution of 
disputes is a drastic remedy that has rarely been invoked.”598  But on 
the same day, the court permitted use of only nine of the thirty-one 
proposed questions in Burnett.599 
Importantly, it was not the actual information sought that was of 
concern, or even the potential construction of a mosaic based on spe-
cific documents—arguments that have previously been considered in 
the course of legal scholarship on state secrets.  Instead, the court in 
Burnett grounded its decision on the potential that further informa-
tion would emerge in the course of cross-examination that would 
threaten national security.600  This line of reasoning—essentially a 
floodgates argument—is distinguishable from both the instant sup-
pression of evidence during discovery (on the grounds that it would 
 
593 Press Release, Project on Gov’t Oversight, Justice Department Caves In:  Allows 
Publication of Retroactively Classified Information; Lawsuit Challenged Classification 
of Public Information (Feb. 22, 2005), available at http://www.pogo.org/pogo-
files/alerts/government-secrecy/gs-oc-20050222.html. 
594 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 2, Project on Gov’t Over-
sight v. Ashcroft, No. 04-01032 (D.D.C. June 23, 2004); see also Sibel Edmonds, Gagged, 
But Not Dead, JUST A CITIZEN (May 14, 2005), http://www.justacitizen.com/ 
articles_documents/May14-05-Gagged%20but%20not%20Dead.htm (last visited Sept. 
15, 2010) (discussing removal of documents from the senators’ websites).  
595 Edmonds v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 323 F. Supp. 2d 65, 73 (D.D.C. 2004). 
596 Id. at 75-76; see also Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159, 1165-66 (9th Cir. 1998) 
(discussing the plaintiff’s argument that the entire regulatory matter of a Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act enforcement cannot be a state secret and challenging 
the application of state secrets on a rolling basis). 
597 Edmonds, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 78-79. 
598 Id. at 81 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
599 See Burnett v. Al Baraka Inv. & Dev. Corp., 323 F. Supp. 2d 65, 84 (D.D.C. 2004) 
(prohibiting asking certain questions of an official during deposition). 
600 Id. at 83. 
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be dangerous when released in the public domain), as well as from 
the potential connection between seemingly disparate pieces of in-
formation.  It also gives rise to due process considerations. 
Under pressure from Congress, the Office of the Inspector Gen-
eral (OIG) published the final report on Edmonds in July 2004, which 
Ashcroft had classified.601  An unclassified version was made public in 
January 2005.602  The Inspector General found that “Edmonds’ asser-
tions regarding the coworker, when viewed as a whole, raised sub-
stantial questions and were supported by various pieces of evi-
dence.”603  In the OIG’s opinion, the FBI had not been able to 
demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that Edmonds would 
have been terminated without her allegations, and the FBI’s investi-
gation of her claims had been inadequate.604 
While the report did not obtain relief for Edmonds, it did have 
some administrative effect, suggesting that perhaps a congressional 
role in state secrets instances is not to be dismissed out of hand.  The 
report recommended new translation procedures within the bureau.605  
It also highlighted the precarious position of attempted whistleblow-
ers and contributed to support for the bill for the Executive Branch 
Reform Act of 2006, which would limit the application of state secrets 
in such suits.606 
Nevertheless, the report did not bring immediate legal relief to 
Edmonds.  To the contrary, the courts continued to protect the gov-
ernment’s invocation of the state secrets privilege, going even beyond 
the executive’s wishes.  For example, although the government had 
already agreed to public argument on appeal, the day before the ar-
gument, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit announced that 
the press would be barred from the courtroom.607  In May 2005, in a 
one-sentence opinion, the appellate court affirmed the lower court’s 
 
601 Edmonds, supra note 594. 
602 OFFICE OF OVERSIGHT & REVIEW, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF THE FBI’S ACTIONS IN CONNECTION WITH ALLEGATIONS RAISED BY 
CONTRACT LINGUIST SIBEL EDMONDS:  UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY (2005), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/0501/final.pdf. 
603 Id. at 11. 
604 Id. at 30, 34. 
605 Id. at 32-34. 
606 Executive Branch Reform Act of 2006, H.R. 5112, 109th Cong. 
607 Edmonds v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. 04-5286 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 21, 2005) (order 
denying motions to open oral argument). 
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ruling.608  Six months later, the Supreme Court denied Edmonds’ writ 
of certiorari.609 
At the most general level, cases that center on espionage contracts 
receive short shrift in court.610  In 2005, for example, the wife and child-
ren of a former covert-status CIA agent sued the CIA for termination of 
employment.611  Allegedly denied medical insurance, the former agent 
and his family left the country to seek medical care.  The family stated 
that they could not leave the country where they were located, that they 
were afraid of detection, and that the former agent could not obtain 
the appropriate psychiatric counseling he needed because of nondis-
closure requirements.612  The plaintiffs sought injunctive and declarato-
ry relief, as well as monetary damages, claiming violations of the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act,613 the Privacy Act,614 and the Federal Tort Claims 
Act,615 as well as the First, Fifth, and Eighth Amendments.616  In re-
sponse, Porter Goss, Director of the CIA, invoked the state secrets privi-
lege.617  The government, acknowledging the breadth of material cov-
ered by its state secrets invocation and motion to dismiss, argued that 
plaintiffs should not be allowed access to secure facilities to prepare 
their arguments.618  In its unreported decision, the Southern District of 
 
608 Edmonds v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 161 F. App’x 6, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2005), aff’g 323 F. 
Supp. 2d 65 (D.D.C. 2004). 
609 Edmonds v. Dep’t of Justice, 546 U.S. 1031 (2005), denying cert. to Edmonds, 161 
F. App’x 6; see also Edmonds v. United States, 563 F. Supp. 2d 196 (D.D.C. 2008) (relat-
ing to a subsequent suit in which Edmonds sought relief under the Federal Tort 
Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671–2680 (2006), for her alleged loss of personal property 
when she was fired). 
610 For a brief overview of similar cases, see Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 9-11 (2005).  
See also Doe v. Tenet, 329 F.3d 1135, 1150-55 (9th Cir. 2003) (refusing to dismiss a 
breach of contract claim by former CIA spies), rev’d, 544 U.S. 1 (2005); Monarch As-
surance P.L.C. v. United States, 244 F.3d 1356, 1364-65 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (affirming a 
lower court’s approval of the invocation of state secrets privilege and vacating on other 
grounds); Monarch Assurance P.L.C. v. United States, 36 Fed. Cl. 324, 329 (1996) (de-
nying discovery to plaintiffs based on the CIA’s invocation of the state secrets privi-
lege), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 244 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
611 Doe v. CIA, No. 05-7939, 2007 WL 30099, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2007). 
612 Id. 
613 5 U.S.C. § 701–706 (2006). 
614 5 U.S.C. § 552(a). 
615 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). 
616 Doe v. CIA, 2007 WL 30099, at *1. 
617 Id. at *2. 
618 Reply Memorandum of Law in Further Support of the Government’s Assertion 
of the State Secrets Privilege and Motion to Dismiss This Action, Doe v. CIA, No. 05-
7939, at 15-17 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2006), 2006 WL 2588099. 
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New York dismissed the case on state secrets grounds.619  The Court of 
Appeals upheld the decision.620  Judge Sack wrote, “The plaintiffs have 
no right to use material that is alleged by the government to contain 
state secrets in order to participate in the district court’s review of the 
bona fides of the government’s allegation.”621 
E.  State Secrets as a Tactical Advantage 
At times, the executive merely threatens the potential application of 
state secrets without formally invoking the privilege.  For example, in 
Stevens v. United States, a civil suit brought in the context of the anthrax 
investigations, the government requested a stay to “provide a reasona-
ble opportunity for the United States to review the national security in-
formation implicated by Plaintiff’s allegations and to decide what must 
be protected by the state secrets privilege.”622  In Stillman v. Department 
of Defense, the CIA argued throughout nine months of briefing that 
more time was needed to determine whether the state secrets privilege 
applied.623  The Agency followed a similar course in Lee v. CIA, a First 
Amendment case centered on the public release of a screenplay.624  In 
none of these cases did the government invoke the privilege.625 
 
619 Doe v. CIA, 2007 WL 30099, at *3. 
620 Doe v. CIA, 576 F.3d 95, 108 (2d Cir. 2009). 
621 Id. at 97. 
622 Defendant United States of America’s Reply Memorandum in Support of Its 
Motion to Stay Proceedings at 10, Stevens v. United States, No. 03-81110 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 
5, 2004), 2004 WL 3705982; see also Defendant United States of America’s Memoran-
dum of Law in Support of Its Motion to Stay Proceedings app. at 1-9, Stevens v. United 
States, No. 03-81110 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 26, 2004) (declaration of Richard L. Lambert), 
2004 WL 3705981 (submitting an FBI declaration in support of the stay to consider the 
implications with regard to bioterrorism). 
623 See Stillman v. Dep’t of Def., No. 01-1342, at 3 (D.D.C. June 10, 2002) (recount-
ing how Stillman “engaged in ongoing negotiations with defendants over the classifica-
tion determination” from October 2000 until June 2001). 
624 See Reply to Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Ex-Parte Motion for Expe-
dited Proceedings at 5 n.5, Lee v. CIA, No. 03-0206 (D.D.C. Mar. 26, 2003), 2003 WL 
24251637 (noting that the CIA never acted on its threat to invoke state secrets).  
625 The pattern here is not that state secrets is couched as an affirmative defense 
(and thus subject to some modicum of reasonableness), but rather that the doctrine is 
merely mentioned as possible grounds for a formal stay of proceedings.  In the Stevens 
case, the United States did, however, enter a motion for a protective order under Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c), which the court granted on December 14, 2009.  
Stevens v. United States, No. 03-81110 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 14, 2009) (order granting mo-
tion for protective order). 
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The threatened use of state secrets is not a new phenomenon.626  It 
takes time for executive agencies to ascertain whether the privilege 
ought to apply.  It may not be immediately clear, at the outset, wheth-
er the state secrets privilege is implicated.  Classified material is, 
moreover, compartmentalized and difficult to evaluate.  Plaintiffs also 
should have early warning that the subsequent suit may be stalled be-
cause of the presence of classified information. 
At the same time, the advantages that may accompany even the 
threatened applicability of state secrets should not be discounted.  
Similar to the contractors discussed in Part I of this Article,627 the con-
sequent delays in litigation may make it difficult for plaintiffs with 
access to limited resources to stay the course.  They may be reluctant 
to proceed where little may ultimately come of their efforts—-
particularly where precedent may exist for the dismissal of similar cas-
es.  A latent conservatism may thereby attach to the proceedings. 
When the state secrets privilege is actually invoked and upheld, 
even where suits are not dismissed, it may have a profound effect on 
motions and related responses, attorneys’ correspondence with their 
clients, and the manner in which discovery unfolds.  Such considera-
tions extend beyond counsel being unable to ascertain exactly what 
information is secret, forcing them to make assumptions on issues 
central to their clients’ defense.628 
Consider Sterling v. Tenet, a state secrets case argued before the 
Southern District of New York, the Eastern District of Virginia, and 
the Fourth Circuit.629  Attorney for the plaintiff, Mark Zaid, drafted an 
opposition brief to the CIA’s invocation of the privilege, arguing that 
the information was not classified and, therefore, was inappropriate 
 
626 See, e.g., Defendant’s Motion for Protective Order at 3, Nat’l Westminster Bank, 
PLC v. United States, 44 Fed. Cl. 120 (1999) (No. 95-0758), 1996 WL 34427440 (assert-
ing that information that would be responsive to the plaintiff’s requests might be privi-
leged and that evaluating such information is burdensome). 
627 See supra Part I (suggesting that the affirmative defense of state secrets draws 
out litigation and may scare off litigants when the outcome of a multiyear court battle 
is uncertain). 
628 See, e.g., Complaint, Edmonds v. United States, 436 F. Supp. 2d 28 (D.D.C. 
2005) (No. 05-00540), 2005 WL 919242. 
629 Sterling v. Tenet, 416 F.3d 338, 343-44 (4th Cir. 2005); see also Memorandum of 
Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Complaint for Improper Venue or 
in the Alternative to Transfer Venue at 14-17, Sterling v. Tenet, 01-8073 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 
18, 2002) (arguing that the state secrets privilege compels either dismissal for improper 
venue or transfer to the Eastern District of Virginia for reasons of national security).  
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for state secrets designation.630  The Southern District agreed with Za-
id and denied the CIA’s motion; however, the CIA subsequently classi-
fied Zaid’s brief and accused him of having violated his secrecy 
agreement for having created a classified document on his work com-
puter.631  Thus, Zaid no longer had access even to his own arguments 
for the balance of the litigation.  The CIA reportedly confiscated the 
judicial opinion, which had been faxed to Zaid’s office.632  Zaid stated 
that eight months later, he received a heavily redacted document in its 
place.633  Zaid’s alleged violation of the secrecy agreement apparently 
became appended to his clearance file, with the possibility of being 
used in the future for an adverse determination.634 
According to Zaid, at the heart of the CIA’s position was the con-
cern that he had been granted a limited security approval and had 
subsequently signed a secrecy agreement, but then had not used se-
cure facilities to write the legal document.635  The secrecy agreement 
explained:  “[Y]ou may only review, create, store, and/or otherwise 
work with or handle classified information in an Agency secure area.”636  
The CIA would provide “paper and pens/pencils, stand-alone informa-
tion processing equipment (e.g., a personal computer), and storage fa-
cilities,” and “[o]nly Agency-provided equipment and facilities may be 
used to create documents containing classified information.”637  The 
document emphasized:  “You may neither create classified documents 
 
630 E-mail from Mark Zaid, esq., to author (Jan. 6, 2010, 14:04 EST) (on file with 
author). 
631 Id; see also Telephone Interview with Mark Zaid, Managing Partner, Mark S. 
Zaid., P.C. ( Jan. 12, 2010). 
632 Telephone Interview with Mark Zaid, supra note 631. 
633 Id. 
634 E-mail from Mark Zaid, supra note 630, attachment (“Secrecy/Non-Disclosure 
Agreement”) (on file with author). 
635 Telephone Interview with Mark Zaid, supra note 631.  Marilyn A. Dorn, Infor-
mation Review Officer for the National Clandestine Service of the CIA, described the 
procedure and scope of a limited security approval:   
A limited security approval is not a security clearance.  Rather, a limited secu-
rity approval is based on a CIA determination that the attorney has a need-to-
know some limited classified information, has had a favorable eligibility de-
termination based upon a background investigation that is more limited in 
scope than the background investigation required for a security clearance, 
and has signed a non-disclosure agreement specific to his or her representa-
tion of an individual employee. 
Declaration of Marilyn A. Dorn at 4, Doe v. CIA, No. 05-7939 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2006). 
636 E-mail from Mark Zaid, supra note 630, attachment at 2 (“Security Guidance for 
Representatives”) (on file with author). 
637 Id. 
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at your office, nor may you reconstruct classified documents from re-
dacted, unclassified documents stored at your office.”638 
What happens, though, when the CIA denies access to its facili-
ties?  How, then, is an attorney supposed to mount his or her case?  In 
the recent Second Circuit decision in Doe v. CIA, the agency refused to 
allow Zaid to use its facilities to submit a classified opposition to its 
state secrets motion.639  “The limited security approval,” the CIA ar-
gued, “does not authorize Mr. Zaid to have access to classified docu-
ments, draft classified documents, or file classified information with 
the Court, nor does it entitle him to use CIA facilities to communicate 
classified information or create classified documents.”640  The district 
court did not require the CIA to provide access to classified facilities: 
Plaintiffs’ arguments that denial of an opportunity for them to present 
classified information currently in their possession to the Court, and that 
the Government’s classification determinations and procedures have 
denied them meaningful access to the courts, were answered by the Su-
preme Court in Reynolds:  “even the most compelling necessity cannot 
overcome the claim of privilege if the court is ultimately satisfied 
that . . . secrets are at stake.”
641
 
In essence, the district court’s ruling prevented plaintiff’s counsel 




639 576 F.3d 95, 99-100 (2d Cir. 2009). 
640 Declaration of Marilyn A. Dorn, supra note 635, at 5.   Joseph H. Holthaus pro-
vided the following statement: 
 In sum, this process does not provide counsel with a “security clearance,” 
but provides counsel with a “security approval” for a specific case involving a 
specific client and grants that counsel access to a limited amount of classified 
information relating solely to the client’s identity and the client’s affiliation 
with the CIA, if an appropriate Agency official has first determined he has a 
need-to-know.  This process does not provide a blanket approval to view classi-
fied SECRET information. 
Declaration of Joseph H. Holthaus at 5, Lee v. CIA, No. 03-00206 (D.D.C. Mar. 17, 
2003). 
641 Doe v. CIA, No. 05-7939, 2007 WL 30099, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2007) (quoting 
United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 11 (1953)). 
642 E-mail from Mark Zaid, supra note 630.  The same attorney now faces a similar 
issue in Peter B. v. CIA, 620 F. Supp. 2d 58 (D.D.C. 2009), which is not yet a state secrets 
case but may well become one.  When Zaid requested use of secure facilities, the CIA 
responded:   
The Security Guidance for Representatives is a generic document which cov-
ers a variety of different legal matters involving the Agency and our personnel.  
The provision of an office-like area for discussions with your client and a 
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Even where access to facilities is granted, as a purely practical mat-
ter, it may be difficult to integrate classified and unclassified informa-
tion into legal documents.  The CIA, for instance, directs attorneys 
who have obtained clearances: 
Do not bring into Agency buildings items capable of storing or otherwise 
recording classified information, such as personal computers, tape re-
corders, or data storage media, and items capable of transmitting such 
information, such as telephones, modems, or facsimile equipment. . . .  
If you need to transfer unclassified information from your office’s in-
formation processing equipment other than Agency-provided informa-
tion processing equipment, please contact your designated Agency secu-
rity officer to make arrangements.
643
 
There are important reasons for these precautions.  For instance, 
the agency has a vested interest in protecting classified materials, es-
pecially those that pertain to its employees.  There is a risk that indi-
viduals may take information out of the building and use it in an in-
appropriate manner, threatening the well-being—and possibly the 
lives—of those who work there. 
At the same time, such provisions burden opposing counsel.  Attor-
neys may be reluctant to bring in too much information:  “Depending 
upon the items and the manner in which they are used, if brought into 
Agency facilities, these items may have to remain under Agency con-
trol.”644  An obvious associated question thus arises in relation to attor-
ney-client privilege:  to what extent is the privilege affected by these 
measures?  The security agreement states, “[a]ppropriate arrangements 
will be made to ensure that attorney-client privilege is preserved during 
the Agency’s review of documents for classification purposes.”645  Exactly 
how this is to be done, however, is not clear. 
The presence of state secrets also may play a role in eliminating or 
shaping the manner in which depositions are performed—even years 
into a suit and on a broad range of evidence.  One breach of contract 
case that came to fruition during the Bush Administration immediately 
 
stand-alone computer applies to those cases in which classified information is 
integral to the proceeding.  It is my understanding that, given the protection 
of your client’s identity (by calling him Peter B.) other pertinent case facts are 
(or can be re-worded to be) unclassified.  Furthermore, CIA will not provide 
nor allow the use of classified information in a civil proceeding. 
E-mail from Mark Zaid, supra note 630 (quoting the CIA’s response to his request). 
643 E-mail from Mark Zaid, supra note 630, attachment at 3 (“Security Guidance for 
Representatives”). 
644 Id. 
645 Id. at 2 (emphasis omitted). 
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comes to mind.  An Air Force contractor working on a missile system 
sued the United States for breach of contract and demanded millions 
in remuneration.646  In May 2006, the executive branch invoked the 
state secrets privilege.647  Although the parties tried to come to an 
agreement on their own in regard to the questions that could be posed 
to Darleen Druyun, the Air Force’s Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary 
for Air Force Acquisitions and Management, their failure to do so led to 
a court opinion heavily laden with state secrets considerations.648 
Other, less visible advantages may accrue in state secrets cases, tilt-
ing the scale towards the government.  The privilege’s invocation, for 
example, may give the state access to opposing counsel’s confidential 
files.  The clearest example comes from the eTreppid line of cases, 
which began on January 19, 2006, when eTreppid filed a complaint in 
a California state court against Dennis Montgomery, claiming that he 
had taken trade secrets with him when he left the company.649  In 
March 2006, the case was removed to federal district court in Neva-
da.650  On January 31, 2006, Montgomery filed a parallel action, alleg-
ing copyright infringement and related claims against eTreppid, War-
ren Trepp, and the U.S. Department of Defense.651  In both cases, the 
district court granted plaintiffs’ lead counsel, Michael James Flynn, 
pro hac vice applications on the grounds that he was licensed in Massa-
chusetts but residing in California.652  Director of National Intelligence 
John Negroponte invoked military and state secrets privilege.653  The 
Nevada district court issued sealed search warrants for Montgomery’s 
home and storage units.654  When Flynn filed a motion with the court to 
unseal the search warrants, the government challenged Flynn’s repre-
sentation of Montgomery in the search warrant proceeding, saying that 
Flynn had only been admitted pro hac vice for civil proceedings.655 
 
646 See Northrop Grumman Corp. v. United States, 63 Fed. Cl. 38, 38-40 (2004) 
(describing the facts of the dispute). 
647 Notice of Filing Classified, In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration, Northrop Grum-
man Corp. v. United States, No. 96-0760 (Fed. Cl. May 12, 2006). 
648 See, e.g., Northrop Grumman Corp. v. United States, 75 Fed. Cl. 761, 766-67 
(2007) (deferring to the Department of Defense’s position in denying plaintiff’s re-
quest to use classified documents to depose Druyun).  
649 Montgomery v. eTreppid Tech., LLC, No. 06-0056, 2009 WL 910739, at *1 (D. 
Nev. Mar. 31, 2009).  
650 Id. 
651 Id. at *3.  
652 Id. at *2. 
653 Id. at *4. 
654 Id. at *3. 
655 Id. at *4. 
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The government, however, did not stop with procedural considera-
tions.  It also challenged the validity of Flynn’s pro hac vice application, 
saying that Flynn regularly practiced law in California.656  Flynn retorted 
that he was being challenged because he was successful in getting the 
warrant partially unsealed and because the case was linked to political 
corruption (also at issue in the case was the alleged transfer of money to 
the state governor to secure a Department of Defense contract).657 
On July 9, 2007, Flynn and his cocounsel, Carla DiMare, moved to 
withdraw as counsel.658  The government responded that because the 
state secrets privilege had already been invoked, withdrawal of counsel 
was not routine; therefore, the government would impose conditions 
regarding documents in their client’s file.659  The plaintiff’s new attor-
neys evinced concern that under the guise of state secrets, the gov-
ernment was gaining access to privileged attorney-client materials that 
would substantially affect their case.660  Unlike many jurisdictions (in-
cluding California), Nevada law allows attorneys to file a retaining lien 
over client files until outstanding fees or bonds have been paid.661  On 
August 21, 2007, Flynn filed a motion for attorneys’ fees; eight days 
later, the district court issued a protective order, which Negroponte’s 
declaration invoking the state secrets privilege had supported.662  Be-
cause of the invocation, Nevada retained control of the client files.663  
Efforts to get the files through other means outside of Nevada met 
with legal sanctions against the new attorneys.664 
In sum, the use of the state secrets privilege may tip the scale to-
wards the government throughout the litigation.  Because the scho-
larly analysis of state secrets, however, has largely focused on final 
judicial opinions, the type and number of suits in which the state se-
crets doctrine has arisen, and the manner in which state secrets has 
influenced these suits, have gone largely unexplored. 
 
656 Id. 
657 See Motion to Dismiss/Stay Pursuant to CCP §§ 410.30(a), 418.10(a)(2) (Forum 
Non Conveniens) at 3-4, Montgomery v. Flynn, No. BC-375335 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 29, 
2007), 2007 WL 4680291 (explaining Nevada’s special interest in hearing the case, 
since it involved allegations of political corruption against its governor). 
658 eTreppid, 2009 WL 910739, at *6. 
659 Id. 
660 Id. 
661 Id. at *7. 
662 Id. at *9. 
663 Id. at *19-20. 
664 Id. at *34-35. 
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In each of the foregoing cases, the executive branch found itself 
in the position of defendant to a civil action, and either threatened to 
invoke or actually invoked the state secrets privilege.  But what about 
when the state finds itself in the position of prosecutor?  Notwith-
standing Judge Learned Hand’s admonition in United States v. Andol-
schek,665 between 2001 and 2009 the executive branch benefitted from 
the state secrets doctrine in the criminal context as well. 
IV.  CRIMINAL PROSECUTION 
The Sixth Amendment guarantees that “[i]n all criminal prosecu-
tions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have compulsory process 
for obtaining witnesses in his favor.”666  This right extends to documen-
tary as well as oral evidence.667  Thus, although the executive branch has 
the authority to suppress documents, even when the documents would 
contribute to settling controversies between third persons, the suppres-
sion of the same in criminal prosecutions, “founded upon those very 
dealings to which the documents relate, and whose criminality they 
will, or may, tend to exculpate” presents a different matter.668  In United 
States v. Andolschek, Judge Learned Hand explained: 
So far as they directly touch the criminal dealings, the prosecution nec-
essarily ends any confidential character the documents may possess; it 
must be conducted in the open, and will lay bare their subject matter.  
The government must choose; either it must leave the transactions in the 
obscurity from which a trial will draw them, or it must expose them fully.  
Nor does it seem to us possible to draw any line between documents 
whose contents bears [sic] directly upon the criminal transactions, and 
those which may be only indirectly relevant.  Not only would such a dis-
tinction be extremely difficult to apply in practice, but the same reasons 
which forbid suppression in one case forbid it in the other, though not, 




665 See United States v. Andolschek, 142 F.2d 503, 506 (2d Cir. 1944) (“While we 
must accept it as lawful for a department of the government to suppress docu-
ments, . . . we cannot agree that this should include their suppression in a criminal 
prosecution . . . .”). 
666 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
667 See United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187, 191 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (stating that it 
is sufficient to request documents that may be material); see also Wilson v. United 
States, 221 U.S. 361, 372 (1911) (“The right to resort to means competent to compel 
the production of written, as well as oral, testimony seems essential to . . . common 
law.” (citation omitted)). 
668 Andolschek, 142 F.2d at 506. 
669 Id.  Indeed, such sentiments reach back to the founding of the Republic.  In 
United States v. Burr, Chief Justice Marshall, sitting as Circuit Justice in the trial of for-
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 Two years later, the court in United States v. Beekman echoed this 
sentiment, stating that “when the government institutes criminal pro-
ceedings in which evidence, otherwise privileged under a statute or 
regulation, becomes importantly relevant, it abandons the privi-
lege.”670  Subsequent cases reinforced the executive’s duty either to 
produce the relevant information or to suffer dismissal.671  The Rey-
nolds court distinguished the civil suit before it ruled precisely on 
these grounds: 
The rationale of the criminal cases is that, since the Government which 
prosecutes an accused also has the duty to see that justice is done, it is 
unconscionable to allow it to undertake prosecution and then invoke its 
governmental privileges to deprive the accused of anything which might 
be material to his defense.
672
 
With the exception of Reynolds, each of these cases dealt with offi-
cial information or informer’s privilege.  Throughout the twentieth 
 
mer Vice President Aaron Burr, who was charged with treason and high misdemeanor, 
addressed a defense motion for the court to order a subpoena duces tecum to compel 
production of a letter in the custody of President Thomas Jefferson.  Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 
187-88.  Granting the motion, Justice Marshall observed 
it is a very serious thing, if such letter should contain any information ma-
terial to the defence, to withhold from the accused the power of making use 
of it. . . . The only ground laid for the court to act upon is the affidavit of 
the accused; and from that the court is induced to order that the paper be 
produced . . . . 
Id. at 192. 
670 United States v. Beekman, 155 F.2d 580, 584 (2d Cir. 1946); see also United 
States v. Krulewitch, 145 F.2d 76, 78-79 (2d Cir. 1944) (discussing when privilege to 
suppress communications is abandoned).  
671 See, e.g., Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 55 (1957) (counting as reversible 
error the lower court’s refusal to require the government to reveal an informer’s iden-
tity where it would have been relevant and helpful to the accused); Christoffel v. Unit-
ed States, 200 F.2d 734, 738 (D.C. Cir. 1952) (“If such evidence is under the control of 
a department of government charged with the administration of those laws for whose 
violation the accused has been indicted, and its production is refused, or it is excluded, 
the courts . . . have held a conviction will not be permitted without the evidence.” (ci-
tation omitted)), rev’d on other grounds, 345 U.S. 947 (1953); United States v. Grayson, 
166 F.2d 863, 870 (2d Cir. 1948) (reiterating that when the evidence in question is un-
der the control of the agency in charge of enforcing the allegedly broken law, the 
agency must produce the evidence in order to prosecute the charge successfully); 
United States v. Schneiderman, 106 F. Supp. 731, 738 (S.D. Cal. 1952) (saying the gov-
ernment must decide if public policy against disclosure is strong enough to warrant 
not prosecuting the defendant, but if it prosecutes, it must disclose relevant docu-
ments).  But see Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 352-56 (1959) (discussing cir-
cumstances in which the government should disclose evidence and concluding a prior 
statement used against the defendant need not be disclosed). 
672 United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 12 (1953). 
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century, the courts refrained from ever directly holding that the state 
secrets privilege could not be invoked in criminal prosecution.673  
Moreover, where the possible evidentiary value of a document to the 
defense was “clearly negligible,” the courts openly stated that national 
security concerns could trump the accused’s defense.674  Perhaps not 
surprisingly, this scenario appeared to be particularly common in 
times of war. 
For instance, one of the first reported cases to raise the state se-
crets privilege in the criminal realm, United States v. Haugen, centered 
on a World War II subcontractor who had agreed to furnish meals to 
workers at a plutonium plant.675  In the context of the prosecution for 
forging meal tickets, the court recognized that “[t]he right of the Army 
to refuse to disclose confidential information, the secrecy of which it 
deems necessary to national defense, is indisputable.”676  Twenty years 
later, Professor Zagel explained that “[t]he judicial temper is sympa-
thetic to claims of privilege based on national security during wartime, 
and Haugen was explicitly grounded on the existing state of war.”677 
Outside of wartime, though, questions related to secrecy continued 
to plague the status of state secrets in criminal law.  In 1952, for in-
stance, addressing reports by a prosecution witness to the FBI, a court 
held that the defendant was entitled to official information as a matter 
of right.678  In United States v. Coplon, the court acknowledged that the 
executive possessed a privilege against disclosing state secrets, but that 
this privilege could not prevent a defendant from accessing evidence 
to which she had a constitutional right.679  In a later prosecution for es-
pionage, the government dropped its case to avoid revealing its infor-
mer apparatus.680  By the mid-1960s, Professor Zagel observed that 
 
673 Zagel, supra note 9, at 904. 
674 Schneiderman, 106 F. Supp. at 736 (citing Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251 
(1938) (holding that an informer’s identity can be withheld from the defense when its 
evidentiary value is negligible)); cf. Zimmerman v. Poindexter, 74 F. Supp. 933, 936 (D. 
Haw. 1947) (denying that national security is an overriding policy consideration great 
enough to justify withholding information from a defendant). 
675 See United States v. Haugen, 58 F. Supp. 436, 437-38 (E.D. Wash. 1944) (dis-
cussing the issue of the Army’s disclosure of state secrets). 
676 Id. at 438 (citations omitted). 
677 Zagel, supra note 9, at 904. 
678 See Schneiderman, 106 F. Supp. at 738 (holding that any government privilege to 
withhold reports from inspection have been waived). 
679 See United States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629, 638 (2d Cir. 1950) (“[T]he refusal to 
allow the defense to see [the evidence] was . . . a denial of their constitutional right . . . .”). 
680 See David Anderson, U.S. Drops Trial of 2 in Spy Case; Cites ‘Security,’  N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 3, 1964, at 1 (noting that the government dropped the case because “the price of 
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“[c]onsidering these cases, it is impossible to state with precision the 
current status of the state secrets privilege in criminal prosecutions.”681 
The lack of clarity in the law and the possibility that individuals 
accused of crime could turn around and require classified informa-
tion for their defense (thus forcing the government either to reveal 
the information or to drop the prosecution), provided the impetus for 
the creation of the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA).682  
 
conviction may have been too high”).  Through the mid-twentieth century, the most 
common criminal cases where state secrets arose came under prosecutions for viola-
tion of the Espionage Act.  See Zagel, supra, note 9, at 905 (“Most criminal cases involv-
ing state secret claims arise under espionage laws . . . .”); Note, Secret Documents in Crim-
inal Prosecutions, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 1356, 1357 (1947) (“In the past[,] prosecution has 
usually been brought under the Espionage Act of 1917.”); see also generally Espionage 
Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 65-24, 40 Stat. 217 (repealed 1948). 
681 Zagel, supra note 9, at 904. 
682 See Pub. L. No. 96-456, 94 Stat. 2025 (1980) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. 
app. (2006)).  For the history that motivated CIPA, see S. REP. NO. 96-823, at 1-3 
(1980).  See also United States v. Fernandez, 887 F.2d 465, 466 (4th Cir. 1989) (explain-
ing that Congress enacted CIPA in 1980 to address what to do when a criminal defen-
dant threatens to reveal classified information); United States v. Sarkissian, 841 F.2d 
959, 965 (9th Cir. 1988) (“Congress passed CIPA to prevent . . . ‘graymail,’ where de-
fendants pressed for the release of classified information to force the government to 
drop prosecution.”); United States v. Pringle, 751 F.2d 419, 427 (1st Cir. 1984) (noting 
CIPA was enacted to respond to “graymail”); Matthew N. Kaplan, Who Will Guard the 
Guardians? Independent Counsel, State Secrets, and Judicial Review, 18 NOVA L. REV. 1787, 
1814 (1993) (discussing graymailing); Richard P. Salgado, Government Secrets, Fair Tri-
als, and the Classified Information Procedures Act, 98 YALE L. J. 427 (1988) (elaborating on 
the complications of balancing secrecy with defendants’ rights under CIPA).  For ex-
amples of such graymail attempts, see SUBCOMM. ON SECRECY AND DISCLOSURE, S. SE-
LECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, 95TH CONG., REP. ON NATIONAL SECURITY SECRETS AND 
THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 12-16 (Comm. Print 1978), discussing cases of grey-
mailing in various government institutions, and Classified Information Procedures Act, 
126 Cong. Rec. S28,811 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1980) (statement of Rep. Biden).  See also 
United States v. Wilson, 732 F.2d 404, 412 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding the district court 
did not err in quashing overly broad subpoenas which the government viewed as a ha-
rassment tactic); United States v. Wilson, 721 F.2d 967, 975-76 (4th Cir. 1983) (declin-
ing to find that the “exclusion of classified information . . . deprived the appellant of a 
fair opportunity to mount his defense”); United States v. Smith, 592 F. Supp. 424 (E.D. 
Va. 1984), vacated and remanded, 780 F.2d 1102 (4th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (holding the 
district court erred in failing to consider the government’s privilege when ordering 
disclosure of classified information); United States v. Wilson, 586 F. Supp. 1011, 1013-
17 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (discussing CIPA in relation to Wilson’s case and holding that he 
could testify that he worked in the intelligence community but could not testify about 
the covert operations); United States v. Irish People, Inc., 502 F. Supp. 63, 67 (D.D.C. 
1980) (upholding request to produce classified information for defense), rev’d on other 
grounds, 684 F.2d 928 (D.C. Cir. 1982); H.R. REP. NO. 96-831, pt. 1 at 8-10 (1980) (dis-
cussing cases in which the choice had to be made between disclosure of confidential 
information or dismissal of the case); Anthony Marro, Helms, Ex-CIA Chief, Pleads No 
Contest to 2 Misdemeanors, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1977, at 1 (regarding the case of Richard 
Helms, a former director of the CIA, in which the Department of Justice accepted his 
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This statute, introduced in 1980, establishes procedures for handling 
classified information in criminal prosecutions.683  It seeks to “pro-
tect[] and restrict[] the discovery of classified information in a way 
that does not impair the defendant’s right to a fair trial.”684  Section 4 
of CIPA establishes special procedures for discovery: 
 The [district] court, upon a sufficient showing, may authorize the 
United States to delete specified items of classified information from 
documents to be made available to the defendant through discovery un-
der the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, to substitute a summary of 
the information for such classified documents, or to substitute a state-
ment admitting relevant facts that the classified information would tend 
to prove.  The court may permit the United States to make a request for 




In 1998, in United States v. Klimavicius-Viloria, the Ninth Circuit in-
terpreted CIPA section 4 as a requirement for the government to first 
invoke state secrets.686  Assistant Attorney General David S. Kris and 
Assistant U.S. Attorney J. Douglas Wilson speculate that the possible 
premise underlying the Circuit’s decision is that the government is 
not allowed to withhold otherwise discoverable documents absent the 
invocation of a privilege: 
In other words, CIPA, standing alone, does not provide sufficient autho-
rization to allow the government to delete specified items of classified in-
formation from documents to be made available to the defendant 
through discovery under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, to 
substitute a summary of the information for such classified documents, 
or to substitute a statement admitting relevant facts that the classified in-
formation may tend to prove.
687
 
 Kris and Wilson, sharply critical of the decision, wrote, “No other 
court has accepted the Ninth Circuit’s view, and there is little to 
 
plea of nolo contendere to two misdemeanor counts for failing to provide full testimo-
ny to the Senate, because of concern about disclosure of classified information). 
683 “Classified information” is defined by the statute as “information or material 
that has been determined by the United States Government pursuant to an Executive 
order, statute, or regulation, to require protection against unauthorized disclosure for 
reasons of national security.”  18 U.S.C. app. § 1(a) (2006). 
684 United States v. O’Hara, 301 F.3d 563, 568 (7th Cir. 2002). 
685 18 U.S.C. app. § 4. 
686 See United States v. Klimavicius-Viloria, 144 F.3d 1249, 1261 (9th Cir. 1998) (“In 
order to show that material is classified, the government must make a formal claim of 
state secret privilege.”). 
687 DAVID S. KRIS & J. DOUGLAS WILSON, NATIONAL SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS AND 
PROSECUTIONS § 24:8 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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commend it.”688  In contrast to the utmost deference required in state 
secrets cases, CIPA requires that the government make a sufficient 
showing that classified information cannot be disclosed.689  Unlike 
state secrets, where only the director of an agency can invoke the pri-
vilege, CIPA allows any prosecutor to request section 4 procedures.690  
And where the privilege presents an absolute bar, CIPA contemplates 
a balance between the defendant’s right to mount a defense and the 
government’s right to secrecy.691 
Kris and Wilson say: 
The absolute protection provided by the state secrets privilege is also in 
tension with the defendant’s right under Brady v. Maryland to informa-
tion necessary to obtain a fair trial.  Applying the state secrets privilege to 
criminal cases would create the very problem that Congress sought to 
address by enacting CIPA:  forcing the government to decide between 
producing to the defendant sensitive classified information in discovery 
or invoking the privilege and preventing all disclosure of classified in-
formation . . . .
692
 
Between 2001 and 2009, a number of cases arose that pushed on 
the relationship between CIPA and state secrets.  On August 5, 2004, 
for instance, the FBI arrested Yassin Aref and Mohammed Hossain in 
a sting operation centered on the sale of surface-to-air missile launch-
ers to terrorist organizations.693  The thirty-count indictment charged, 
inter alia, conspiracy, attempt to commit money laundering, and ma-
terial support to a designated terrorist organization.694  The case, Unit-
ed States v. Aref, which involved top-secret code-word filings, affirmed 
the state secrets privilege’s applicability to CIPA cases in the criminal 
context. The court explained:  “It is important to understand that CI-
PA section 4 presupposes a governmental privilege against disclosing 
classified information.  It does not itself create a privilege.  Although 
Rule 16(d)(1) authorizes district courts to restrict discovery of evi-
dence in the interest of national security, it leaves the relevant privi-
 
688 Id. (footnote omitted).  
689 See id. (citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974)).  Note, how-




693 Brendan Lyons, Suspects Raise Domestic Spy Issue, TIMES UNION (Albany), Jan. 5, 
2006, at A1, available at http://albarchive.merlinone.net/mweb/wmsql.wm.request? 
oneimage&imageid=6376980. 
694 United States v. Aref, 533 F.3d 72, 76 (2d Cir. 2008). 
DONOHUE FINAL REVISED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/18/2010  11:10 AM 
210 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 159: 77 
lege undefined.”695  The court stated that “[t]he most likely source for 
the protection of classified information” was the common law state se-
crets privilege.696  This meant that the “classified information at issue 
in CIPA cases fits comfortably within the state-secrets privilege.”697  
The court flatly disagreed with the House of Representatives Select 
Committee on Intelligence, which had reported in its treatment of 
CIPA that state secrets did not apply to the criminal realm.698  “That 
statement,” the court wrote, “simply sweeps too broadly.”699  On the 
contrary, consistent with Klimavicius-Viloria, the court held the state 
secrets privilege applied: 
Reynolds, Andolschek, and Coplon make clear that the privilege can be 
overcome when the evidence at issue is material to the defense.  This 
standard is consistent with Roviaro v. United States, where the Supreme 
Court held in a criminal case that the Government’s privilege to withhold 
the identity of a confidential informant “must give way” when the infor-
mation “is relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is essen-
tial to a fair determination of a cause.”  Indeed, we have interpreted “re-
levant and helpful” under Roviaro to mean “material to the defense.”  We 
have also noted that the government-informant privilege at issue in Ro-
viaro and the state-secrets privilege are part of “the same doctrine.”
700
 
 Consistent with other circuits, the court thus “adopt[ed] the Ro-
viaro standard for determining when the Government’s privilege must 
give way in a CIPA case.”701  In this case, the court assumed that the 
 
695 Id. at 78 (citations omitted); see also H.R. REP. NO. 96-831, pt. 1, at 27 (1980) 
(noting that CIPA “is not intended to affect the discovery rights of a defendant”). 
696 Aref, 533 F.3d at 78 (citing Zuckerbraun v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 935 F.2d 544, 
546 (2d Cir. 1991)). 
697 Id. at 79. 
698 See H.R. REP. NO. 96-831, pt. 1, at 15 n.12 (1980) (“[T]he common law state 
secrets privilege is not applicable in the criminal arena.”). 
699 Aref, 533 F.3d at 79. 
700 Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60-61 
(1957), United States v. Saa, 859 F.2d 1067, 1073 (2d Cir. 1988), and United States v. 
Coplon, 185 F.2d 629, 638 (2d Cir. 1950)). 
701 Id. at 79-80; see also United States v. Klimavicius-Viloria, 144 F.3d 1249, 1261 
(9th Cir. 1998) (stating that information must be disclosed if it would materially alter 
the result of the proceeding); United States v. Varca, 896 F.2d 900, 905 (5th Cir. 1990) 
(holding that a declassified summary of evidence was sufficient because none of the 
redacted material would have helped the defendant’s case); United States v. Yunis, 867 
F.2d 617, 623 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (noting that a defendant is entitled to information help-
ful to his defense); United States v. Smith, 780 F.2d 1102, 1107-10 (4th Cir. 1985) (en 
banc) (balancing the interests of the public against those of the defendant); United 
States v. Pringle, 751 F.2d 419, 427-28 (1st Cir. 1984) (concluding that protective or-
ders were appropriate because the information in question was neither relevant to the 
case nor “helpful to the defense”). 
DONOHUE FINAL REVISED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/18/2010  11:10 AM 
2010] The Shadow of State Secrets 211 
classified information was discoverable, and it “agree[d] with the dis-
trict court that the Government had established a reasonable danger 
that its disclosure would jeopardize national security.”702  The undis-
closed information, however, was not material to the defense.703 
Extraordinarily, the court did not require that the head of the de-
partment with control over the information formally invoke the privi-
lege:  “We have previously excused the Government’s failure to comp-
ly with this formality where involvement of the department head 
would have been ‘of little or no benefit’ because disclosure of classi-
fied information was prohibited by law.”704  The court warned:  “Based 
on our holding today, however, we trust that this issue will not arise in 
future CIPA cases.”705 
Another case, against attorney Lynn Stewart, United States v. Ste-
wart, arose from charges related to unauthorized contact with and be-
havior relating to Shiekh Omar Ahmad Ali Abdel Rahman, who was 
serving a life sentence for “seditious conspiracy, solicitation of murder, 
solicitation of an attack on American military installations, conspiracy to 
murder, and a conspiracy to bomb.”706  The Second Circuit, in deciding 
this case, followed the court’s reasoning in Aref:  “CIPA,” the court 
wrote, “does not itself create a government privilege against the disclo-
sure of classified information; it presupposes one.”707  Roviaro provided 
guidance on the application of state secrets to the criminal realm.708 
Once again, the executive branch had not actually invoked the 
state secrets privilege—nor did it need to do so: 
We note, as we did in Aref, which postdated the district court’s order 
here, the absence of a formal public “claim of privilege[] lodged by the 
head of the department which has control over the matter, after actual 
personal consideration by that officer.”  As in Aref, we conclude that in 
the pre-Aref context, such a flaw “is not necessarily fatal,” and that “[i]t 
would ‘be of little or no benefit’ for us to remand for the purpose of hav-
 
702 Aref, 533 F.3d at 80. 
703 See id. at 80-81 (finding that the district court did not deny any material evi-
dence to the defendant). 
704 Id. at 80. 
705 Id. 
706 United States v. Stewart, 590 F.3d 93, 98 (2d Cir. 2009).  Rahman had been sub-
ject to “Special Administrative Measures” restricting his communications.  Id. 
707 Id. at 130. 
708 Id. at 131. 
DONOHUE FINAL REVISED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/18/2010  11:10 AM 
212 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 159: 77 
ing the department head agree that disclosure of the classified informa-
tion would pose a risk to national security here.”
709
 
The court stated:  “[T]he absence of the formal claim is not a tri-
vial matter.  We do not demean it. . . . We expect . . . we will not need 
to address [these omissions in the future] as the government is now 
well-informed of this obligation.”710  Other courts are beginning to fol-
low Aref in the conduct of criminal trials.711 
Both Aref and Stewart center on activity linked to more traditional 
areas of national defense.  But criminal cases from 2001 to 2009, deal-
ing with a variety of industries, similarly implicated state secrets.  In 
2005, for example, the Securities and Exchange Commission brought 
charges against former officers of Qwest Communications Interna-
tional for securities fraud.712  “[T]he company ha[d] classified con-
tracts with U.S. intelligence agencies.”713  Four defendants requested 
discovery of classified information related to U.S. intelligence, and 
one of the defendants who already had classified information in his 
possession wanted to use it in his defense to demonstrate that, far 
from misleading shareholders, the company had based its estimates 
on expected classified government contracts.714  They claimed that 
the NSA had “withheld the promised contracts as punishment after 
Qwest declined to help the NSA with a [sic] unspecified project that 
Nacchio believed was illegal.”715 Redacted versions of Nacchio’s ar-
gument, released in October 2007, suggest that the NSA had asked 
Qwest “to monitor and data-mine traffic on its own domestic net-
work” in February 2001 (seven months prior to the September 11th 
attacks), and that, after the attacks, the NSA had requested access to 
call-record databases.716  On November 19, 2007, J. Michael McCon-
 
709 Id. at 132 (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Aref, 533 F.3d 
at 80). 
710 Id. 
711 See, e.g., United States v. Hamama, No. 08-20314, 2010 WL 330375, at *3 (E.D. 
Mich. Jan. 21, 2010) (noting that “[t]he Second Circuit’s analysis [in Aref] is instructive”). 
712 SEC v. Nacchio, 614 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1166-67 (D. Colo. 2009). 
713 Declaration and Formal Claim of State Secrets and Statutory Privileges by J. Mi-
chael McConnell, Director of National Intelligence, Nacchio, 614 F. Supp. 2d 1164 (No. 
05-0480). 
714 Nacchio, 614 F. Supp. 2d at 1167. 
715 Ryan Singel, Feds Invoke Secrets Privilege to Limit Qwest CEO Defenses in Civil Suit, 
WIRED (Nov. 21, 2007, 9:42 AM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2007/11/feds-
invoke-sec. 
716 Id. 
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nell, Director of National Intelligence, invoked state secrets.717  “On 
May 1, 2008, the Court extended the State Secrets Protective Order,” 
stating that it would remain in place until lifted by the court.718 
It may be that where the government wants to invoke the protec-
tions of CIPA in order to protect classified information, it is necessari-
ly making a claim that the classified information is privileged from use 
in litigation—that is, that the state secrets privilege applies.  But this 
fact does not mean that the privilege can then trump the criminal de-
fendant’s constitutional rights to gain access to information relevant 
to the defense.  Here CIPA and state secrets depart:  while the latter 
might be said to overcome a civil litigant’s discovery interests, CIPA 
does not then trump a defendant’s right to mount a defense.  In other 
words, CIPA does not side with state secrets; rather, it instructs the 
judge to impose a sanction, which may include dismissal of the 
charges.  Perhaps the salient point, if the Ninth Circuit’s position is 
accurate, is that CIPA cases need to hold the government to the Rey-
nolds formalities—a position that does not appear to reflect the cur-
rent practice. 
V.  THE LONG SHADOW 
The cases addressed in this Article represent some, but not all, of 
the state secrets cases to emerge from 2001 through 2009.719  Collec-
tively, they present a formidable challenge to analyses that narrowly 
base their conclusions about state secrets on published judicial opi-
nions specifically ruling on the privilege.  They suggest that the sha-
dow of state secrets is much longer than previously realized—indeed, 
that the state secrets doctrine has expanded well beyond the framing 
of Reynolds to become a powerful litigation tool for both private and 
public actors.  A number of insights from this more careful exposition 
present themselves. 
 
717 Robert S. Woodruff’s Motion for a Protective Order Staying His Deposition Un-
til the Disposition of His Motion to Dismiss at 2, Nacchio, 614 F. Supp. 2d 1164 (No. 05-
0480) [hereinafter Woodruff’s Motion for Protective Order]; see also The United States’ 
Consolidated Reply in Support of its Motion for Entry of Protective Order at 2, Nacchio, 
614 F. Supp. 2d 1164 (No. 05-0480) (discussing McConnell’s assertion of privilege). 
718 Woodruff’s Motion for Protective Order, supra note 717, at 2. 
719 See, e.g., Defendants’ Answer Brief at 16, Al-Turki v. FBI Document Custodian, 
No. 06-1076 (D. Colo. Oct. 26, 2007), 2007 WL 3195129 (asserting state secrets privi-
lege over classified documents and information being submitted ex parte, in camera); 
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and Brief in Support Thereof at 30-33, 
Abdel-Hafiz v. Fox Entm’t Group, Inc., No. 096-204518-04 (Tex. Dist. Apr. 5, 2008), 
2008 WL 5687221 (listing materials that the Justice Department refused to produce). 
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The executive branch appears to have a fairly conservative ap-
proach to intervening in third party disputes, particularly when class 
action torts, conduct of war, or foreign state secrets cases present 
themselves.  In contrast, the executive seems more likely to become 
involved when breach of contract, trade secrets, or patent disputes are 
at issue.  Such suits take many years to unfold, and once the executive 
branch invokes state secrets, subsequent administrations hold the line.  
The range of technologies, disputes, and types of activities being chal-
lenged appears to be steadily expanding.  However, considering that 
the War on Terror is still in its early stages, and that such cases may 
span decades, exactly how most of these suits will evolve is unknown.  
What is remarkable is that, notwithstanding Reynolds, corporations in 
the first instance are citing state secrets as an affirmative defense.  
Even where the government does not intervene in commercial dis-
putes, corporate entities gain a significant tactical advantage by raising 
its specter.  This gives rise to concern about the emergence of a new 
form of graymail, as well as the impact of the mere reference to state 
secrets in the course of litigation. 
The telecommunications cases related to the NSA’s warrantless 
wiretapping program stand apart from the general third-party cases.  
Here the government has acted variously as plaintiff, intervenor, and 
defendant.  Although none of the forty-six cases dismissed under the 
MDL turned on the invocation of state secrets, the privilege played a 
key role throughout.  The executive’s decision to invoke state secrets 
in this set of cases rested on a closely held executive branch jurispru-
dence—suggesting that this body of opinions may be relevant to un-
derstanding operation of the privilege.  This set of suits also reveals a 
parallel effect:  when invoked in one case, courts may treat similarly 
positioned cases as though the state secrets privilege has been as-
serted, even in the absence of a formal invocation thereof.  The tele-
communication suits also bring to the fore the major battles between 
the branches that mark invocations of the privilege. 
In suits alleging such varied legal claims as Fourth and Fifth 
Amendment violations, the abrogation of international law, environ-
mental degradation, wrongful termination, unlawful discrimination, 
defamation, and breach of contract, the executive invoked the state 
secrets privilege as part of its own defense.  These cases suggest that, at 
times, the privilege is used not just to protect national security inter-
ests, but to hide officials’ bad behavior.  A different type of cost 
presents itself in allowing state secrets privilege to apply in cases claim-
ing constitutional violations, as opposed to civil suits between private 
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parties.  As in third-party disputes and the telecommunications realm, 
once the executive branch invokes the state secrets privilege, it holds 
its course—even when it does not seem in its best interests to do so.  
Perhaps this should not come as a surprise:  even where cases are not 
dismissed, the advantage of invoking the privilege goes well beyond 
simply suppressing a document, influencing motions, protecting at-
torney-client communications, and controlling discovery.  In at least 
one case, the privilege provided the government with opposing coun-
sel’s client files once the attorney tried to withdraw from the case. 
The final set of cases considered in this Article focused on the 
criminal context.  Despite historical concern about prosecutorial use 
of state secrets, a number of courts have upheld the state secrets privi-
lege in criminal cases, suggesting that the common law privilege pre-
cedes CIPA section 4 procedures.  The circuits, however, do not ap-
pear to be in agreement on this point, and commentators have been 
quick to criticize courts who have taken this line.  What is remarkable 
here is that, in at least two cases, the executive branch did not even 
have to invoke the state secrets privilege—as required by Reynolds.  In-
stead, the court, issuing a mild admonition, simply assumed that it 
had been asserted and, therefore, applied. 
Failure to appreciate the extent to which state secrets doctrine 
now permeates substantive law sidesteps the difficult question of 
whether the law is what it appears to be.  Few people realize by reading 
tort law that private contractors who possess state secrets are exempted 
from their duties to behave nonnegligently.  Pari passu, employment 
law, patent law, contract law, environmental law, and criminal law—in 
these and other areas, private and public actors can bypass the values 
and goals that animate the law.  Evidence from the 2001 to 2009 pe-
riod suggests that this is done with some regularity, and that the exer-
cise of associated power distorts the course of litigation. 
Judging by the number of lawsuits that emerged from 2001 to 2009, 
the use of the state secrets privilege is not going to subside.720  If any-
thing, new issues, such as the emergence of graymail, will present them-
selves.  Neither the DOJ guidelines, which lack an enforcement me-
chanism and are narrowly limited to the DOJ’s exercise of the state 
secrets privilege (i.e., not the invocation of the same by the DoD, the 
 
720 Indeed, new states secrets cases continue to arise.  See, e.g., Opposition to Plain-
tiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ 
Motion to Dismiss, Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, No. 10-1469 (D.D.C. Sept. 25, 2010); Com-
plaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, No. 10-1469 (D.D.C. 
Aug. 30, 2010). 
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CIA, or the State Department), nor the statutes currently before Con-
gress have grasped the extent to which the state secrets privilege oper-
ates.  The reason is because these “solutions” are built on only a partial 
understanding of the problem—one based narrowly on published judi-
cial opinions ruling on the invocation of the privilege. 
By looking more carefully, however, at the range of cases in which 
state secrets plays a role, a different picture emerges.  At a minimum, 
the evidence shows that the doctrine is engaged more often and in 
different ways than have previously been presumed.  This suggests that 
it warrants more attention from the legislative branch in its oversight 
function, from the courts in their Article III capacity, and from the 
executive branch in its decision to invoke the privilege.  The struc-
tures and procedures that would best meet the concerns raised in this 
Article, while safeguarding the purpose for which the doctrine was 
created, remain a subject for future work. 
 
